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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to demonstrate the 
usefulness of the concept of public participation to the 
areas of forecasting stock market and security trends. The 
concept was applied to forecasting trends for both the 
aggregate market and individual securities in order to de­
termine whether or not there was application to either area 
or to both areas. It was hypothesized that the public 
majority was usually wrong in the stock market. This 
hypothesis implied that a public majority was actually in 
existence in the market, as well as an informed minority.
It was also implied that activities of the various groups 
could be measured. Empirical data used to test the hypothe­
sis were taken from past stock market trading.
Several indicators guided the investigation. The 
Monthly Credit Balance, the Monthly Debit Balance, the 
Balance Index, and the Short Sales Index were the primary 
indicators employed to test the aggregate market. Respective­
ly, these indicators represented the round-lot public, the 
professional speculator, the odd-lot public, and the odd-lot 
short seller. By testing these indicators, each of the 
different groups present in the market was tested. The 
indicators were determined for time periods surrounding each 
market juncture from 1956 to 1967, Since one's financial
ix
acumen is seriously tested at each reversal of trend in the 
market, the astuteness of the public was tested primarily 
at the junctures. A portion of each trend was also covered.
The following conclusions were reached with regard to 
the aggregate market:
1. The public was usually wrong at the critical 
junctures in the market. However, they were 
right during a portion of the trends.
2. Although the public was essentially correct in 
purchasing securities at the bottom, they were 
incorrect in selling securities at the beginning 
of the advance.
3. The public illustrated an apparent skepticism 
for new trends until these trends became well 
established.
4. The majority apparently was induced to partici­
pate by news, tips, and advisory services.
Such inducements seemed to be too late to be of 
real value.
Since odd-lot data are available on some individual 
securities, the concept of public participation was applied 
to individual issues. The following conclusions were reached 
with regard to individual securities:
1. Heavy public buying usually weakened the stock 
technically, thus restricting its advance or 
resulting in a downward movement.
2. Heavy public (odd-lot) selling generally 
strengthened the stock technically, thus fostering 
an upward move or restricting a move on the 
downside.
3. Odd-lot data seemed to be more meaningful when 
used in conjunction with the relative strength 
measurement.
x
On the basis of these conclusions, the hypothesis 
of the study was accepted with qualification. The public 
was generally wrong, but it was primarily wrong at the 
critical junctures or turning points of the market. The 
public was generally correct during a portion of the major 
trend. This study did prove that an informed minority and 
an uninformed majority do exist in the stock market. It 
is recognized that more work is needed on the public par­
ticipation concept, but it is believed that the present 
research has suggested areas of further investigation.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I find more and more that 
it is well to be on the side of 
the minority, since it is always 
the more intelligent.
-- Goethe
Garfield A. Drew, a keen student of stock market 
psychology, says, "Every successful speculator and every 
student of psychology knows that the mass of people are 
less intelligent than the few."1 Drew asserts that "... 
only 5 percent of the population think for themselves,
10 percent copy the 5 percent, and 85 percent believe what
2
they read and hear, and do what they are told."
From Drew’s observations, one could conceivably 
classify people into three distinct categories: innovators,
imitators, and incompetents. Therefore, success apparently 
is reserved for those who have the creativity and ability 
to think and reason for themselves.
^■Garfield A. Drew, New Methods for Profit in the Stock 
Market (Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 196&),
p. T6$.
2Ibid., p. 170.
Humphrey B. Neill, the Vermont Ruminator and the 
world's foremost contrarian, says there are but "three
3
types of thinkers--thoughtful, thoughtless, and emotional." 
Neill's statement obviously lends credence to the thoughts 
and theories of Drew. If one is thoughtful, he is an inno­
vator (5 percent) and thinks for himself; if one is thought­
less, he lacks the ability to think and has to resort to 
being an imitator (10 percent); and if he implements 
decisions which are based on emotion, he is an incompetent 
(85 percent).
The aforementioned three terms may be applicable to 
most segments of society, but special attention will be 
focused on the stock market. These emotional and thought­
less opinions probably have been dissipated widely from
A
"imitation and contagion."
Since individuals are categorized in accordance with 
their thought processes, behavior patterns, and actions in 
society, it would doubtless be helpful to attempt to 
classify stock market participants on a similar basis in 
connection with their activities in the market. If such 
categories also have application to the stock market, one
3Humphrey B. Neill, The Art of Contrary Thinking 
(Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers,X t d ., 1963), p. 136.
4These terms have been borrowed from an eminent French 
Sociologist who authored an interesting treatise on mob or 
crowd actions and behavior patterns. For a treatment and 
development of these concepts, see Gustave LeBon, The Crowd 
(New York: The viking Press, Inc., 1966).
3may develop a valuable forecasting tool to aid in the 
determination of market trends. By acting concurrently 
with the informed 5 percent, one should enjoy success in 
the stock maVket.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF INVESTORS
Graham, Dodd, and Cottle state that, "It would be most 
useful to classify security buyers into two groups-- 
defensive investors and aggressive or enterprising in­
v e s t o r s . T h e y  further state that "Defensive investors 
are those who should place their chief emphasis upon 
freedom from effort, annoyance, and the necessity for making 
frequent investment decisions."6 The distinguishing feature 
of the aggressive or enterprising investor "is their 
willingness and ability to devote time and care to the
*7
selection of sound and attractive investments."
Although these classifications are generally accepted 
throughout the investment field, they will not be employed 
in this study. If one were willing to circumvent precise 
interpretation of the above terms, it might be feasible to 
accept these classifications. However, if innovators, 
imitators, and incompetents are actually present in the
^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, 
Security Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
I nc., 1^62) , jp. 56.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., p. 67.
stock market, other classifications must be devised. 
According to Drew, Neill,® and Walter A. Heiby,^ there are 
three much more appropriate categories to portray the 
general characteristics of security buyers. These three 
types of market participants can be grouped roughly into 
the following divisions:
1. Investors. The investors are individuals who are 
primarily seeking dividend income and long-term 
appreciation as opposed to dividend income plus 
immediate capital appreciation. This classification 
encompasses the "defensive investors" who lack the 
time, knowledge, and ability to engage competently in 
security analysis or market analysis for a livelihood 
or to any greater degree than a part-time basis. 
Industrial corporations, corporate pension funds, 
mutual funds, and other institutional investors are to 
be included under this classification.
2. Professionals. The professionals are the real 
elite of the market place. They are the minority or 
5 percent, the innovators mho think for themselves. 
Professionals supposedly do not place reliance on news,
Q
See Humphrey B. Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics 
(Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publxsning Company, I960).
o
See Walter A. Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through 
Dynamic Synthesis (Chicago, Illinois: The Institute of
Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., 1965).
5tips, and gossip to enjoy stock market success. Pro­
fessionals are allegedly not swayed by "propaganda" 
in the execution of their decisions. A very inter­
esting analogy can be drawn between investment 
professionals and golf professionals. Both groups are 
in the minority and thrive on the majority for their 
living. Golf pros sell their services and advice for 
exorbitant prices to the uninformed majority of golfers 
who have illusions of shooting par. Investment pro­
fessionals likewise sell their large inventories of 
securities at exorbitant prices to the uninformed 
majority who dream of stock market fortunes. In effect, 
investment professionals apparently buy securities at 
wholesale prices and sell them at retail prices to the 
unknowing majority. The public, or the alleged imi­
tators and thoughtless, theoretically buy high and 
sell low, the converse of stock market Utopia.
Included in the professional category are the 
intelligent speculators, stock exchange floor-traders, 
investment bankers, large investors, and a few small 
investors who are conversant with predictive techniques 
and have the foundation and framework to forecast 
market trends and security trends with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy. Also included as professionals 
are the "insiders," who are executives of large, well- 
established corporations, and who are in the strategic 
position to act upon news pertaining to their corpora­
tion before it is published.
63. Public. According to Neill, Drew, and Heiby, this 
group is largely composed of the 85 percent, the un­
thinking majority. It consists of the millions of 
ill-advised, uninformed investors and speculators, 
including many businessmen speculators, brokerage- 
office traders, and the many thousands of gullible 
amateurs who are deluded into thinking they can 
capitalize on "easy money" opportunities. Many members 
of the majority can probably be detected by their 
habitual trading in odd-lot quantities, or quantities 
which number less than one hundred shares. Although 
there are some astute odd lotters, the odd-lot traders 
in the aggregate are reputed to lack the financial 
acumen of the professionals.
Groups two and three will tend to dominate discussion 
throughout the investigation. It is a premise of this study
that the "investors" do not purchase in quantities which are
commensurate with the quantities purchased by the pro­
fessionals and the public. The defensive, conservative 
investors could not possibly purchase even a small fraction 
of the stocks which are exchanged in one day alone.
II. APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF THE STOCK MARKET
In view of the many pronounced bull and bear markets 
of previous periods, there apparently exists a profound 
feeling of obligation among most market analysts to detect 
these trends prior to their actual inception. When one
delves into the area of forecasting stock-market trends, it 
becomes self-evident that there exists a major dichotomy 
cmcng the prediction doctrines.
On the one hand, there is the doctrine of the funda­
mentally-oriented analyst who bases his prognosis on such 
factors as earnings, dividends, book values, economic out­
looks, company outlooks, industry outlooks, and government 
contracts. In addition, he is concerned with price-earnings 
ratios, rates of capitalization, sales of durable goods, 
production indexes, and governmental attitudes and outlooks. 
The doctrine of technical thought, on the other hand, does 
not include many of the factors which are so revered by the 
fundamentalist. The technician is occupied with such 
factors as charts, price, volume, short position, odd-lot 
statistics, and breadth of market data.
It is doubtful that the fundamental approach could be 
useful as the major approach in this study, because funda­
mentalists give little or no consideration to the partici­
pation of the public in their prognosis of future market 
gyrations. The technical approach, by its emphasis on odd- 
lot statistics, debit balances, and credit balances, 
provides the market analyst with a better conceptual frame­
work of public participation which may be useful in rendering 
future projections. Garfield Drew advocates the technical 
approach by stating:
There have been frequent occasions when technical 
analysis was the only thing that could possibly have 
given the correct answer to the future trend of the 
market. This was true, for example, in the spring
8of 1946. If any investor had then possessed a 
crystal ball which would have shown him what 
corporate earnings were to be a year later, he 
could only have concluded that stock prices 
would be considerably higher. Instead, they 
were substantially lower in the face of record 
earnings and dividends.
To rebuff the non-believers, other examples may be cited.
From 1950 to 1952, there was a complete divergence between
earnings and the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. The earning
power of the Industrials dropped from $30.70 in 1950 to
$24.78 in 1952. During the same time span, the Industrial
Average rose eighty-five points. Had one adhered solely to
the fundamentals, he would have abstained from the market
at a time when it counted most to participate.
It is also meaningful to investigate the situation in
1957 and 1958. The earning power of the Dow-Jones
Industrials dropped from $36.08 in 1957 to $27.95 in 1958.
A concurrent drop was also registered in dividends, as they
dipped from $21.61 in 1957 to $20.00 in 1958. For the
complete 1957-58 period, the Industrial Average climbed
109 points. Fundamentals alone apparently do not suffice.
Other examples could be cited, but it is now time to
turn attention to other matters of concern. The discussion
will now center around the scope of the study.
10Drew, o£. cit.,- p. 242.
^These examples are derived from data taken from 
selected issues of Barron's National Business and Financial 
Weekly.
9III. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The objective of this investigation is to determine the 
actual perspicacity of the stock market majority or the so- 
called ''public” investors. It has often been theorized that 
the informed fern are much more apprised of developments and 
happenings than are the uninformed majority. This investi­
gation will concentrate on testing the application of the 
above proposition in the stock market. Although much 
interest is devoted to the area of forecasting market trends 
and security trends, primary attention will be focused on 
the public and its importance in determining such trends.
Now that the scope of the problem has been explored, 
it is necessary to determine the limitations which will be 
imposed on the study.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
As in most studies concerning the stock market, various
limitations are involved. The investigation has benefitted
very much from the brilliance of hindsight. It is an
eternal truism that perception is much keener in retrospect
than in prospect. Dr. Sloan J. Wilson, eminent market
author and Professor of Medicine at Kansas University
School of Medicine, says that "the retrospectroscope is one
12of the most infallible diagnostic instruments known."
■*-2Sloan J. Wilson, Public participation in the Stock 
Market (Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 1966),
17.
10
To be sure, hindsight is very revealing. After all, the 
practice of medicine is predicated almost completely on 
events which have occurred in the past. Although some un- 
know ni ng individuals possess adamant attitudes toward the 
importance and value of hindsight, many successful specu­
lators view the "retrospectroscope" as the surest way to 
profit. It is perhaps the unwritten creed of successful 
speculators that success is based on the supposition that 
people (namely tne public majority) will continue in the 
future to make the same mistakes that they have in the past.
Neill, however, takes exception to any form of extra­
polation concerning the stock market or the economy. 
Extrapolation, as defined by Webster, is "to project by 
inference into an unexplored situation from observations in 
an explored field, on assumption of continuity or corre­
spondence." Neill concedes that statistical extrapolation 
is of real advantage, but he states that "the distinction
when and when not to trust extrapolation would arise when
13the human factor is involved." Neill continues by 
stating:
That it is a fallacy to rely upon extrapolation 
in making economic forecasts becomes evident, I 
believe, when you stop to realize that what is 
occurring at any given time may be the cause of a 
complete shift and reversal of the extrapolated 
trends. Obviously, this is witnessed in the 
revolutions of the business cycle: a boom brings
on a bust (or used to!) and the lesser gyrations.^-4
*3Neill, o£. cit., p. 169.
14Ibid., pp. 169-170.
11
According to Neill, extrapolation is perhaps most 
dangerous when it falls into the hands of the majority. He 
says that the majority of people are characteristically 
optimistic and bullish. As a result, they are inclined to 
extrapolate the prosperity and buoyancy of the present. 
Societal conditions in the future are perceived by the 
majority as an extension of themselves, where perennial 
optimism reigns supreme. Consequently, most people have a 
very short memory. However, as Santayana once said: "He
who cannot remember the past is condemned to repeat it."15
Despite some uncertainty in the assumption that history 
will repeat itself, it is wise to review the enunciation of 
the immortal Patrick Henry: "I have but one lamp by which
my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience. I 
know of no way of judging the future but by the past."1^ 
Heiby asserts: "No science can ever give an exact picture
of the universe... Perfection in the understanding of the
1 7
laws of nature is an impossible goal."
Reliance on hindsight should be construed as a limi­
tation in this study. To reiterate, however, retrospect 
has been very beneficial in the past. One should recall an 
old aphorism that reads, "The best prophet of the future is 
the past."
15As quoted by Karl N. Kaiser, "Timing Technology," 
Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques (Larchmont, New 
York: Investors Intelligence^ Inc., 1965), p. 465.
16From Patrick Henry’s speech given in the Virginia 
House of Delegates, March 23, 1775.
17Heiby, o|>. cit. , p. 10.
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V. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
Debit balances, credit balances, and odd-lot data are 
employed in the study to depict the participation of the 
public at critical junctures in the market. The data will 
be used in conjunction with the Standard and Poor's Average 
to determine whether or not public activity is indeed a 
valuable forecasting tool. It can be stated that indicators 
are either leading, lagging, or coincident. By means of 
charts and tables, the aforementioned data will be analyzed 
to judge the type of indicator represented by the data.
The charts and tables will be employed from 1956 to 
June, 1967. Such an extended period is representative, 
since it will encompass major market cycles and trends.
There will be major trends, reactions, and sharp reversals 
to witness and apply the indicators. All data will be 
analyzed at the critical junctures of the market from 1956 
to June, 1967. The analysis of each market juncture during 
the above time interval will help one draw a conclusion as 
to the validity and reliability of the indicators. In 
addition, the financial acumen of the public or majority 
will be subjected to close scrutiny.
Many individuals feel that forecasting market trends 
is analogous to forecasting the weather--there is nothing 
that one can do about it. This study takes exception to 
such a statement and will seek to disprove it.
Since the data for the Debit Balances and Credit
13
■alances are published monthly, they are employed on a 
monthly basis. Odd-lot data have been converted to a meekly 
basis, although such data may be obtained daily. All indi­
cators are employed prior to each juncture, coincident with 
the juncture, and immediately following each juncture.
In addition to the data employed for purposes of fore­
casting the aggregate market, odd-lot data are also applied 
to individual securities. Such data are available on a 
weekly basis, but they are utilized quarterly to determine 
the effect of public participation on individual securities 
as well as the aggregate market. Stocks which are charac­
terized by heavy public participation during a quarterly 
interval are grouped together for each quarter from June, 
1965, to June, 1967. The same procedure is then applied 
for those stocks which are characterized by a lack of public 
activity or interest. Then, stocks are randomly selected 
from each of the two groups to determine the effect of 
public interest on the market performance of the stock.
The testing period for individual securities encompasses 
two bull markets and one bear market, providing an ample 
framework to test the theory of public participation with 
individual stocks.
Thus, the methodology employed should marshall to­
gether the data and facts and make the investigation very 
intelligible. In addition, the analysis may prove to be a 
valuable technical approach in forecasting market trends, 
which is in turn an essential ingredient in the analysis 
of any individual security.
14
Attention now turns to the preview to the presentation 
and to the sequence of employment of the aforementioned 
indicators.
VI. PREVIEW TO THE PRESENTATION
As was seen earlier in this section, people supposedly 
lend themselves to certain definable categories. It is 
hypothesized that the stock market also possesses the imi­
tators and the thoughtless, the non-thinking 95 percent.
This group will be termed the crowd or public. Throughout 
the investigation, these two terms will be used inter- 
changably. The remaining 5 percent, the innovators or the 
thinkers, are termed professionals. This study will try to 
determine whether or not there is in fact a professional 
element or informed minority in the stock market. If pro­
fessionals are in existence, they are to be segregated from 
the crowd because they have the distinct ability to think, 
to supplant emotion with judgment, and to dissuade them­
selves from being led astray by propaganda designed to 
disillusion the masses. If there is actually an informed 
minority in the stock market, then the public or majority is 
doubtless victimized. If public constituents are victimized, 
they apparently lack creativity and the ability to think and 
are thus easily swayed by advice and propaganda.
Chapter II deals with the "opinions of others" on the 
basic actions of crowds. The opinions of eminent authors 
are essentially studied to provide a conceptual framework 
of crowd conduct, especially during manias. The factor of
15
human emotion is investigated to ascertain influences on 
both the professional element and the crowd or public. 
Chapter II also seeks to determine from other opinions 
which group is truly objective, and what role the concept 
of objectivity plays in successful stock market participa­
tion.
Chapter II also contains a brief discussion of the 
"Theory of Contrary Thinking," formulated by Humphrey Neill. 
Although Neill is not a market analyst or technician, many 
expert analysts believe that there is definite applicability 
of this theory to the stock market. Opinions of other 
authors are then explored to determine the possible effect 
of news, tips, advice, and brokers on both the professional 
and public elements.
Chapter III marks the beginning of the empirical evi­
dence used to test the hypothesis. This chapter concerns 
the debit and Credit Balances, an area which has undergone 
little investigation thus far. Both Balances are investi­
gated at all market junctures in order to determine their 
usefulness as an indicator. From the analysis, it should be 
possible to derive a relationship between the balances and 
the market trends and reversals. It will be determined 
whether the Balances are leading, lagging, or coincident 
indicators.
Chapter IV investigates the Odd-Lot Theory and the 
thesis that the "little man" is always wrong in the market. 
Odd-lot indicators are tested on a weekly basis at critical 
market junctures to see if the theory has any validity.
16
Correlation between the odd-lot data and market trends will 
be revealed.
Chapter V seeks to determine whether or not the Odd- 
Lot Theory is applicable to situations involving individual 
securities. Tests are applied to the securities on a 
quarterly basis for a period of two years to determine 
whether or not odd-lot data are actually a worthwhile indi­
cator of security trends for the technical student of the 
stock market.
Chapter VI attempts to synthesize all of the previously 
mentioned indicators and determine the over-all importance 
of public participation in the stock market. Judgment will 
be passed as to which indicator is the most efficient, 
which indicators give the first and most reliable signal at 
tops and bottoms, and which indicator best serves as a 
warning to detect the entrance of the public.
In conclusion, it is hypothesized that the role of the 
participation by the uninformed majority is an essential 
criterion in predicting future market moves as well as 
trends for individual issues. The problem is to determine 
the extent that the uninformed majority affects the stock 
market, if such a group does in fact exist. It is also of 
major interest to see how the crowd acts during typical 
bull and bear markets, as well as during the recurring 
secondary reactions. Conduct of the masses is closely 
scrutinized at market junctures, the critical points where 
the market is headed for a pronounced reversal of trend.
17
Finally, a sharp eye is focused on the public's degree of 
participation at bull market tops and bear market bottoms 
in order to test and judge their timing, astuteness, and 
over-all market acumen.
Before the participation of the public can be analyzed 
from a technical standpoint, the groundwork must be laid to 
gain a basic insight into the general conduct of crowds.
Such groundwork will be formed by devoting special attention 
to analyses of crowd action by others who have witnessed 
the speculative manias of the past. By understanding crowd 
actions and behavior, it will expedite the understanding of 
public behavior in the stock market.
CHAPTER II
EXPERT OPINIONS ON PUBLIC BEHAVIOR
Where all think alike, 
no one thinks very much.
-- Walter Lippmann 
According to Henry H. Harper,* the stock market is one 
of the better examples of crowd action, non-thinking, and 
conformity. As Harper once said:
There are four subjects on which advice, however 
good, is generally wasted— politics, stock specula­
tion, religion, and love; for in these matters 
grown-ups rarely follow the advice of others, and 
when they do, if they profit by it they take all 
the credit to themselves, whereas if they lose they 
always blame the adviser.2
Harper contends that the above represents the universal 
and inexorable laws of human nature. Before delving into 
public participation in the stock market, it is necessary 
to check them against the empirical evidence presented later 
in this study.
*See Henry H. Harper, The Psychology of speculation 
(Wells, Vermont; Fraser Publishing Company, 1966).
2Ibid., p. 14.
3Ibid.
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I. CROWD PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
In speaking of an agglomeration of individuals, Gustave
LeBon says: "A collective mind is formed, doubtless transi-
4
tory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics.*' 
LeBon continues by asserting that a crowd "...forms a single 
being, and is subjected to the law of the mental unity of 
c r o w d s . in another of his brilliant treatises on crowd 
behavior, LeBon states that "...the convictions of the 
crowd always tend to assume a religious form. The masses 
are devoid equally of skepticism and of the critical 
spirit."6 In referring to blind acceptance and non-thinking 
by crowds, LeBon asserts that a creed accepted by a collec­
tive group "...is always adopted without discussion, and
7
fervently venerated."
According to Neill, the characteristic of collectivism 
has frequently precluded people from success in the past.
In his famed column The Ruminator, Neill says "Individuals 
are influenced to act as a herd on popular, intangible
4Gustave LeBon, The Crowd (New York: The viking Press,
Inc., 1966).
5Ibid.
6Gustave LeBon, The Psychology of Socialism (Wells, 
Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company,“T965) , p". 86.
7Ibid.
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questions.'* Neill contends that people are gregarious by
their very nature. Perhaps it is nan's reliance on others
to think for him that prompted Drew to point out that 85
percent of the people believe what they read and hear.
LeBon asserts that crowd opinions are frequently ill-
founded and ill-timed because of the concepts of "imitation
9
and contagion." Neill and LeBon contend that an idea be­
comes implanted in the minds of the imitators and the 
thoughtless. Their thesis terms this point the imitation 
stage, where seeds of cursory thought generally bloom into 
colorful, dogmatic opinion. From the imitation stage, the 
idea or thought then becomes popularized through contagion. 
Neill says that as contagion spreads, the public or majority 
"has but three ways to think: PC6ITIVE, SPECIFIC, AND
DOGMATIC."10
The point made by Neill and LeBon is that submission 
to popular thought will ultimately remove individualism and 
creativity. LeBon assails conformity and crowd conduct by 
stating: "All that has gone to make the greatness of
civilizations: sciences, arts, philosophies, religions,
military power, etc., has been the work of individuals and 
not of aggregates."11
Q
H. B. Neill, The Ruminator (March, 1967).
9See Humphrey B. Neill, The Art of Contrary Thinking 
(Caldwell, Idaho: The Carton Printers, Lid,, 1963).
10Ibid., pp. 140-141.
i:LLeBon, The Psychology of Socialism, op. cit. , p. 25.
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Bernard Baruch, a Wall Street scholar and one of the 
world's foremost authorities on crowd behavior, once 
asserted:
I think that the depression of 1929 was due more 
to a world madness and delusion than anything else.
It was somewhat similar to the Tulip Craze, The 
Mississippi Bubble, and the South Sea Bubble. The 
world seems to go mad at times, and has extraordi­
nary delusions or crowd madness. 2
Crowd madness has been present in these manias and in
13many more. Baruch continues by saying that much of the
crowd delusion is centered around "great speculative mad- 
14ness." It xs very appropriate here to cite Schiller's 
great dictum: "Anyone taken as an individual is tolerably
sensible and reasonable--as a member of a crowd, he at once 
becomes a blockhead."*5
Most of the aforementioned individuals were scholars 
who ruminated over ideas rather than blindly subscribing to 
a thought or idea. Baruch believed that many popular 
thoughts were tossed up as bait for the unthinking majority.
12Bernard M. Baruch, "Madness of the Crowd," A Treasury
of Wall Street Wisdom, edited by Harry D. Schultz and Ramson
CosTow (Palisades Park, New Jersey: Investors' Press, Inc.,
1966), p. 164.
^^For an interesting treatment of crowd participation 
in past manias, see Charles MacKay, Memoirs of Extraordinary 
Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds IfNew York:
L. C. Page & Company, 19667"]!
14Baruch, loc. cit.
^Cited by Baruch in the Foreword of the book by
Charles MacKay, op. cit., p. xiii.
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Such belief once prompted Baruch to remark:
I think much of the legislation to prevent 
incompetency and corrupt practices in the sale 
of securities and regulation is good. The 
laws ought to be strengthened that will protect 
the public when they are in these periods of 
madness such as in 1929 and the Florida Boom.
That is going to be a difficult thing. The 
world has been struck with those things over 
and over again...Whatever men attempt they seem 
driven to try to overdo.
Judging from the commentaries on crowd participation 
in the debacles of yesteryear, it seems as if the crowd 
moves with a unanimity of thought.
Unanimity of Opinion
Harry D. Schultz says that "You need not fear being
contrary to any unanimous thinking, even when it occurs
17among experts." The preceding statement serves admirably 
as a possible explanation for the public's participation in 
the mass manias of time. Baruch always contended that the 
majority or public was ruled by its susceptibility to mass 
thinking. Consequently, Baruch alleged that the majority 
always entered speculative manias well after their incep­
tion. According to Baruch's theory, the public or majority 
engaged in speculative endeavors at their zenith because 
they had been carried away by mass feeling, emotion, and 
sentiment. As these manias peaked and began to subsequently
^Baruch, o|>. cit., p. 164.
^Harry D. Schultz, Bear Markets: How to Survive and
Make Money in Them (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc.,“1956), pi 173.
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fizzle, the public participated fully all the way down the 
decline.
Unanimity of thought or opinion is apparently one of 
the greatest obstacles to success in the stock market. Neill
says, "When everybody thinks alike, everyone is likely to be
18wrong." Another of the astute observers of public psy­
chology is Peter Wyckoff, who states, " ... if everybody 
were truly intelligent, no one would sell too cheaply or 
pay too much, and the result would be that wide price swings 
would not occur."
Need For Leadership
LeBon contends that most people want to be led and want
to avoid thinking. LeBon states: "A crowd is incapable of
20ever doing without a master." Neill agrees with LeBon
and proposes that people have an obvious distaste for
thinking. Neill contends that the crowd or public in the
stock market is continually deluded or led astray by news,
tips, advisory services, and the omnipresent "experts" who
21occupy chairs in every brokerage office. As a result of 
people's distaste for thinking, they want to be told what
1 8
H. B. Neill, The Ruminator (January, 1967).
^^Peter Wyckoff, The Psychology of Stock Market Timing 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Ha"Il, Inc. , 1966) ,
p. 123.
20LeBon, The Crowd, op. cit. , p. 118.
21For a treatment of this thesis, see H. B. Neill,
Tape Reading and Market Tactics (Wells, Vermont: Fraser
Pu d 1 ishing Com pa ny"J I95oy"I
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to do. The public, according to Neill, desires leadership, 
regardless of its quality.
II. THE PUBLIC AND MARKET CYCLES
Since its inception, the stock market has been charac­
terized by recurring cycles. George C. Selden, an eminent 
market analyst through the behavioral approach, says that 
these cycles will continue "...as long as prices are fixed
by the competition of buyers and sellers, and as long as
22human beings seek a profit and fear a loss." Don Guyon, 
a former broker of prominence on wall Street, asserts that
95 percent of the people are correct during a portion of
23the trends, but incorrect at the important junctures.
Guyon further contends that there is a 95 percent majority 
or public in the stock market. Guyon says that such an 
uninformed majority does in fact exist because "only 5 per­
cent of the average brokerage firm's customers are able to
24survive a complete market cycle."
R. W. McNeel contends that the public or majority is 
nearly always wrong because they have a propensity to base
22George C. Selden, Psychology of the Stock Market 
(Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing ^ompany^ TPSsyj p. 10.
^^Don Guyon, One-Way Pockets (Wells, Vermont: Fraser
Publishing Company*^ 1963) , pp. 5^7.
24Ibid.
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their action on surface indications in the market, which
25are usually wrong. J. E. Granville states: "The public
is always attracted to the obvious and thus the major timing
errors in the market are constantly being committed by the
2 6public." Timing errors are apparently the reason why most 
members cannot survive in a complete market cycle.
Activity in a Bull Market
McNeel says that the market rise "always has its founda-
27tion in a sea of pessimism." He asserts that the majority 
of people are extremely pessimistic, and majority sentiment 
is that they have been ruined after an extended decline in 
stock prices. Both Selden and McNeel assert that lagging 
fundamental positions are created because the business cycle 
follows the stock market cycle by several months. Conse­
quently, fundamentals will become much poorer only after 
the market has bottomed out and remained low for some time. 
Selden and McNeel both assail the public or majority for 
rigid adherence to fundamentals, which are termed "surface 
factors" by both authors. McNeel belittles the action of 
the majority at market bottoms because they have allowed
25R. W. McNeel, Beating the Stock Market (Wells,
Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 1963), p. 39.
26J. E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market 
Timing for Maximum ProfiT (EngiewootT-Cliffs, N . J . :
Prentice-Ha 11, Inc."^ 1^60) , p. 162.
2 7McNeel, o£. cit., p. 40.
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their interest to wane at a time when enthusiasm should be 
increasing. McNeel states: "Even when the market is on
bottom, the news from the business world grows more pessi­
mistic, and the courage and inherent optimism of the public 
in looking towards the future are almost entirely broken 
down.”28
When the wave of pessimism prevails among the public or
majority, the bull market is usually launched. Granville and
Wyckoff call this stage the "accumulation” stage, where stock
2 9is passing from weak hands to strong hands. Granville' 
says that the informed minority or professional element is 
responsible for the initial increases in a bull market. As 
the public dumps stocks, the strong hands of the profession­
als are there to accumulate them. McNeel and Selden believe 
that most of these initial bull market advances are almost 
imperceptible, and thus not obvious to the public constitu­
ents. McNeel states that during the early stages of an
advance, "Men of normal vision can see nothing particularly
30encouraging in the outlook.”
McNeel also states that "The public normally does not
go into the market until it is well towards the upper levels
31of the cycle.” Selden and McNeel both maintain that
28Ibid.
2% e e  Granville, o£. cit. , pp. 161-163.
30McNeel, o£. cit., p. 43.
3*1bid.9 p .  44.
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fundamentals are looking much better and serve as an 
inducement for the public to participate. Schultz believes 
that the entrance of the public is the result of news, tips, 
and advice, which in turn fosters unanimity of thought. 
Schultz states: nSince mass thinking on any matter is
always tinged with exaggeration, it tends to be extremist
thinking. This means that a reaction must come to erase
32the extreme and restore balance."
In Neill's classic treatise, Tape Reading and Market 
Tactics, he states: "The greatest public participation is
near and at the tops, because, as we have learned, rising
33prices attract a following." Harper says that bull market
tops seem to "pervade the country with an epidemic of 
34bullishness." Harper says that at this point, majority
or public action is "directed by sentiment rather than
35judgment."
3 £%Kelly and Burgess contend that public or majority 
entrance into the stock market behooves the professional to 
alter his course of action and pursue the opposite alterna­
tive. Harper believes that the majority or public is
3^Schultz, o£. cit., p. 170.
33Neill, op. cit., p. 47.
34Harper, oj>. cit., p. 82.
36Fred C. Kelly and Sullivan Burgess, How Shrewd 
Speculators Win {Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company,
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analogous to a herd of stampeded cattle rushing blindly
into a river or butting their heads against stone walls.
He states that under similar conditions in the stock market,
37"men are but little saner than cattle."
Activity in a Bear Market
Granville38 contends that while the remainder of the 
market has begun its downturn, the blue-chip securities 
remain high and support many of the popular market averages. 
He believes that the public places too much emphasis on 
these stocks alone in trying to anticipate the general trend 
of the market. Since blue-chip securities are generally the 
last to fall in a bear market and the last to rise in a bull 
market, Granville's point apparently has much merit.
McNeel and Selden both believe that the lagging business 
cycle is definitely an inducement factor, since fundamentals 
are becoming stronger rather than weaker. In addition, 
Schultz assails the unanimity of public thought. Granville 
joins with the aforementioned three authors in asserting 
that fundamental conditions of business and other obvious 
attractions induce the uninformed majority to participate
at precisely the wrong time. Granville states; "If it's
39obvxous to the public, then it's obviously wrong."
37Harper, op. cit., p. 83.
38See Granville, o|>. cit. , pp. 274-276.
39Ibid., p. 162.
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Wyckoff, Granville, and Schultz agree that the mass 
entrance of the majority or public investors places the 
market in an overbought position. Granville states emphati­
cally that "The market just cannot and will not accommodate
40that many people." The market reversal mentioned by
Schultz becomes a reality with the advent of heavy public
participation. When the market becomes overbought and is
readying itself for a reversal, Wyckoff says that this is
the distribution stage, where stocks are passed from strong
41
hands to weak hands. The minority or professional element 
has liquidates its portfolios to the uninformed public 
investors.
Bernard Baruch once contended that the minority was
never ruled by avarice, and they never attempted to depict
precise tops and bottoms. Baruch once advised: "Don't try
to buy at the bottom and sell at the top. This can't be
42
done--except by liars."
Humphrey Neill says that it is characteristic of the 
public to buy on market declines. It is the opinion of 
Neill, as well as others, that many public investors regard 
the beginning of a downtrend or bear market as a "healthy 
reaction." Neill says, however, that "Many a healthy
40Ibid.
4lSee Wyckoff, op. cit., pp. 195-196.
4^Baruch, "Baruch's Ten Rules," A Treasury of Wal1 
Street Wisdom, op. cit., p. 172.
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43reaction has proved fatal." The public is apparently 
expanding its portfolios and showing disregard for the 
downtrend because they believe it to be only a "healthy 
react ion."
As a consequence of these "healthy reactions," lagging
blue-chips, and lagging business conditions, the public
apparently purchases most of the way down the decline.
McNeel says that the fact that everyone is so optimistic
over business reports and so unanimously confident that
prices cannot go lower precludes the majority from leaving 
44the market.
The cycle is subsequently renewed as the market hits 
bottom, and pessimism pervades the ranks of the public. 
Consequently, the majority sells at the bottom at precisely 
the time they should be buying. From the standpoint of 
investors, it is at best a very pernicious cycle.
Market Cycles
To reiterate, market cycles are regularly recurring
movements which will always be present in the stock market.
For the skeptics who endeavor to refute the theory of
cycles, it is worth while to recall the wonderful passage
in Byron's "Childe Harold":
Here is the moral of all human tales,
'Tis but the same rehearsal of the past;
43Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics, op. cit.,
p. 71.
44McNe ill, op. cit., p. 49.
31
First freedom and then glory; when that fails 
Wealth, vice, corruption, barbarism at last,
And history, with all her volumes vast,
Hath but one page.4^
Former editor of the Wal1 Street Journal, William Peter 
Hamilton, lends further confirmation by remarking, "There 
seems to be a cycle of panics and of times of prosperity." 
Apparently, the majority or public investors have been 
inadequate in depicting market junctures or reversals in 
trend before their actual inception. Then, an apparent 
refusal to believe causes the majority of investors to 
suffer from erosion of paper profits obtained by joining 
the previous bull trend in the later stages. To epitomize 
the action of the majority or public, it is perhaps best to 
refer to the words of Robert L. Smitley, who states: "The
mob is always extreme. At first it believes that the New 
Era will last forever. Then it is satisfied that everything 
is going to hell, and that we will have a hundred years of 
economic struggle."47
4^Lord Byron, "Childe Harold," as quoted by William P. 
Hamilton, The Stock Market Barometer (New York: Richard
Russell Associates, 1960), 2^
46Ibid.
47Robert L. Smitley, Popular Financial Delusions 
(Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 1^63}, p. 152.
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III. HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY IN THE MARKET
Graham, Dodd, and Cottle comment that "The market is a
voting machine, whereon countless individuals register
choices which are the product partly of reason and partly of 
48emotion." By the preceding statement, Graham, Dodd, and 
Cottle infer that many individuals base their purchases upon 
sentiment and emotion rather than reasoning and good common 
sense.
From the above it may be stated that a knowledge of
human psychology is an invaluable tool in the stock market.
Gerald M. Loeb, author of the best seller, The Battle for
Investment Survival, states that "The most important single
factor in shaping security markets is public psychology."4^
Loeb continues by saying:
I feel that the psychology which leads people to 
pay forty times net for a stock under one set of 
conditions and refuse to buy the same shares under 
another set of conditions at ten times is such a 
powerful and vital price-changing factor that it 
can overshadow actual earnings trends as an influence 
on stock prices.5®
Fred C. Kelly, a successful market trader through the 
psychological or behavioral study approach, says that vanity,
4®Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, 
Security Analysis (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 
T552y-;“ p .-3 Z :-------
49Gerald M. Loeb, The Battle For Investment Survival 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1965) , p. 6Q~.
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greed, and the will to believe are the three most malign 
influences to one trying to make a profit in the stock 
m a r k e t K e l l y ' s  thesis is that the only way to obtain a 
profit in Wall Street is through an understanding of human 
psychology and behavior.
Kelly states that, "Vanity, one's own personal vanity, 
is probably the greatest single enemy to stock market 
success. It is vanity that leads us to take small profits
CJ
but large l o s s e s . W h e n  one employs a behavioral or 
psychological approach, he is basing his study on the 
conduct or actions of the majority. Kelly contends that the 
majority is characterized by conformity, unanimity of 
thought, imitation, contagion, impulse action, and the 
desire for leadership, regardless of quality.
LeBon, Neill, Drew, Heiby, and Wilson all believe the 
informed minority to be a group of thinkers who are willing 
to diverge from majority opinion and action. As Wilson 
says, "The greatness of our nation has been built upon 
concepts that include the willingness to take chances.”53
According to Kelly, "Next to vanity, I suppose the 
worst foe of good judgment that a person in the market must
^For a treatment of these concepts, see Fred C. Kelly, 
Why You Win or Lose (wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing
Company, 196*57, pp. 34-49.
52Ibid., p. 34.
53Sloan J. Wilson, The Speculator and the Stock Market 
(Palisades Park, New jersey: Investors1 Library, Inc.,
1963), p. 3.
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guard against, is old Uncle Greed.*1 According to Kelly, 
greed is probably sore potent as an influence than danger. 
Kelly's reasoning steins from his conclusion that people are 
optimistic by their very nature and thus are not easily 
scared•
Kelly contends that greed leads the majority astray
and contributes to unanimity of thought. He states:
Let a stock market forecaster predict an advance 
that doesn't come and the public will forgive him, 
but as he turns bearish too soon and warns of a 
slump long before it comes, his reputation is ruined.
Kelly blames greed for the animosity that the public
majority will bear toward the forecaster. He says that
individuals never shake free from the memories of money
they might have made.
According to Kelly, the third of man's infirmities in
the stock market is the "will to believe." This concept
refers to the susceptibility of the majority to news, tips,
advisory services, and unanimous thought. Kelly believes
that the public or majority relies on these "other opinions"
to avoid the arduous task of thinking. Consequently, public
or majority opinion has been molded.
Dangers of Human Emotion
Since the individuals are emotional beings, they are 
usually incapable of segregating their emotions from their
^4Kelly, o£. cit., p. 40. 
55lbid., p. 42.
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powers of reason. According to Schultz, emotion is perhaps
the one concept that serves as an explanation for lack of
success by the majority in the stock market. Schultz
states: "Emotions are the common denominator that makes us
all the same, and they can bring down the mightiest.
Emotions have separated a king from his throne more than
once."^ Schultz continues by saying, "Marilyn Monroe had
everything: great beauty, personality, attraction, wit,
position, and success. But her emotions are alleged to
have been her problem.
Schultz and McNeel both believe that emotionally-
oriented decisions are invariably poor ones. McNeel says
that as many as 98 percent of market decisions have been
58emotional decisions. The governing of decision making and 
action by emotion undoubtedly provoked McNeel to remark that 
"Ninety to ninety-eight of every one hundred men who try to 
beat the stock market are beaten."^9
S. B. Lurie asserts that the average member of the 
crowd or majority makes mistakes which stem from two roots. 
"First, he forgets to follow the IBM slogan to Think--which 
is by far the best word in the English language. Secondly, 
he falls into the popular error of acting with his emotions
^^Schultz, op. cit., p. 165.
57Ibid.
58McNeel, op. cit., p. 147.
59Ibid.
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rather than his intellect.”60 Lurie feels that ” ...day- 
to-day fluctuations are often emotional. But the really 
important money-making opportunities come from using one's 
thinking processes."61
Schultz, McNeel, and Lurie all infer that emotion in­
duces people to believe what they wish to believe as opposed 
to an objective appraisal of the situation at hand. As 
Napoleon once remarked: ”We must look upon things as they
are, and not as we would wish them to be.”62 Schultz 
alleges that the concept of emotion is the single factor 
which precludes individuals from application of successful 
theories and ideas. He also believes that it is the main 
reason most individuals perpetrate mistimed judgments in 
the market. Schultz epitomizes his theory of emotion by 
commenting that emotion is ”the single factor most likely 
to keep you from using what know-how you accumulate, or 
using it correctly, or at the right time.”
IV. THE TIE CRY OF CONTRARY OPINION
As of March 21, 1949, the Theory of Contrary Opinion 
was finally given some consideration as a way of thinking
6°S. B. Lurie, "Market Philosophy,” Encyclopedia of 
Stock Market Techniques, op. cit., p. 485.
61Ibid.
62Napoleon, as cited by Kenneth ward, "The Technical 
Approach to the Stock Market,” Encyclopedia of Stock 
Market Techniques, op. cit., p. 552.
63Schultz, op. cit., p. 163.
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by Life.6* Even in the present era, however, the Theory 
has not received the recognition that it merits.
Neill says that the Theory is "primarily a method of 
ruminating over a broad range of public questions; political, 
economic, and social."65 Neill further states: "In sum,
the purpose is to contest the popular view, because popular 
opinions are so frequently found to be untimely, mis lead 
(by propaganda), or plainly wrong."66 Neill says that the 
Contrary Theory does not contest facts; however, it does 
contest the ill-founded acceptance and astonishing credulity 
of the public masses.67 Neill also believes that the Theory 
is applicable to almost any area of endeavor, including 
forecasting, politics, socio-economics, business, and the 
stock market.
Neill's theory has been primarily designed to challenge 
any form of unanimous thinking or majority opinion. LeBon's 
thesis is that words and opinions are often insidious in 
that they misrepresent, mislead, distort, and delude.^®
64See William Miller, "The Strange State of the Market," 
Life (March 21, 1949), wherein appeared comment that Humphrey 
B. Neill formulated the Theory of Contrary Opinion.
^Neill, The Art of Contrary Thinking, op. cit, p. 9.
66Ibid.
67This thesis is treated at length throughout Neill's 
books, The Art of Contrary Thinking and Tape Reading and 
Market Tactics.
For a complete treatment of this concept, see both
of LeBon's books, The Psychology of Socialism and The Crowd.
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The thinking of both Neill and LeBon is closely correlated 
with Kelly's "will-to-believe" concept. The use of the 
Contrary Theory is probably best evidenced when it is used 
to challenge the majority's "will-to-believe" propensity.
The application of the Contrary Theory to the stock 
market is strongly supported by Kelly and Burgess, who re­
mark: "Wide public belief is of itself proof that something
is wrong, for seldom is a vast number of persons capable of 
arriving at a wise conclusion in the stock market."^9 
Granville and Kelly both blast advisory services, the news 
media, and tipsters and allege that they foster unanimity 
of thought and the "will-to-believe." Granville contends
70that the nature of human beings gravitates toward laziness. 
Fraser supports the views of Kelly and Granville, and he 
also agrees that news, advisory services, and tips are 
nothing more than "moulders of public opinion." Fraser, who 
is a disciple of Neill, says that the presence of these 
moulders of opinion can destroy judgment. He writes: "A
significant human problem is to withstand group forces that
71seek to modify and distort individual judgments."
^Kelly and Burgess, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
^Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing 
for Maximum Profit, op. cTT7, p. 162.
71James L. Fraser, "The Neill Theory of Contrary 
Opinion," Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques, op. cit., 
p. 465.
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Since many individuals are of the opinion that the 
Theory of Contrary Thinking should be used to rebuff these 
moulders of public opinion, it is necessary to ascertain 
other contentions concerning the harm of these opinion 
moulders.
V. THE MENACE OF NEWS
Joseph Mindell contends that "The day-to-day market 
trend often reflects the ebb and flow of emotional reactions 
to the news... This belief has enough surface appeal to make 
it the basic principle of the market letter and the financial 
colunn,"^ Mindell further states that "The proposition 
that the trend of the market follows the news is not accepted 
by the financially literate."73 Mindell believes that any­
one who is reasonably conversant with the market knows that 
the market will often respond differently to the same type 
of news. Mindell says that news has a very misguiding 
effect, and many misleading inferences may be drawn from it. 
He believes that the majority, however, continually searches 
for news, regardless of the shape of the market. Mindell 
states that such a continual quest for news "...indicates 
an implicit acceptance of the fallacy as a working 
principle."74
7^joseph Mindell, "How News Affects Market Trends,"
The Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1 (january- 
February, 196iy^ p! 5T.
74ibid.
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Granville believes that the sheer characteristics of
the majority lead them to accept news as opposed to thinking
for themselves. He feels that the public characteristics
of laziness and distaste for thinking,
...dictate that the task of determining what is 
really going on in the stock market and the 
economy in general at any particular time be 
reserved for government officials, magazine 
editors, financial writers, brokers, and 
customers' men. Their pronouncements on the 
state of the economy or the condition of the 
stock market are generally believed and acted 
upon by the maiority of the investing and specu­
lating public.?5
Granville contends that news is a chief factor in the 
accumulation and distribution of stocks. Drew supports
Granville's theory and states that "The public will buy on
76good news and sell on bad news." From the aforementioned 
statements, it must be inferred that the market elite go 
contrary to news and majority thinking. Perhaps it is 
appropriate to recall the wise counsel of Sir Francis Bacon, 
who stated: "Doubt all before you believe anything, watch
your idols I"??
Bacon's commentary apparently has considerable merit 
because the public's purchases of stocks at high prices has 
led Granville to remark that the stock market is merely a
75Granville, op. cit., p. 162.
?^Drew, op. cit., p. 192.
??As cited by Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics, 
op. cit., p. 58.
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"wholesale-retail operation," where the professionals buy 
low and sell high. The public or majority, in turn buys 
high and sell lou.^
Reliability of News
Granville relates an interesting news story which
illustrates the alleged authenticity of news. Although the
news story relates to war, it would likewise relate to the
stock narket. He writes:
During World War I there was a strategically 
important town in Austria called Lembert. As 
the going got real rough late in the campaign, 
a daily communique from the Austrian general was 
circulated among the ranks which simply said,
"Lembert is still in our possession." interpre­
tation: The city is as good as gone. A few
days later the city was officially c a p t u r e d . 7^
Granville believes that news interpretation is the same,
whether it be in war or in the stock market. He contends
that news in the market is always best at the zenith of a
movement, and the professional element uses it to implement
AOtheir distribution process.
Kelly and Burgess both doubt the accuracy of news, and 
they remark: "The public is usually told what it prefers
to believe, regardless of whether this tallies with the
A i
truth." Mindell confirms the preceding statement and
78Granville, op. cit., pp. 162-163.
79Ibid., p. 168.
80Ibid.
®^Kelly and Burgess, op. cit., p. 26.
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asserts that a lot of news merely ’'...reflects the intensity 
of public interest in the stock market, and important tops
05
have usually been made during this time."
Neill blasts publication accuracy and policy by stating:
To my mind, news agencies owe a greater 
responsibility to their readers than is consistent 
with publishing sensational items which they must 
know are acted upon without deliberation by the 
thoughtless public. I criticize severely public 
men who, with their news agencies and propagandists, 
play upon public opinion without regard to the 
serious consequences which must ensue.83
Discounting the News
Don Guyon once remarked: "News can seldom be utilized
for market purposes, even when its authenticity is beyond
q X
question." Richard W. Schabacker, one of Wall Street's
greatest technicians, subscribes to the thoughts of Guyon.
He comments: "By the time news regarding a stock is made
public such news has generally been discounted in the
85market and the cream is off." Both Guyon and Schabacker 
believe that the intelligent opinion of the minority has 
been registered long before the publication of facts ever 
takes place.
Most market analysts believe that news has a tendency 
to govern the emotions of the majority. Wilson comments:
82Mindell, . Cit., p . 32.
83Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics, op. cit., p.
55.
84_Guyon, 0£. cit., p. 44.
85Richard W. Schabacker, "Price Discounting News,"
A Treasury of Wa11 Street Wisdom, op. cit., p. 222.
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"Financial news can get one into a lot of emotional
Q i
trouble," Neill contends that a judicious dose of news 
can incite a frenzy of public action which will lead to 
accumulation or distribution. If intelligent opinion is 
truly registered early, then the majority should recall the 
immortal words of Homer: "After the event, even a fool is
wise."8 ^
VI. THE MERIT OF TIPS
The "moulders of public opinion" concept cited by 
Kelly, Granville, and others has another component which is 
very much present in the stock market environment. This is 
the "tips" or advice which floats around every brokerage 
office.88
Wyckoff says that "Nearly everybody is exposed to tips 
on the market, but the overwhelming majority of such pre-
Q Q
dictions never come true." Kelly reveals: "I have seen
men earnestly listening to the advice of a broker's colored
porter--because he was telling what they earnestly desired
90to think was true." Guyon berates tipsters, stating:
8^Wilson, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
Q  "7
As cited by James L. Fraser, Crises a nd Pa nics
(Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company' T96S), p. 21.
Q Q
Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics, op. cit.
oq
Wyckoff, op, cit., p. 22.
90Kelly, op. cit., p. 48.
"I do not knot* of a single case where anyone has been able 
to >ak« money consistently by following information of this 
character, even when the information comes to him first­
hand."91
Robert P. Crawford says that many people "...have be­
come parasites on the thinking of other people. Nine times
out of ten you will discover that they are repeating,
92parrot-like, someone else's ideas." S. A. Nelson 
commented: "Great minds have purposes; others have wishes
Q3
.... He who prates of his wisdom doth but conceal an ass." 
Garrulous individuals who continually fill brokerage offices 
encounter the wrath of s. B. Lurie, who states: "It's
strange how substantial amounts of money often are invested 
on the basis of locker room gossip, or somebody else's 
hearsay, rather than on the basis of using a professional 
intellect to help arrive at a sound conclusion.... The moral 
is clear: There is little or no charm to the obvious in
Q4
Wall Street." Nelson refers to the talkative tipster as
95"Great vaunters, little doers." Nelson further asserts
91Guyon, op. cit., p. 8.
^Robert P. Crawford, Think for Yourself (Wells, Vermont 
Fraser Publishing Company, 1937), p. 87.
93S. A. Nelson, The ABC of Stock Speculation (Wells, 
Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 1964), pp. £08-209.
94Lurie, op. cit., p. 769.
95Nel son, op. cit., p. 208.
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that the tipster 11 is as far resoved fro* the avenues that
lead to desirable information as he is from those which
lead to Paradise.**"
Neill says that if one becomes bored and has time on
his hands, "...go out and play parches!--do anything but
join in the idle, unintelligent gossip in a broker's board-
rooi."97 Perhaps the general opinion of the learned in
market analysis is best stated by Joseph Marshall Wade:
If I wanted to become a tramp I would seek 
information and advice from the most successful 
tramp I could find. If I wanted to become a 
failure I would seek advice from men who had 
never succeeded. if I wanted to succeed in all 
things, I would look around me for those who 
are succeeding and do as they have done. 8
VII. DANGER OF ADVISORY SERVICES
Wyckoff proposes that "The more statistics, opinions,
resumes, reports, and other printed material a trader reads,
go
the farther is he removed from the market's present state."
In commenting on news, tips, and advisory services, Wyckoff 
feels that they "...are to the market what thunder is to
96Ibid., p. 145.
"Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics, op. cit., 
p. 44.
98As cited by editors Schultz and Coslow in the 
beginning of A Treasury of Wall Street Wisdom.
"wyckoff, o£. cit., p. 186.
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10Olightning.** He feels that such "expertise" is too late
to be of value to the investor.
Fraser concludes lh«t despite the continual increase 
in advisory services, especially during bull Markets,
"...bear Markets wipe out Much so-called shrewd judgments. 
Better judgment is not exclusive to any individual or 
committee. That is why you see experts selling the same 
shares other experts are b u y i n g . i n  October, 1959, 
advisory services were subjected to close scrutiny and the 
following conclusion was reached: "There's a literary bull
market on Wall Street too, and no sign yet that it's topping 
out. Luckily for the men who produce stock-market literature, 
their success does not depend on their records as fore­
casters." 102
103Drew says that the public is "almost always bullish."
Such feeling by the public makes Walter Heiby comment that
if an advisory service recommends general selling, "...he
will lose many subscribers whether or not time proves him
104to have given a correct prognosis." Therefore the in­
vestment advisor apparently has a great business incentive
100Ibid.
lOlpraser, "The Neill Theory of Contrary Opinion," 
Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques, op. cit., p. 678.
102"Stock-Market Letters: A Growth Situation,"
Fortune, Vol. 50, No. 4 (October, 1959), p. 141.
103Drew, op. cit., p. 191.
104Heiby, op. cit. , p. 24.
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to avoid pessimism and the mention of short sales. Schultz 
contends that "A special reason why you must regard all 
advice with caution is that, sad as their record is in bull
105markets, their record in bear markets is much, much worse."
Schultz also contends that advisory services are em­
ployed extensively by the public to circumvent the arduous 
task of thinking. However, as Kelly and Burgess comment:
"No market prophet is ever good enough in the long run to 
be followed blindly."*06
Fortune blasts advisory services in general by stating: 
"...the circulation achieved by the pundits who produce this 
literature seems to have little to do with their own records 
as forecasters; it depends much more on public interest in 
the market."*0^ Fortune further states that professionals, 
for the most part, are very dubious about advisory services 
and their past accuracy and records.
Schultz says that advisory services and financial 
writers "tell their readers that the stock aiarket cannot be
forecast with any precision, by anyone, and then promptly
108proceed to forecast it." He further comments: "wrong
guesses exceed correct ones to such a degree it*s a marvel 
the services continue."*0^ Nelson blasts the public's
l05Schultz, ££. cit., p. 108.
106Kelly and Burgess, o|>. cit., p. 28.
*07Fortune, op. cit., p. 141. 
108Schultz, o£. cit., p. 109.
109Ibid.
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reliance on advice by stating: "Great minds have purposes;
others have wishes."**^ Apparently Nelson refers to the 
distinction between the innovators (informed minority or 
professionals) and the imitators or thoughtless (the remain­
ing 95 percent public or majority).
Brokers
Heiby, McNeel, and Kaiser are among many who feel that 
advice from a broker is analogous to that rendered from an 
advisory service. Heiby asserts that brokers "...rarely 
recommend the sale of a specific stock, and when they do, 
they are very apt to talk in favor of using the proceeds 
for an immediate purchase of another i s s u e . i n  effect, 
then, brokers are primarily interested in sales and 
commissions.
McNeel says that when taking a broker's advice, "...It
should probably all be shunned, or at least their advice
should be considered very carefully before one acts on 
112it." McNeel believes that the interests of the public
and the broker are very divergent, which should make any 
market participant very skeptical about the advice being 
rendered by the broker. Kaiser believes that advisory 
services and brokers are both very remiss in their thinking 
and analysis. He belittles brokers by commenting that
110Nelson, op. cit., p. 208. 
i^Heiby, op. cit. , p. 24.
112McNeel, o£. cit., p. 106.
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brokers' "...pronouncements are always couched in hedge 
language, a canny knack aimed at survival. Their predic­
tions during the spring break of 1962 left something to be
, , 113desired."
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in the midst 
of a drastic price decline starting on September 3, 1946, 
undertook a painstaking study of the market literature which 
was disseminated by 36 investment advisers and 130 brokers. 
The investigation pertained to the literature for the week 
of August 25 to September 3. Following is a part of the 
f indings:
TABLE II-l
SEC FINDINGS OF DISSEMINATED MARKET 
LITERATURE FOR THE WEEK OF AUGUST 26 TO SEPTEMBER 3, 
_____________________________ 1946_______________________________
General Market - Attitude on Long-Term Outlook
Number of Letters and Wires
Bullish without qualification ...................  260
Bullish, but uncertain on day-to-day
market action .....................................  97
C a u t i o u s ............................................ 74
Definitely bearish and/or advised selling
at least part of holdings........................... 20
Inconclusive.......................................... 38
489
Source: Cited by Garfield A. Drew, New Methods for Profit
in the Stock Market, op. cit., 1TSTT
**3Karl N. Kaiser, "Timing Technology," Encyclopedia 
of Stock Market Techniques, op. cit., p. 466.
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The findings of the Commission showed that only 4.1
percent of the professional commentary and advice at this
critical juncture was correctly bearish. Perhaps Schultz
was correct when he remarked that brokers and advisory
114servxces are usually "wrong at key turning points." He,
like Kelly and Burgess, believes that "There is a normal ten­
dency to give the public what they want."115
Summary
Judging from the opinions of many eminent market 
analysts, the majority of people do not think for themselves 
and ultimately fail in the stock market. Most contentions 
are that such failure stems from the propaganda or "moulders 
of public opinion" which induce public participation at 
precisely the wrong time. Vance Packard, an authority in 
the area of hidden persuasion, has said that manipulators 
who are probing "... beneath the surface of American life, 
are starting to acquire a power of persuasion that is be­
coming a matter of justifiable public scrutiny and concern.
Crawford says that, "Propaganda, or concerted and 
definite effort to remake our thought or to save us from 
thinking for ourselves, has suddenly burst into view like
114Schultz, o£. cit., p. 114.
ll5Ibid., pp. 114-115.
Il6yance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New York:
Pocket Books, Inc., 1957), p~. 17.
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7 7 7a meteor.” From the authoritative sources cited thus
far, one receives the distinct impression that the majority 
has a propensity to base their judgment on surface indica­
tions and propaganda such as news, tips, brokers, and 
advisory services. If the public does in fact place such 
reliance on these media, their participation should be noted 
at the zenith of a movement. In effect, their participation 
should take place at precisely the opposite time that it 
should occur. If the public does base its action on surface 
indicators in the market, then the majority probably is 
right during most of the trends but wrong at the critical 
junctures in the market.
Beginning in Chapter III, the aforementioned technical 
indicators are employed. Empirical evidence will be 
utilized to check past conduct of the public at these 
critical junctures to determine the validity of preceding 
contentions and to ascertain the financial acumen of the 
stock-market majority or public, if such a group does really 
exist. The first indicators used will be the Monthly Debit 
and credit Balances.
117Cxawford, o£. cit. , p. 52.
CHAPTER III
THE DEBIT AND CREDIT BALANCES
People have been educated to 
buy on declines. There is a 
point, however, where such buying 
ceases and selling begins.
-- Charles H . Dow 
In the preceding chapter, others suggested that one 
should apply Neill's Theory of Contrary Thinking and act 
opposite to public opinion and unanimous thought in order 
to enjoy success in the stock market. Eminent authors 
suggested that one must depict the entrance and extent of 
public participation and then become active buyers at a 
time when the public majority is not in the market. There­
fore, to be successful, one must move in contrary fashion 
to that of the public.
The outstanding technician Joseph E. Granville says:
There is no easy road to stock market success.
Here in the United states there are millions of 
pianos and each one is basically the same in that 
they all have 88 notes. Yet, how many piano 
virtuosos are there in the united States? It is 
the same with the stock market. The printed music 
can be distributed to everyone but many cannot 
play it at all, a large number can just manage to 
play it, another group plays well and a much 
smaller group is downright brilliant. So, there 
are no qualms about distributing the music. It is 
up to the reader and his patience, desire to work,
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and ability to interpret as to whether he plays at
all, plays well, or plays like a virtuoso.^
In order to act in an opposite fashion from the public, 
one must determine when the public enters the market and 
when it makes its exodus. The action of the round-lot public 
is probably best portrayed by the conduct of the Credit 
Balance. The astute professional element can likewise be 
observed by the action of the Monthly Debit Balance. Through 
an explanation of these balances, one may obtain a valuable 
insight into the stock market and its future gyrations.
The Theory of the Credit Balance. The Credit Balance 
or the customers' free Credit Balance Figure represents the 
uncommitted money on deposit with brokers who are members 
of the New York Stock Exchange. According to Wilson, the 
Credit Balance is indicative of that portion of the public 
which habitually trades in round lots. The "round lot" 
public pays cash for all stocks purchased. Wilson says,
"... This monthly figure is predominantly that amount be­
longing to the public, and it is what we have been looking
o
for for a long time." Wilson asserts: "Banks, trust
accounts, and mutual funds usually do not have cash in a 
credit account. Thus this monthly figure is predominantly
*1
Joseph E. Granville, Granville's New Key to Stock 
Market Profits (Englewood Cliffs, hi. J. : Prentice-Ha 11,
Inc., 1965), p. 11.
2Sloan J. Wilson, Public Participation in the Stock 
Market (Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 1966),
pr & .
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that amount belonging to the public and it fluctuates
3
with the advances and declines of the market."
Through the use of the Credit Balance and the odd-lot 
data (to be discussed in the next chapter), one can gain 
an insight into the actions of the large and small members 
of the stock market public. These indicators will be used 
to test the hypothesis that "The public is always wrong."
It should be remembered that a dichotomy is present among 
the members of the public--the small "odd-lot" public and 
the large "round-lot" public. To adequately test the fi­
nancial acumen of these public participants, it is 
essential that one have a working knowledge of both segments 
of the public investors.
Monthly figures of the New York Stock Exchange Credit 
Balance represent the amount of uncommitted money on 
deposit with brokers who are members of the New York Stock 
Exchange. Since a large portion of these funds are eventu­
ally used to purchase stocks, an increase in this balance 
may be interpreted to indicate that more money has been 
left on deposit with the brokers by the "round-lot" public. 
The larger participants in the market have refrained from 
purchasing stocks and are not presently active in the 
market. Since the majority have avoided the market, it is 
said to be oversold. These Credit Balances represent
%loan J. Wilson, "The Monthly Credit and Debit 
Balances," Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques (Larch- 
mont, New York: Investors intelligence, Inc., 1965),
p. 291.
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buying power, a part of which will be invested when an up­
ward trend in prices becomes evident. Therefore, the 
technical position of the market should be strong because 
only the informed few have been accumulating stocks and 
providing demand.
The Credit Balance should decline when stocks are pur­
chased. The purchasing of stocks may be construed as a 
reduction in buying potential, which tends to have bearish 
overtones because the round-lot public has entered the 
market. The astute technician who is vigilant of the 
Credit Balance leaves the market at approximately the same 
time that the round-lot public makes its entrance.
Walter Heiby states: "It is possible, however, that a
decline in the Credit Balance may, on occasion, indicate a
withdrawal of funds for purposes other than for stock 
4
investment." Heiby suggested that funds may be diverted 
into Savings and Loan shares, time deposits of commercial 
banks, bonds, and other similar investments which bear a 
fixed return. If funds are withdrawn for these purposes, 
a decline in the Credit Balance is interpreted as bullish 
because the public perceives the market outlook as bearish 
and has withdrawn from the market. However, determining 
when funds begin to leave the market and flow to other
^Wa Iter A. Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic 
Synthesis (Chicago, I llinois** The Institute of Dynamic 
Synthesis, Inc., 1965), p. 87.
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investment media is a difficult task.^
Round-lot public investors, however, characteristically 
remain in the market most of the time. These individuals 
obviously have the money to participate, as evidenced by 
their cash purchases of round lots. Many members of the 
round-lot public suffer from "the perils of over-acquisi­
tiveness."^ Henry Harper, in commenting on whether or not 
the majority is willing to refrain from the market, says 
that nearly all people, . . whether experienced or
inexperienced, are subject to those inscrutable laws of 
psychology which Nature herself seems to have designed for
7
the discomfiture of those who play at the wheel of Fortune."
Continuing, Harper says: "They all resolve to stay out of
8
the market, but they all go back."
5
It should be noted that the Federa1 Reserve Bulletin 
does contain a quarterly flow-of-funds statement which 
reveals shifts in deposit flows and in amounts of deposits 
outstanding. The publication of such data, however, occurs 
several months subsequent to the investigated period. The 
resulting time lag prohibits the data from being as useful 
as it would otherwise be. For example, see "Changes in 
Time and Savings Deposits, April - July 1967," Federa1 
Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 53, No. 9 (September, 1967), pp. 
1488-15177;
^For an excellent treatment of this concept as it 
relates to stock market participation, see Henry Howard 
Harper, The Psychology of Speculation (Wells, Vermont: 
Fraser Publishing Company, 1666J, pp. 56-64.
7Ibid., p. 63.
8Ibid.
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Basic Concepts of the Credit Balance. To understand 
how the Credit Balance serves as an indicator, one should 
understand the concepts of convergence and divergence.
These concepts refer to the relationship between the action 
of the Credit Balance and the performance of the market as 
shown by the averages. The two most commonly used market 
averages are the Dow-Jones Industrial Average and Standard 
and Poor's Composite ''500" Stock Average. Standard and 
Poor's Average is employed in this study because it is more 
representative of the general market. Standard and Poor's 
Composite Average consists of 500 stocks, while the Dow- 
Jones Industrial Average is comprised of only 30 issues, 
most of which are blue chip securities. Standard and Poor's 
Average should give a better indication of the possible 
correlation between the Credit Balance and over-all stock 
market trends. A comparison between the two averages 
reveals a close approximation between the Dow-Jones 
Industrial Average and Standard and Poor's Composite aver­
age. Granville says that an important rule of thumb 
concerning the two averages is that, "The ratio of the Dow- 
Jones Industrial Average reading to Standard and Poor's
9
Index is approximately 10 - 1." Granville further states 
that if the 1 0 - 1  ratio is not approximated, this " . . .
9
J. E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market 
Timing for Maximum Profit (Englewoocf Ciiffs, N.J.:
Prentice-HaTl, Inc., 1966), p. 162.
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would indicate that the Dow-Jones was not typical of the 
general market.’1*^
Convergence occurs when Standard and Poor’s Average is 
declining, and the Credit Balance is rising. Technicians 
interpret such convergence as the nearing of a market bottom 
and the beginning of an advance in the market.
The normal behavior of the Credit Balance moves in the 
same direction as the stock indicators. The professional 
element accumulates stocks and initiates the upward trend 
in the market. The public is reputed to avoid the market 
during the early stages of an advance as a result of losses 
incurred during the last decline, so the Credit Balance 
theoretically rises with the market as stocks are liquidated 
at approximate break-even levels.
Since the public supposedly enters the market near the 
top, the Credit Balance begins to shrink at or near the 
crest of the bull market. As the market declines, the 
Credit Balance also may decrease because the public allegedly 
participates during the course of the market decline.
Divergence occurs when Standard and Poor's Average is 
rising and the Credit Balance begins to decline. When this 
occurs, a market top has been signalled. Diminishment of 
the Credit Balance indicates that the majority has entered 
the market and is participating on a large scale. Pro­
fessionals distribute stocks to the public, allowing them
10T, . , Ibid.
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to hold the stocks until the market crests and then retain 
the stocks while the market moves downward at a precipitous 
rate. Divergence and convergence occur only when the Credit 
Balance is a leading indicator of market trends and not 
when the indexes move in the direction of the market aver­
ages.
The Theory of the Debit Balance. Sloan Wilson says: 
uThe Debit Balance represents the margin accounts, the most 
potent tool of the very active speculator."^  In another 
of his analytical works, Wilson asserts:
These figures represent one of the largest groups 
of active traders, and are truly the telltale mark 
left behind by the speculator. The New York Stock 
Exchange Monthly Debit Balance figures are much 
greater than those of the Monthly credit Balance.
It is fantastic when one realizes the Debit Balance 
is similar to the visible part of a huge iceberg; 
the largest part, representing the- transactions and 
actual value of shares, is completely hidden 
beneath the surface. 2
Louis Engel maintains that "Margin is the speculator's
Number 1 tool."^
Each monthly Debit Balance figure represents the total
amount of money borrowed on margin in order to hold stock.
According to Wilson, shrewd speculators utilize margin and
Sloan J. Wilson, The Speculator and the Stock Market 
(Palisades Park, New jersey: Investors1 Library, Inc.,
1963), p. 4.
l2Sloan J. Wilson, "The Monthly Credit and Debit 
Balance," Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques, op. cit., 
p. 291.
1 ^ Louis Engel, How to Buy Stocks (New York: Bantam
Books, Inc., 1962), p. 1T57.
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are generally able to detect market trends at their incep­
tion, thus allowing them to buy low and sell high. Specu­
lators theoretically increase their commitments as the 
market rises and subsequently decrease their commitments as 
a bear trend is initiated.
Wilson takes exception to those who attempt to negate 
the importance of the Debit Balance because of the presence 
of changing margin requirements. Wilson made a study of 
margin requirement effects, concluding that for the most 
part they were negligible. He stated: "The margins are
lowered or raised in an attempt to influence a broad move­
ment. In almost every historical period, the Federal
Reserve Board has appeared to be fighting an already estab-
14lished market trend." Continuing, Wilson asserts:
Thus, on numerous occasions from 1949 to 1963 
the margin requirements were changed up and down, 
but the upward trend continued on its way. It 
would be difficult to conclude that the margin 
requirements affected a bull market when it was 
able to survive the Korean War, the Suez Crisis, 
Lebanon, Eisenhower's heart attack, and the 
development of Sputniks. During this time, the 
New York Stock Exchange Monthly Debit Balance 
advanced from $466 million to $4,215 million.
By March, 1963, it had reached $4,360 million-- 
an advance of over 800 per cent.-*-*
During the extended bull and bear markets of previous 
years, nothing has had much effect in reversing trends 
which were well under way. Bernard Baruch continually
4^Sloan Wilson, The S p e c u l a t o r  and the Stock Market, 
op. cit., p. 7.
I5ibid.
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accentuated the idea that there mbs no legislation which 
could ever be passed to protect man from his own folly.16
During an extended period of market decline, the Debit 
Balance figures generally decline because speculators 
continue to leave the market. Speculators theoretically 
conduct themselves in a diametrically opposite fashion 
from the public, because they buy close to the bottom and 
sell near the top of the market.
If empirical evidence does substantiate the preceding 
theory, one may conclude that speculators comprise a group 
of astute market operators. Consequently, the discovery of 
the Debit Balance as a market indicator may reflect the 
intelligent opinion of the market's astute segment. Many 
people, perhaps from envy, feel that speculation is a de­
plorable act. Speculators are subjected to ridicule and 
abuse which is usually not directed toward the more 
conservative investors who purchase for the "long pull."
It is worthwhile, however, to recall the words of Humphrey 
B. Neill:
The stock market is a great cauldron of the hopes, 
desires, and despairs of speculators, or traders.
If it were not for the speculators, there would be 
no active stock market. If it were not for the 
speculators, America would not stand where she does, 
as the leading industrial country in the world. We 
may deplore speculation, but if it were not for this 
outpouring of money for stocks, you and I should not
For a complete treatment of this theory, see Bernard 
M. Baruch, My Own Story (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1 9 5 7 )1
enjoy a fraction of the comforts and luxuries which 
we accept as necessities.1?
Now that the theory of the Balances has been explored, 
it shall now be determined how the Balances have performed 
at the bull market tops and bear market bottoms of the 
past. By empirically testing these Balances at actual 
market junctures, one can determine the conduct of the 
round-lot public as well as the professional element. In 
addition, the hypothesis that "The public is always wrong" 
will encounter the first of a series of formidable tests 
designed to check the financial acumen of the public or 
stock market majority.
Definition of Market Tops and Bottoms. An analysis of 
the meaning and levels of Debit and Credit Balances provide 
some insight into the actions of the different participants 
in the market. Such insight may be important in order to 
ascertain the future trends of the market. As Humphrey 
Neill once asserted: "So long as we guess who is doing the 
buying and selling, we shall remain in a sea of confusion." 
By understanding the Credit and Debit Balances, one can 
depict the activity of the round-lot public and the market 
speculator. Subsequently, these indicators will be synthe­
sized with the odd lots, indicative of the action of the
^Humphrey B. " “ ~ Jing and Market Tactics
(Wells, Vermont; Company“ i960)~t p. 2.
18Ibid., p. 9
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odd-lot public. As a result, one can determine the action 
of all segments of the stock market.
The Debit and Credit Balances are tested empirically 
at the previous bull market tops and bear market bottoms 
from 1956 to May, 1967. The turning points are determined 
by a procedure developed by Robert Rhea. Rhea defines a 
primary bull market as follows:
A primary bull market is a broad upward movement, 
interrupted by secondary reactions, and averaging 
longer than two years. During this time, stock 
prices advance because of a demand created by both 
investment and speculative buying caused by improv­
ing business conditions and increased speculative 
activity. There are three phases of a bull period: 
the first is represented by reviving confidence in 
the future of business; the second is the response 
of stock prices to the known improvement in corpora­
tion earnings, and the third is the period when 
speculation is rampant and inflation apparent--a 
period when stocks are advanced on hopes and 
expectations
In another of his treatises, The Story of the Averages, 
Rhea provides the general characteristics of a primary bear 
market. He states:
A primary bear market is the long downwazd move­
ment interrupted by important rallies. It is 
caused by various economic ills and does not termi­
nate until stock prices have thoroughly discounted 
the worst that is apt to occur. There are three 
principal phases of a bear market: the first
represents the abandonment of the hopes upon which 
stocks were purchased at inflated prices; the 
second reflects selling due to decreased business 
and earnings, and the third is caused by distress
19Robert Rhea, The Dow Theory (Colorado Springs, 
Colorado: Rhea, Greiner & Co., T559), p. 13.
selling of sound securities, regardless of their 
value, by those who must find a cash market for 
at least a portion of their assets.
In the study, secondary reactions are not analyzed.
According to Rhea, secondary reactions are:
...considered to be an important decline in a bull 
market or advance in a bear market, usually lasting 
from three weeks to as many months, during which 
intervals the price movement generally retraces 
from 33 percent to 66 percent of the primary price 
change since the termination of the last preceding 
secondary reaction. These reactions are frequently 
erroneously assumed to represent a change of 
primary trend, because obviously the first stage 
of a bull market must always coincide with a move­
ment which might have proved to have been merely 
a secondary reaction in a bear market, the contra 
being true after the peak has been attained in a 
bull market.2*
In an editorial published December 19, 1900, Charle
Dow remarked:
The market is always to be considered as having 
three movements, all going on at the same time.
The first is the narrow movement from day to day. 
The second is the short swing, running from two 
weeks to a month or more; the third is the main 
movement, covering at least four years in its
duration.22
Dow formulated a theory of market movements which has 
attracted much interest over the years. Since Dow's per 
ceptive formulation of market movements, there has been
20Robert Rhea, The Story of the Averages (Colorado 
Springs, Colorado: Robert Rhea, 1934y^ pp. 3-5.
21Rhea, The Dow Theory, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
22As quoted by william Peter Hamilton, The Stock 
Market Barometer (New York: Richard Russell Associates,
T 960) , p. 30'J------
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much speculation as to the cause of these movements.
William Peter Hamilton believed: "The pragmatic basis for
the theory lies in human nature itself. Prosperity will
drive men to excess, and repentance for the consequence of
o Q
these excesses will produce a corresponding depression." 
Baruch said: "Whatever men attempt they seem driven to try
to overdo."^4
Peter Wyckoff asserts:
Nature teaches us that there is a time for every­
thing: a time for sowing, a time for reaping; a
time for living, a time for dying. Farmers now know 
that the laws of nature cannot be defied, and would 
no more try to raise pineapples in Maine than start 
a maple sugar farm in a Miami suburb.
The same holds true in the stock market. When 
stocks are overbought after a long advance and the 
market cycle changes, neither the bullish opinions 
of all the brokers and financial services in Wall 
Street nor the glowing forecasts made by government 
officials and corporate chiefs can stem the flow of 
selling, any more than bearish news headlines and 
reports, shrunken profit margins, or even the kneel 
of doom itself can halt the tide of buying when the 
time is ripe for another cyclical change.
The stock market moves in definite cycles of 
distribution, decline, accumulation, and advance.
They dovetail roughly with cycles of prosperity, 
recession, depression, and recovery in business.
It is important to be able to identify and time
^^/illiam Peter Hamilton, as cited by Richard Russell, 
The Dow Theory Today, op. cit. , p. 24.
^4Bernard M. Baruch, "Madness of the Crowd," A Treasury 
of Wall Street wisdom, edited by Harry D. Shultz and Samson 
Cos low (Palisades Park, New Jersey: Investors' Press, Inc.,
1966), p. 164.
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these cycles correctly, and to anticipate corre­
sponding changes in public psychology as far as 
possible.25
From the preceding one can conclude that human nature 
may contribute to the various trends which occur in the 
market. Since the Debit and Credit Balances, respectively, 
represent the speculators and the round-lot public, one is 
able to determine the behavior patterns of each group.
These balances should not only be understood as technical 
indicators of market trends, but as indicators of the human 
nature and conduct of different segments participating in 
the stock market. The Balances and behavior patterns are 
first examined at the primary bull market tops from 1956 to 
May, 1967.
Bu11 Market Tops, 1956-57. The year 1956 was marked 
by a double top formation, with the tops occurring on 
April 6 and August 2. In referring to double tops, William 
L. Jiler comments: "Experienced analysts have long recog­
nized them as common patterns of market behavior at a 
turning p>oint, or reversal, and therefore as highly valu­
able ,"2*>
p c ,
Peter Wyckoff, The Psychology of Stock Market Timing, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. 777 Prentice-Hall"i Inc.7 1963) , 
pp. 54-55.
26Wil liaro L. Jiler, How Charts Can Help You in the 
Stock Market (New York: Trendline, 1966*57 p. 73.
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The turn was also signalled by the change in the 
Monthly Credit Balance. At both the tops in 1956, the 
Monthly Credit Balance proved to be a valuable indicator. 
However, the Debit Balance plateaued rather than decreased 
as did the Monthly Credit Balance. Table A-l in Appendix A 
provides the Monthly Credit and Debit Balance figures for 
the tops of 1956. Chart III-l graphically portrays the 
relationship between the Balances and Standard and Poor's 
Average for all major tops from 1956 to May, 1967.
The Monthly Credit Balance peaked on January 31, 1955, 
and then began to decline. A decrease in the Credit Balance 
indicated that the round-lot public had begun to enter the 
market. The majority entered the market long after the 
primary upward trend started as early as September 14, 1953. 
The Credit Balance signalled the first top by reaching a 
low on November 30, 1955, thus leading the first top and 
subsequent downturn by approximately four months. Starting 
in December, 1955, however, the public began to participate 
again as evidenced by a diverging Credit Balance, which 
plummetted downward and leveled out on June 29, 1956. The 
second market top occurred on August 2, 1956, making the 
Credit Balance a leading indicator of the downtrend by 
approximately one month. From its original point of di­
vergence in April, 1956, the Credit Balance was a leading 
indicator by three months. The situation present in 1956 
was somewhat unique in that a double top formation existed, 
with the Monthly Credit Balance serving as a leading indi­
cator in both instances.
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The Monthly Debit Balance was also an indicator in
both cases, as it plateaued in September, 1955. The Debit
Balance usually increases almost all the way to the market
crest at which time the speculators either decrease their
commitments or maintain their present position. Wilson says
that "The Debit Balance frequently plateaus just before 
27market tops.1* When the Debit Balance plateaus, this 
suggests that the speculators have maintained their present 
position and have refused to increase their commitments.
In effect, they are dubious about the continuation of the 
market rise and will not enlarge their portfolios as they 
did at the beginning of the advance. Therefore, the Debit 
Balance may give an indication of a downturn by declining 
or plateauing. The Debit Balance plateaued for more than a 
year, providing ample evidence that the speculators were 
wary and had doubts about the resumption of the uptrend.
As of June, 1956, the Credit Balance also began to stabilize 
at a low level, indicating that the public had maintained 
its heavy commitments in the market. The large expansion 
of personal portfolios by the round-lot public had 
apparently created an overbought market, leading to a weak 
technical position and an opportunity for the informed 
minority to distribute stocks.
As the market rose steadily during 1959-60, both the 
Debit and Credit Balances illustrated a concurrent rise.
Sloan J. Wilson, "The Monthly Credit and Debit 
Balances," Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques, op. 
cit . , p . 29%~.
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It can be seen from Table A-2 in the Appendix that the 
Monthly Credit Balance peaked on March 31, 1959, and then 
diverged from the rising market. A temporary bottom was 
reached on November 30, 1959, which led the January 5,
1960 top by about one month. The Credit Balance continued 
to decline and reached its lowest level on April 29, I960. 
Thus, the public continued to purchase securities as prices 
declined.
The Debit Balance peaked on April 30, 1959, one month 
after the Credit Balance peak, and then began to diverge 
from the rising market to reach a temporary bottom on 
November 30, 1959. The diminishing balances on the ensuing 
decline may be interpreted as indicatory that the specula­
tors were leaving the market while the round-lot public was 
entering.
Both the Debit and Credit Balances reached temporary 
bottoms on November 30, 1959, leading the market by approxi­
mately one month. The Monthly Credit Balance actually 
reached its final bottom on April 29, 1960, indicating that 
this was the point of greatest public participation. Four 
months after the market peak, in the midst of a steep price 
decline, the public was engaged in its heaviest buying of 
the movement. Speculators showed skepticism before the 
market peak and continued to reduct their commitments.
Another primary bull market began on July 18, 1961, 
and culminated on December 12, 1961. Although this bull 
market does not adhere strictly to Rhea's definition of a
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primary bull market, it is nevertheless a top formation 
worthy of mention because of a mass entrance by the round- 
lot public.
Table A-3 in Appendix A indicates that the Credit 
Balance peaked on April 28, 1961, and that the market con­
tinued on its upward path. This is illustrated in Chart 
III-l. As of July 31, 1961, however, the Credit Balance had 
leveled out, indicating that over a two-month span the 
round-lot public made a simultaneous entrance into the 
stock market. Unanimous thinking by the majority was ap­
parently present at the top of 1961, as evidenced by the 
large, simultaneous purchases of the round-lot public.
After the Credit Balance reached bottom in July, it 
plateaued at a relatively low range, indicating that the 
public was still participating heavily. Although the public 
was no longer increasing its holdings, neither was it de­
creasing commitments. This stability indicated that the 
public was apparently optimistic and satisfied that the 
market would continue its upward movement. As Gerald Loeb 
says :
The buying or selling power of the public once 
on a stampede is almost beyond calculation, and 
the fact that they are probably doing an eventually 
costly thing does not in any way decrease the loss 
in fighting the trend or make up for possible 
profits in not taking advantage of it.^8
OB
Gerald M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Survival, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), p. 67.
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The Monthly Credit Balance reached a bottom on July 
31, 1961, leading the market by four months. A clear point 
of divergence with the market averages was obtained on June 
30, 1961. This development led the market by some five 
months.
The Monthly Debit Balance plateaued as of May 31, 1961,
a time when the round-lot public was participating heavily.
Speculators became wary at this point and were reluctant to
increase commitments. Wilson points out: "Apparently, no
rising market of any consequence has expended itself until
29
the public enters it wholeheartedly." Richard Russell
asserts: "Perhaps 80 percent of all stockholders tend to
think of major price movements in terms of special news,
manipulation, government decrees, and Presidential wishes.
The majority is either ignorant of or incapable of grasping
30the concept of the all-powerful trend."
A bull market top first occurred on Standard and Poor's 
Average of 500 stocks on January 18, 1966, and a second top 
was formed on April 21, 1966. Juding from other indicators, 
the market was technically strong. However, Humphrey Neill 
pointed out in his letter of January 5, 1966, that the 
market could be destined for darker days. Neill said that
2^Wilson, The Speculator and the Stock Market, op. cit., 
p. 27.
30For a treatment of this thesis, see Richard Russell, 
The Dow Theory Today (New York: Richard Russell Associates,
m i y : ------------------
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despite technical strength present in the market, "preser-
31vation comes ahead of profits." Continuing, Neill stated
32
that ". . . 1966 is destined to be rough." The letter
urged that a "protective program" be adopted along with a 
"contrary thinking approach."
In his letter of January 19, 1966, Neill again reite­
rated the necessity for adopting the Contrary Thinking 
Theory. Although not a market analyst, Neill devoted almost 
the entire letter to the stock market and the anticipated 
downturn, which he felt was imminent. He asserted: "So--
from the standpoint of past history, it is time for a set­
back; large or small. Crowd psychology will determine
whether the cbming drop will be minor or of some magni-
3 3tude." To substantiate his contrary opinion, Neill
observed: "There is this to be said for the possibility of
a fa 11 that will make the headlines: According to a survey
34of advisory services actual bearishness is at a minimum." 
Advisory services and other moulders of public opinion had 
apparently entered the picture after the market had reached
3 1Humphrey B. Neill, Neill Letter of Contrary Opinion 
(Vermont: January 5, 1966).
32Ibid.
33Humphrey B. Neill, Neill Letter of Contrary Opinion 
(Saxtons River, Vermont: January 19, 1U<56X*
34Ibid.
74
its peak. Therefore, the ultimate result should be that 
the round-lot public would enter the market on the downside 
of the 1966 tops, as opposed to right before the top which 
is the usual custom. Neill once wrote: "The history of
speculation demonstrates that an understanding of mob psy-
O c
chology is a prime essential of price forecasting."
Neill continued in his letter of January 19 by re­
marking :
From the contrary-opinion viewpoint, we 
contrarians have to consider that a bear market 
may eventuate because it is definitely not 
anticipated. Everybody is becoming bullish.
As readers know, it is seldom that this 
contrary observer writes at length on the stock 
market. However, Wall Street today is making 
history--is making a big splash, throwing off 
countless irridescent bubbles that seduce the 
unwary and ensnare the greety. 6
On February 2, 1966, Neill commented: "It seems clear
something must give. A breakaway of some kind appears
likely soon (may have already commenced in the stock market)
37--so we have to be contrary and look at the bear side."
On February 14, 1966, Neill observed, "while no one now 
conceives that there can be a collapse as in those days 
(1929), yet experienced speculators do recognize the
Humphrey B. Neill, Harvest Time Ahead for Contrary 
Thinkers," Financial world, Vol. 77, No. 12 (March 25,
1942), p. 5.
op cit"®111* Neill Letter of Contrary Opinion, pan. 19, 1966),
~^Humphrey B. Neill, Neill Letter of Contrary Opinion 
(Saxtons River, Vermont; February 2”,”~ 1'956')~!
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probability of setback that will look like a '29, while it 
is sliding."38 If this contrary theory had been applied at 
the critical juncture of 1966, many investors would have 
avoided large losses.
The Monthly Credit Balance failed to indicate a market 
reversal. The Credit Balance reached a low on August 31,
1965, although the bottom was not a strong deviation from 
the plateau which had begun in January, 1965. The Credit 
Balance then began a precipitous rise, which indicated that 
the public was not participating in the rise. The market 
formed a double top, the second peak occurring on April 21,
1966. The Balances ordinarily have to be leading indicators 
to be valuable to the market technician. There was no de­
crease in the Monthly Credit Balance until June 30, 1966,
at which time the public began to participate in the market. 
In relation to the second market top in April, the Monthly
Credit Balance was a lagging indicator by some two months.
The top of 1966 was the only case examined where the Credit 
Balance did not perform as a leading indicator.
The Monthly Debit Balance likewise gave no leading 
indication that a market juncture was imminent. It reached 
a low on July 30, 1965, and continued upward with the 
market. The Debit Balance plateaued, beginning in February, 
1966. However, a Monthly Debit Balance figure was recorded
38Humphrey B. Neill, Nei11 Letter of Contrary Opinion
(Saxtons River, Vermont: February 14, T § 6 6 ) .
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for April 29, 1966, meaning that the speculators shrewdly 
increased their commitments immediately prior to the 
second crest in April. Although the Debit Balance did 
plateau, such action could not be perceived until after the 
second market crest. The service of the Debit Balance was 
that of a lagging indicator.
Bear Market Bottons, 1957-1967. During the summer of 
1957, Neill gave emphatic exception to the universal agree­
ment among the public. Neill asserted: ", . . the public's
opinion appears to be swinging strongly to the market's 
going-up-again viewpoint. Thus it appears that businessmen
and average-men look for a higher stock market over coming 
3 9months." With the unanimous opinion extremely optimistic
and bullish for the year 1957, the stock market witnessed a
bear market which bottomed out on October 22, 1957. Neill's
comment on July 17, 1957, was as follows:
It is not often that opinions become as one-sided 
as they appear to be today. The striking reaction 
a contrarian gets from the recent surveys and group 
viewpoints is that the deceptive New Era idea has 
taken root in so many mature minds. Ag'a in, it is a 
reminder of 1928-29 and 1936-37, notwithstanding 
those who retort that this era is "different." The 
resemblance may later prove a shock to current 
complacency. 4<->
39Humphrey B. Neill, Neill Letters of Contrary Opinion 
(July 17, 1957).
40Ibid.
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Neill’s remarks proved to be prophetic as the market 
suffered a precipitous decline. The Contrary Thinking 
Theory, used in conjunction with the Balances, signalled the 
upturn which followed the market bottom. Table A-5 in 
Appendix A illustrates the movement of both Balances during 
the bottom of 1957. In addition, Chart III-2 graphically 
illustrates the movement of these Balances at all market 
bottoms which were examined.
The Monthly Credit Balance decreased throughout the 
period of the market decline. This development indicates 
that the round-lot public increased their purchases as the 
market started its downward slide. The Credit Balance 
reached bottom on April 30, 1957, as funds left on deposit 
with brokers were committed to purchases of securities. The 
plateau which formed slightly before the market bottom 
indicated that heavy public participation was still very 
much in evidence in the market, although the level of the 
plateau was slightly higher than the Credit Balance bottom. 
The plateau indicated some degree of convergence, although 
it was not as distinguishable at the juncture as it was 
immediately thereafter.
After the market bottom of October 22, 1957, the market 
then entered a period of congestion with little fluctuation. 
It was during this congestion range that both Balances gave 
lucid, easily establishable signals of a market upturn.
Both Balances rose rapidly, and the market followed.
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The Monthly Debit Balance plateaued throughout the 
decline, which indicated that speculators were skeptical and 
reluctant to increase their commitments. However, on 
October 31, 1957, the Debit Balance dropped rapidly which 
indicated that the speculators had left the market. The 
Debit Balance continued to drop, while the market remained 
relatively stable. The Debit Balance then increased and 
moved upward simultaneously with the market.
The Monthly Credit Balance began its upward climb on 
May 31, 1957, which made it a leading indicator of a market 
reversal by almost five months. The Monthly Debit Balance 
gave evidence that the speculators decreased their margin 
accounts rather apathetically during the market decline.
In the rise that followed, speculators engaged in almost 
panic buying. The indication of the Debit Balance followed 
closely the movement of stock prices and gave no leading 
indication of a reversal of the bear trend. While the 
market was in its congestion range, however, speculators 
increased their commitments rapidly. Thus the Debit Balance 
led price increases in the early stages of the gradual up­
trend. The Debit Balance rose rapidly as a result of almost 
panic buying on the part of the speculators.
The market decline in 1960 will probably be discussed 
at length for quite a few years to come because there was 
much argument as to whether it was a secondary reaction or 
a primary bear market. For purposes of this study, it is a 
moot question. However, the Financia1 WorId took emphatic
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exception to those who termed the decline a secondary re­
action. Financia1 WorId stated: . . the stock market
embarked on its biggest binge since the late 'twenties, a
wild speculative orgy that ended--as all previous ones have--
41in a slide of cataclysms proportions."
Since the dip was regarded as a rather serious one, it 
is analyzed thoroughly despite the fact that the bottom 
does not strictly adhere to Rhea’s definition of a primary 
bear market. Selden points out, however, that " . . .  the 
decline is usually much more rapid than the previous ad- 
va nee.1,42
Monthly Balance figures in Table A-6 of the Appendix 
reveal that the Credit Balance began to decline prior to the 
market top of early I960 and proceeded to decrease through­
out the entire market decline. The Credit Balance actually 
reached bottom on April 29, 1960, and then began its upward 
climb. The fact that the rising Credit Balance was con­
verging on the falling stock market became obvious at the 
end of July, 1960. The Monthly Credit Balance began to 
lead the increase in stock prices by about three months.
The concept of convergence and its implication of a near- 
term market reversal are very well illustrated at the market 
bottom of October 25, 1960.
^"Extraordinary Delusions," Financia1 WorId, Vol. 124, 
No. 26 (December 29, 1965), p. 3.
^George C. Selden, Psychology of the Stock Market 
(Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company^ T9S5y^ pi 17.
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The Monthly Debit Balance touched bottom on July 29, 
1960, and then moved upward. A large increase in the Debit 
Balance had been recorded by the end of August, I960, which 
meant that this Balance was also converging with the market. 
An especially strong signal was provided since both balances 
confirmed the bottom by converging with the market.
Both Balances continued to increase, thus paralleling 
the upward trend in the market. The rising Debit Balance 
may be interpreted to mean that the speculators were 
accounting for the first stages of a new bull market trend, 
while the rising Credit Balance illustrated that the round- 
lot public was abstaining from the stock market during the 
early stages of the advance--a time when they should have 
been buying.
The market bottom of 1962 was a "double bottom" forma­
tion, with the first bottom occurring on June 26, and the 
second taking place on October 23.
The Monthly Credit Balance reached a temporary bottom 
at the end of April, 1962, and then increased for the next 
two months. The temporary bottom and the ephemeral increase 
in the Credit Balance gave evidence that a rally would occur 
in the near future. The upswing in the Credit Balance led 
the brief increase in stock prices on the secondary reaction 
by approximately one month. On June 26, the market hit 
bottom and then exhibited a pronounced reversal of trend, 
which gave surface indications that an uptrend was in the 
making. However, the Credit Balance once more decreased
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sharply and indicated a renewed interest on the part of the 
round-lot public. The Credit Balance reached its final 
bottom at the end of September and then showed a distinct 
rise by the end of October, as illustrated by Chart III-2 
and Table A-7 in the Appendix. The increase in the Monthly 
Credit Balance was coincident with the upsurge in stock 
prices, rising in gear with the market toward the end of 
October.
The Monthly Debit Balance proved to be a good indicator 
in both instances. The Debit Balance decreased during the 
market decline and barely missed bottom at the end of June, 
1962. The final bottom for the Debit Balance was reached 
at the end of July, and the concept of convergence became 
pronounced. The increase in speculator commitments during 
August signalled that the market bottom was near, and the 
Debit Balance then led the market in its upward course by 
almost two months. By failing to increase in June, the 
Debit Balance gave warning that the secondary reaction did 
not represent the formation of a true primary uptrend and 
that another bottom would follow. Speculators decreased 
their commitments into stocks as prices fell, and holdings 
reached a low level coincident with the first market bottom. 
Technicians who followed the Debit and Credit Balances were 
given ample indication of the subsequent upturn and were 
able to capitalize on the reversal of trend in the market.
At the bottoms of 1962, examination of the Monthly 
Credit Balance revealed that the round-lot public increased
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stock commitments during the entire decline and did not 
complete purchasing until the second market bottom. Ap­
parently the public believed that 1962 marked another new 
era market, where prices would never cease to go higher.
Wyckoff says, however, that: "The market actually is very
43old; only we who participate in it are new." Fred c. Kelly
and Sullivan Burgess once remarked:
Our New Era market (1920's) could hardly have 
ended in any other way than it did, in a panic.
People had to be dynamited out of the idea that 
they were dealing only in prices and not in values. 
Seemingly intelligent folk actually began to 
believe that only minor reactions were ever needed, 
and that broad upward trend could last forever.44
From the standpoint of the Balances, the juncture of
1966 is perhaps the most peculiar on record. The market
reached for a double top on April 21, 1966, and then began
its downward course. The terminal point of the bear market
was reached on October 7, 1966. Although the top of 1966
has previously been analyzed, it is necessary to synthesize
the top and bottom of 1966 in order to determine over-all
public participation in one of the most perplexing of all
ma r ke t pe r i od s .
Since Neill mentioned that advisory services became
bullish in January, 1966, the many "public readers" were
43Wyckoff, op. cit., p. 76.
44Fred C. Kelly and Sullivan Burgess, How Shrewd 
Speculators win (Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company,
1^64) , pp. l T ^  120.
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apparently encouraged to become bullish and to purchase 
stocks. After the second market top, the market began to 
drop quickly. The Theory of Contrary Thinking is perhaps 
one of the better market tools when one detects the influ­
ence of the "public opinion moulders" which encourage 
unanimous thought by the majority.
The Monthly Credit Balance first gave evidence of 
round-lot public participation in June, 1966, two months 
after the second top formed in the market. Although the 
round-lot public entered the market, it entered much later 
than usual. The round-lot public entered the market on the 
decline as opposed to immediately prior to the market top.
Bernard Baruch once asserted: "All economic movements, by
45
their very nature, are motivated by crowd psychology."
Baruch also stated:
Although there be no scientific cure, yet, as in 
all primitive, unknown (and therefore diabolic) 
spells, there may be potent incantantions. I have 
always thought that if, in the lamentable era of the 
"New Economics," culminating in 1929, even in the 
very presence of dizzily spiralling prices, we had 
all continuously repeated, "two and two still make 
four," much of the evil might have been averted.4^
The round-lot public participated continuously during
the market decline and during a few months of the recovery.
However, the round-lot public began to liquidate its
Bernard M. Baruch in the foreword of the book by 
Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the 
Madness of Crowd's (New York: L . C. Page & Co., Inc. ,' 1966)
46Ibid.
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securities in December, 1966, before the market underwent 
any appreciable rise.
The Monthly Debit Balance peaked at the end of April, 
1966, approximately the same time that the second market 
top was formed. Speculators then began a steady reduction 
of their commitments, with real evidence being provided by 
the low figures at the end of September and the final 
bottom at the end of October. Speculators increased their 
stock holdings until the market reached its second crest, 
then reduced their stock holdings during the entire de­
cline, and reached a low point almost coincident with the 
final market bottom. Speculators were selling their 
securities to the public as the market entered its downward 
movement. It should also be mentioned that the Monthly 
Debit Balance plateaued from December, 1965, to August, 
1966, which indicated that speculators were dubious and 
opposed to an increase in their holdings.
The F i na nc ia 1 world, like Neill, showed very much 
skepticism. On December 29, 1965, Financia1 World stated:
When too many people begin to believe they can 
make a lot of money in the market quickly and 
easily, prudent investors would do well to prepare 
for the inevitable. Once again brokers* board 
rooms are filled to standing capacity with hordes 
of tape-watchers. Many of the more gullible are 
succumbing to the frequent and persistent rumors 
that are making the rounds.4”
47"Extraordinary Delusions," Financial WorId, op. cit.,
p. 3.
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Confucius, the sage for another era, once remarked: "The
superior man makes demands upon himself; the inferior man
makes demands upon o t h e r s . C o n f o r m i s t s  have apparently
fared poorly in the annals of the stock market, but the
correlation between man's ability to think and success has
never been in greater evidence than during the bear market
of 1966. Such success brings to mind the great wisdom of
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow:
The heights by great men won and kept 
Were not attained by sudden flight 
For they, while their companions slept,
Were toiling upwards in the night.
It should be indicated that the followers of the
Balances, despite their lagging relationships, probably
left the market at a time when losses were not great. At
the market bottom, both Balances followed the initial rise
in stock prices. Neither Balance signalled an upturn until
December, 1966, some two months after the market bottom.
Both Balances then paralleled the market in its upward
spiral. The lagging Balances enabled the followers of the
Balances to join the market at a time when one could have
participated and enjoyed an appreciable market rise. The
junctures of 1966, more than any other critical points
investigated, indicated the necessity of using the Balances
48As quoted by Walter A. Heiby, Live Your Life (New 
York; Harper & Row Publishers, 1966)"i 65.
49Ibid., p. 47.
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in conjunction with the Contrary Thinking Theory. The 1966 
junctures, as evidenced by the commentaries of Neill and 
the Financia1 World, were associated with unanimous opinion 
and thought that were more one-sided than at any other 
juncture. Granville contends: "Human nature being what it
is, the public majority is unfortunately wedded to majority 
opinion despite the fact that the stock market has proven 
such opinion wrong at the most critical times, just prior to 
major market turns.
Summary. From the preceding analysis, it is readily 
seen that there are worthwhile indicators to aid the market 
technician in ascertaining the type of buying and selling 
which is transpiring in the market place. The Monthly 
Credit Balance indicates the round-lot public, the generally 
uninformed segment of the market place. The round-lot pub­
lic has a propensity to begin purchasing near or at the 
zenith of a market movement and then expanding these pur­
chases during the market decline. Generally the round-lot 
public will purchase securities on the downward move to the 
proximity of the bottom. Although the round-lot public is 
essentially right in purchasing near a market bottom, they 
are decidedly wrong in liquidating their portfolios as the 
market begins to rise. The beginning of the market rise
50J. E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market 
Timing for Maximum ProfiT,~op^ cit., p. 162.
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marks the precise time when securities should be purchased 
rather than sold.
The Monthly Debit Balance represents the apparently 
more astute group in the market known as speculators. 
Speculators are generally characterized by increasing their 
stock commitments as the market begins to rise and then 
reducing these holdings as the market declines. The timing 
of the speculators is generally good and is in contrast to 
that of the public. While the speculators buy low and sell 
high, the public appears to buy at higher prices and sell 
at lower prices. The action of the two Balances lends 
credence to the market maxim that for every seller, there is 
a buyer and conversely, for every buyer, there is a seller.
The Monthly Credit Balance served as a valuable, 
leading indicator of all market tops, with the exception of 
the 1966 crest. The Credit Balance gave leading indications 
of the tops from one to four months, and it thus allowed the 
astute market technician to determine the entrance and 
degree of public participation. By knowing from one to four 
months ahead of time that the public had entered the market, 
it allowed the intelligent trader ample time to liquidate 
his securities prior to the anticipated downturn. Neill 
advises:
The ideal situation is a result of your having 
timed your actions so that you precede the public 
in buying--that is, buy when stocks are being 
accumulated--then you can go along with the 
majority during the major portion of the advance, 
and can part company at definite signs of in­
creased public participation without corresponding 
progress in the movement of the stock. The
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greatest public participation is near and at the 
tops, because as tie have learned, rising prices 
attract a f olloti ing . 51
The Credit Balance does not confirm the idea that the 
round-lot public is always wrong. Essentially, the public 
is right during a portion of the major trends, but it is 
wrong at the critical junctures where the market is readying 
for a pronounced reversal of trend.
Of the four p>eriods reviewed, only in the 1966 period 
did the Credit Balance fail to give a leading indication of 
a market top. The Credit Balance was a lagging indicator 
by some two months, but it did illustrate that the round- 
lot public accumulated stocks during the decline in the 
market.
For the market bottoms tested, the Monthly Credit 
Balance was once a coincident indicator and twice a leading 
indicator of the terminal points of bear markets. Only in 
1966 did the Credit Balance actually not provide a strong 
signal, as it was a lagging indicator by some two months.
The Credit Balance, however, did turn upward shortly there­
after and parallel the market rise.
The Monthly Debit Balance was also a leading indicator 
of market tops in every instance tested with the exception 
of the 1966 top. It should be recalled that the Debit 
Balance may give an indication of a market top by either 
diverging from the market or by plateauing. The divergence
■^Neill, Tap>e Reading and Market Tactics, op. cit., 
p. 47.
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process usually occurred approximately one or two months 
prior to the downturn of the market, while the plateau 
process started several months before the market top. Es­
pecially strong signals are given when the two Balances 
confirm each other; that is, acting together and diverging 
from the rising market prior to the market reversal.
The Monthly Debit Balance was also an excellent indica­
tor of stock market bottoms. As in the analysis of market 
tops, the Debit Balance proved to be a strong leading indi­
cator in every instance except the 1966 bottom, where it 
lagged by approximately two months. In most cases the Debit 
Balance was a leading indicator by some two to three months 
and illustrated the concept of convergence, where it began 
to rise and converge on the falling stock market. At the 
juncture of 1957, the Debit Balance was a coincident indica­
tor, paralleling the market rise and still providing a 
useful signal.
Now that the speculator and the round-lot public have 
been investigated, it is necessary to delve into the actions 
of the odd-lot public. By investigating the actions of the 
odd-lot public, a picture will be obtained of the professi­
onals (speculators), the round-lot public, and the odd-lot 
public. Constituents of the odd-lot public will be con­
trasted with the round-lot mmbers and an over-all view of 
public participation will be gained.
CHAPTER IV
QDD-LOTTERS AND MARKET JUNCTURES
There is a tide in the affairs 
of men, which taken at the flood, 
leads on to fortune; omitted, all 
the voyage of their life is bound 
in shallows and in miseries.
-- William Shakespeare 
Stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange are 
generally traded in round lots or in lots of one hundred 
shares. (There are approximately 200 issues which trade 
in lots of 10 shares, most of these being preferred and 
high-priced, low-volume issues.) In most cases, however, 
one who desires to buy or sell in quantities of less than 
one hundred shares is considered to be an "odd-lot" in­
vestor. About 99 percent of the odd-lot volume is handled 
by two brokerage firms: Carlisle & Jacquelin and De Coppet
& Doremus. Odd-lot transactions are reported as prelimi­
nary figures on the ticker tape before noon of each trading 
day. These reported figures relate to the trading of the 
immediately preceding market day. Some two weeks later 
the Securities and Exchange Commission publishes the final 
figures. Preliminary figures are far the more valuable as 
forecasting devices since they are more timely. Walter 
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis,
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made the completion of this section possibly by furnishing 
such preliminary, odd-lot trading data.
Predictive yalue of Odd-Lot Data. One of the most
exhaustive studies ever conducted on odd-lot data was made
by the Brookings Institution (1920 - 1938) and published
in book form by Charles Hardy. Hardy concluded that the
behavior of the odd-lot trading public was contrary to
those (professionals) who dominated the price movements.^
Hardy asserted: "In general, unless either the net balance
or the price change was very small, the public net sales
were followed by price advances, and public net purchases
2
were followed by price declines."
Hardy continues by stating: "This phenomenon has been
observed frequently enough to give rise to a tradition that 
the public is always wrong or is wrong so often that the
movements of the odd-lot balance furnish a serviceable
3
forecaster of stock prices." Hardy then apparently re­
verses his position by contending: "In the writer's judg­
ment, however, the correlations have little or no real 
forecasting value, because a forecast based on the behavior 
of the odd-lot public would be substantially the same as
^For a complete treatment of this thesis, see Charles 
0. Hardy, 03d Lot Trading on the New York Stock Exchange 
(Washington, D. C."i The Brookings I ns t it ut ion , 1939) .
2Ibid., pp. 61-62.
^Ibid.
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one based on the movements of the market itself." Atten­
tion will be focused on Hardy's contention that the 
correlations have little or no forecasting value.
Underlying Theory of the Odd Lots. Garfield Drew, the 
originator of the Odd-Lot Theory, states that odd-lot data 
"are a fairly recent innovation and, for the first time in 
Stock Exchange history, have afforded definite information 
on the question of who is doing what."5 Drew also advocates 
the use of preliminary figures as opposed to the final 
figures of the SEC, as he mentions that the latter "comes 
too late to be of much significance."^
Granville apparently supports Hardy's initial conten­
tion that odd-lotters do represent the trading public. He 
states: "The public usually buys and sells stock in lots
of less than lOO shares and thus the odd-lot figures best
7
reflect what the public is doing." Loeb says: "People
who depend more on the buying or selling quality information 
given by the odd-lot figures are in a far better position 
to know of a coming trend before it actually starts."
4Ibid., pp. 62-63.
Garfield A. Drew, New Methods for Profit in the Stock 
Market {Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company” 1966),
p.' 193.
^Ibid., p. 194.
7
Joseph E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market 
Timing For Maximum Profit (Englewood cTTffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc.~ 1966), p. 76.
Q
Gerald M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Surviva1 
(New York; Simon and Schuster, 1963)“ pT 76.
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Drew says that technicians should be vitally concerned with
the odd-lotter because he is a "creature of emotion with
o
his psychology and reactions." Drew also states: "The
trading public is ordinarily most interested in this day,
10this week, and this month." In another of his classic 
articles on odd-lot behavior, Drew maintains: There are
classic, consistent patterns of mass behavior which appear 
in the varying quantities of odd-lot buying and selling; 
from these, much can be learned about future probabili­
ties."^ The findings of the Brookings Institution that 
80 to 95 percent of all odd-lot trades were turned over 
within one month during the eighteen-year-study illustrated
that odd-lotters apparently succumb to emotions and the de-
12sire to make a quick profit. In view of the character­
istically rapid turnover of shares held by odd-lot traders, 
it is understandable that one could contend that the public 
is victimized by emotion and sentiment. Drew says that "It 
is fair to say that changes in odd-lot trading are evidence
o
Garfield A. Drew, "The Misunderstood Odd-Lotter," 
Barron's, Vol. XLII, No. 26 (June 25, 1962), p. 5.
"^Garfield A. Drew, "The Odd Lotters," A Treasury of 
Wall Street Wisdom, edited by Harry D. SchuTtz and Samson 
Coslow (Palisades Park, New Jersey: Investors' Press, Inc.,
1966), p. 164.
^Drew, "The Misunderstood Odd-Lotter," o£. cit., p. 5.
1 2See Hardy, op* cit., p. 65.
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1 3of shifts in public sentiment."
The theory^-4 alleges that trading patterns of the odd- 
lotters usually fall into the same sequence in relation to 
cyclical swings of stock prices, as well as on the shorter 
term moves. According to Drew, odd-lotters are purported 
to regard a decisive price decline as a bargain day, and 
they begin to buy heavily on balance. As the slide is sus­
tained, however, the confidence of the odd-lot segment is 
shaken and a reduction of odd-lot purchases is witnessed. 
When prices increase, the theory maintains that the odd- 
lotters are dubious concerning the extent of the advance 
and reduce their holdings. Ultimately, however, the per­
sistence of the advance overcomes the skepticism and the 
odd-lot public buys on balance. According to the Odd-Lot 
Theory, the odd-lot public manages its portfolios in a 
manner similar to the round-lot public in that it does not 
join an advance until near the top or just subsequent to 
the market crest. After a market bottom has been reached, 
the public supposedly liquidates its portfolios, thus 
illustrating a lack of timing in the market.
Walter Heiby is another proponent of the Odd-Lot Theory 
and a staunch supporter of Garfield Drew. Heiby says that
. these odd-lotters are quite representative of the
13D rew, "The Misunderstood Odd-Lotter," o£. cit., p. 5.
14For a complete treatment of the Odd-Lot Theory and 
its many implications, see Garfield Drew, New Methods for 
Prof it in the Stock Market, op. cit.
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general public.” '*'5 Heiby confirms Drew's idea that odd- 
lotters are creatures of emotion, as he states: "Odd-
lotters, as a group, act in ways that suggest a considerable 
sensitivity to the immediate trend of stock prices.""*-^  
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that such theories do 
have some merit. On May 28, 1962, the Dow-Jones Industrial 
Average dipped 34.95 points and became known as "Black 
Monday." As a concurrent reaction to such a dip, odd- 
lotters sold more than thirteen shares for each ten that 
were purchased. However, on May 30, 1962, odd-lotters re­
versed their position and purchased approximately three 
shares for each one sold.
On November 3, 1948, the entire nation was stunned when 
President Truman won the presidential election. On that 
day, the odd-lotters sold some five shares for every four 
that were purchased. On the next day, however, odd-lotters 
purchased approximately 10 shares for every six which were 
sold.
Misunderstandings of the Theory. As a result of the 
complexity of the Odd-Lot Theory, there have been many re­
sulting misconceptions. There are at least two important 
factors which have been largely overlooked by the vast 
majority. First, the Brookings study explicitly states that
15Wa Iter A. Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic 
Synthesis (Chicago, Illinois: The Institute of Dynamic
Synthes is, Inc., 1965), p. 157.
l6Ibid,, p. 159.
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some 6 percent of odd-lot purchases are made by "investors" 
who are concerned with the long pull. These investors 
purchase blue-chip stocks for storage in bank boxes and 
completely dismiss the idea of selling them. Any moderate 
excess of odd-lot purchases over sales, therefore, may 
represent an excess of selling so far as the active public 
trading element is concerned. The public trading element, 
to be sure, is almost the entire part of the whole as re­
lating to the odd-lot transactions.
Secondly, Drew states:
...because odd-lot trading is essentially a 
speculative quick turn affair--its volume is 
always directly proportional to the total volume 
of trading. Therefore, it is not the number of 
shares bought or sold on balance that is 
important, but the proportions of buying or 
selling to each other.17
Since the total amount of odd-lot trading is a relative
constant as it relates to total trading volume, the number
of shares bought or sold on balance by the odd-lotters is
not a primary consideration. The proportions of buying or
selling to each other, however, represent the essential
criterion to gauge the activities of the general odd-lot
segment of the market place.
Indicators in the Study. In order to determine the 
financial acumen of the odd-lot public, certain indicators
17Drew, New Methods For Profit in the Stock Market, 
op. cit., p. 198.
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1 ftare used. These consist of the Weekly Balance Ratio, a 
Balance Index, the Weekly Short Sales Ratio, and a Short 
Sales index. Before proceeding with the investigation, it 
is necessary to define each of the above.
The Weekly Balance Ratio is defined as total weekly 
odd-lot sales divided by total weekly odd-lot purchases.
The Balance Index is a five-week moving average of the weekly 
ratios of odd-lot selling to odd-lot buying. Mathematically, 
the moving average of the weekly figures is not completely 
accurate, but it is easier than the more tedious methods of 
deriving the five-week totals and then obtaining the Index 
figures. In addition, the calculations used illustrate the 
trends as well as any other method and allows the technician 
an opportunity to formulate a trend of odd-lot activity.
The Balance Ratio and the Balance Index both serve well as 
an indicator of trends in odd-lot activities and public 
sentiment.^ Drew regards the determination of the trend of 
public sentiment as the key factor involved, stating: "Most
important, however, is the fact that the trend of sentiment 
as indicated by the odd-lot balance of trading is more
1 ftFor other variations of this same type of analysis, 
see Walter A. Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic 
Synthesis, op. cit. Also, see Garfield A, Drew, New 
Methods For Profit in the Stock Market, op. cit.
l^ F o r  a treatment of odd-lotter behavior, see "The Odd- 
Lotter," Financial World, Vol. 120, No. 16 (October 16, 1963), 
pp. 3, 23“
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20important than the side on which the balance lies."
If the Odd-Lot Theory has merit and proves the public 
to be wrong at critical market junctures, both the Weekly 
Balance Ratio and the Balance Index should become lower on 
market declines and at market bottoms. This would be con­
strued as increased public participation as the market turns 
downward. Both indicators should increase when the stock 
market turns upward, as the public begins selling during 
the early stages of a market advance. Heiby asserts that 
the Balance Index and Balance Ratio are of primary value
when one can observe "the trend relative to the trend of
21stock prices."
The other indicators employed in the study are the 
Weekly short Sales Ratio and a Short Sales Index, these 
being expressed in terms of percentages. The odd-lotter 
who sells short is of special interest because of the 
comment made by Drew:
The odd-lot short seller is apparently a 
different breed of cat than the average member 
of the odd-lot public, which is not surprising, 
since comparatively few members of the public 
understand short selling and even fewer are 
willing to put it into practice. However, he is 
even less right than the average odd-lot trader, 
and the reactions of those willing to employ the 
short side more nearly conform to the supposed 
habits of the public than is indicated by the
20Drew, New Methods For Profit in the Stock Market, 
op. cit., p. 198.
2^Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic Synthesis, 
op. cit., p. 205.
10O
22buying and selling share balances themselves.
From Drew's comment, one could infer that if the odd-lotter 
is truly wrong, then the odd-lot short seller is even more 
wrong. This proposition shall be tested.
The Short Sales Ratio is determined by dividing weekly 
odd-lot short sales by total weekly odd-lot sales. The 
Short Sales Index is a five-week moving average of the Short 
Sales Ratios, and it also allows the technician to formulate 
a trend of odd-lot activity. Both of these indicators have 
a propensity to move in the opposite direction from the 
stock market. The Short Sales Ratio and Index both generally 
rise as stock prices fall and decline as the market rises. 
When the market reaches a bottom, the odd-lot short seller 
is typically very busy. Anthony Ludovici says that "... in­
creases in odd-lot short sales usually precede a market 
23rally," Ludovici believes that "the more shares sold
24short the more bullish the implication." Therefore, both 
the odd-lotters and the odd-lot short sellers should provide 
an indication of over-all public sentiment.
These four indicators are employed to determine the 
astuteness of the odd-lot public at the critical market 
junctures. Drew contends that the Balance Ratio and Index
22Drew, New Methods for Profit in the Stock Market, op. 
cit., p. 205.
23Anthony Ludovici, "Odd-Lot Short Sales Presage Market 
Rally," The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 204,
No. 6622 (October 20, 1966)7 P» 1388 •
24Ibid.
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are key determinants. He also asserts: "Corroboration by
25the Short Sales Index, however, is an important factor."
Pitfalls of the Balance Indicators. At the end of 
each calendar year, empirical evidence reveals that many 
odd-lotters begin to liquidate their stocks for income tax 
purposes. Consequently, there is an abundance of odd-lot 
selling at this time. If there is a buyer for every seller 
and a seller for every buyer, each purchase is a sale and 
each sale represents a purchase. In odd-lot transactions, 
however, "there is an intermediary, the odd-lot dealer, and 
the number of shares purchased differs, in general, from 
the number of shares sold. Shares purchased and shares sold
9
are reported as distinct figures."
The abundance of odd-lot selling at the end of the year 
results in a distortion of the Balance Index and the Balance 
Ratio and both become larger. Consequently, one could 
easily misinterpret the Index to conclude that odd-lotters 
are leaving the market as a result of public sentiment being 
on the bearish side. The distortion as a result of tax- 
selling usually occurs between mid-November and the first 
week in December, but there is no rigid date for the be­
ginning of tax-selling effects.
25Dr ew, "The Misunderstood Odd-Lotter," Barron's, op. 
cit., p. 22.
2^*Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic Synthesis, 
op. cit., p. 167.
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Now that the basic tenets of the Odd-Lot Theory have 
been examined, an investigation of the odd-lot public at 
critical market junctures will be conducted.
Odd-Lotters at Critical Market Junctures. The odd-lot 
public began purchasing stocks on balance in the middle of 
October, 1955. These purchases preceded the double top of 
April 6, 1956, and August 2, 1956. Chart IV-1 illustrates 
the indicators and standard and Poor’s Average for all 
critical junctures from 1956-1960. The derived computations 
of the indicators for the 1956 double top are presented in 
Table B-l of Appendix B.
Odd-lotters purchased on balance from the middle of 
October, 1955, until the second market top in August, 1956. 
The odd-lot segment then continued to purchase on the de­
cline which followed. The action of the odd-lotters con­
firms the thoughts of William L. Jiler, who states: ’’Toward
the end of an advance, odd-lotters begin to buy more than 
normally. They continue to do so while the market is making
its top. Often their buying becomes frenzied close to the
2 7very top.” Granville says : ’’The sharp increase in the
on-balance odd-lot buying usually commences somewhere near 
the end of the upswing and thus the informed elements are 
pleased to accommodate the public with all the stock it
27William L. Jiler, How Charts Can Help You in the 
Stock Market (New York: Trendline Corp., 1^66), p. 173.
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28wants at the then advanced prices." Continuing, Gran­
ville contends that when there is ". . . heavy public
participation on the bullish side, the time has come to
29
think about some serious selling." The only noticeable 
selling occurred in the calendar distortion period of 
December, 1955.
Both of the market tops of 1956 were adequately de­
picted by the odd-lot indicators. The Balance Ratio and 
the Balance Index were firmly corroborated by the Weekly 
Short Sales Ratio and the Short Sales Index, the confirma­
tion beginning at the first of the year 1956 and terminating 
in August, 1956. As the Balance Index and Ratio remained 
low, the Short Sales indicators likewise were unusually de­
pressed. Such action is construed that the odd-lot public 
was unusually bullish and purchased on-balance prior to the 
tops and down the subsequent decline. The odd-lot short- 
sellers were concurrently bullish, as the Short Sales indi­
cators reflected very little activity.
The Balance Ratio and Balance Index diverged from the 
climbing market by mid-October, 1955, almost six months 
prior to the market downturn. However, the tax-selling 
effect was present in December, thus nullifying an earlier 
signal that the public had entered the market. However, the
28Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing 
For Maximum Profit7 op. cit~7, pp~T~T7^7W.
^Ibid .
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Balance Index, corroborated by the Short Sales Index, 
clearly signalled the market decline by some four months.
If one had studied the odd-lot data closely, he would have 
easily understood that the double top formation indicated 
only a struggling attempt by the market at the second top 
to attain previous heights. Heavy odd-lot purchases warned 
the technician that the odd-lot public had entered the 
market on a large scale, thus relegating the market to a 
weaker technical position. Consequently, the astute tech­
nician understood that a market decline was imminent.
The bull market began on September 14, 1953, but the 
odd-lot public was apparently not cognizant of such a move 
until mid-October, 1955. Odd-lotters joined the market late 
in the trend and continued purchasing on the decline, proba­
bly eroding most of the profits that had been realized late 
on the upswing.
A market bottom was registered on October 22, 1957.
The general odd-lot public began to purchase on balance as 
of late June, 1957, and continued to do so until May, 1958. 
Computations to indicate the activity of the odd-lot public 
are provided in Table B-2 of the Appendix. The Short Sales 
indicators decreased concurrently with the Balance Ratio and 
the Balance Index, which meant that the general odd-lot 
public and the odd-lot shorts were all confident that the 
market would continue to rise. The general odd-lot public, 
as evidenced by the Balance Index and the Balance Ratio, 
showed that they remained bullish all the way to the market
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bottom and for a slight portion of the advance. Odd-lot 
short sellers remained inactive until October, immediately 
prior to the market bottom. Drew asserts that the odd-lot 
short-seller "is only prodded into exceptional activity by 
the spectacle of sharply declining prices, at which time he 
proceeds to swim with the tide.'*30
The Weekly Odd-Lot Short Sales Ratio and the Short 
Sales Index proved to be excellent indicators of the market 
bottom in 1957 as both measures increased substantially at 
approximately the market bottom. The market then remained 
in a congestion range until April, 1958, before an appreci­
able market rise was launched. By becoming active only at 
the market bottom, the odd-lot short sellers apparently
confirmed Drew's contention that they are "even less right
31than the average odd-lot trader." Odd-lot short selling 
reached a maximum coincident to the market bottom of 1957. 
The Balance Ratio and the Balance Index, indicative of the 
general odd-lot public as opposed to the odd-lot short 
seller, revealed that the general public mistimed the market 
movement. The public purchased on the decline and apparent­
ly watched paper profits diminish. The general odd-lot 
public was essentially correct in purchasing securities at 
the bottom, but they were obviously wrong in selling as the
3(^ Drew, "The Misunderstood Odd-LotterBarron's, op. 
cit., p. 22.
31Drew, New Methods For Profit in the Stock Market., op. 
cit., p. 205.
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market began an appreciable rise in May, 1958. This is 
graphically shown by Chart IV-1. It was in May, 1958, that 
the odd-lotters started selling heavily on balance, as de­
tected by the Balance Ratio and the Balance Index. The 
change in public sentiment proved to be most inopportune
and supports Drew's statement that "Changes of public senti-
32ment are almost always wrong." Granville contends that
the on balance selling by odd-lotters at the start of a
market advance ", . • is only providing the professional
element with a grand opportunity to take the stock off their
hands at wholesale prices," The conduct of the majority
or odd-lot public at the market bottom of 1957 apparently
lends credence to Robert L. Smitley's thesis that "The
greatest majority are ruled entirely by their emotions and
34are, therefore, the natural prey of those who think."
The double top of 1959 and early 1960 resembled very 
much the double top of 1956. The first top occurred on 
July 29, 1959, and the second on January 5, 1960. The 
general odd-lot public began to purchase on balance at the 
beginning of August, 1959, immediately after the first
32Ibid., p. 199.
33Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing 
For Maximum ProfitJ op. cifT, p. 76.
^ F o r  a treatment of this thesis, see Robert L. 
Smitley, Popular Financial Delusions (Wells, Vermont: 
Fraser Publishing Company, 1963).
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market top. Table B-3 in the Appendix provides computations 
necessary to understand odd-lot activity during this period.
Jiler says that odd-lotters " . . .  buy more than normally
35during the beginning stage of a decline in the market.1*
The initial stages of the on-balance buying were concurrent 
with depressed Short Sales indicators, indicating a very 
bullish public sentiment.
The second market top in Figure IV-1 for 1960 was also 
greeted with depressed figures for all indicators, meaning 
that public opinion was still optimistic. The odd-lot 
public did not purchase on-balance until immediately after 
the first market top, and then continued to purchase heavily 
on-balance throughout the second market top and on the de­
cline. Both tops illustrated unanimity of public thought 
and sentiment, as reflected by the indicators. The concept 
of unanimous thinking makes one recall the immortal words 
of Charles F. "Pop" Kettering, who stated:
Whenever you look at a piece of work and you 
think the fellow was crazy, then you want to pay 
some attention to that. One of you is likely to 
be, and you had better find out which one it is.
It makes an awful lot of difference,
A technician who was conversant with odd-lot statistics 
perceived the second market top as a struggling effort to 
regain former heights. The odd-lot public was heavily
35Jiler, op. cit., p. 173.
3^Charles F. Kettering, as cited by Walter A. Heiby, 
Live Your Life (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966),
PT15T:
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engaged in the market, and such buying apparently made the
market overbought and technically weak. Schultz says that
Mthe market does not accommodate a majority, because it
cannot. You can't have a majority of winners in anything,
be it horse-racing, or a turkey raffle, an election, rou-
37lette, baseball, etc." Wyckoff reiterates these thoughts, 
stating: "A moment's reflection will show that important
episodes in the market cannot possibly occur when the 
majority thinks they will."88
The odd-lotters purchased on-balance as the market 
entered its downward course, and they continued such activi­
ty until mid-May, 1960, some four and one-half months after 
the second market top. The public actually maintained a 
noimal sales to purchases relationship from mid-May until 
the market bottom of October 25, I960.
Short Sales indicators again reached their greatest 
heights at a time coincident with the market bottom, so they 
provided excellent signals of the approaching market bottom. 
The Weekly Short Sales Ratio and the Short Sales index 
gradually increased on the market slide, reached a crest at 
the market bottom of 1960, and then gradually decreased as 
the market reversed and headed upward.
Harry D. Schultz, Bear Markets: How to Survive and
Make Money in Them (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 15^6), p. 112.
38Peter Wyckoff, The Psychology of Stock Market Timing, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Pre ni ic e-Ha 11^ Inc .~ 1966)~, p^ 137.
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Despite the strong possibility of tax selling towards 
the end of the year, odd-lotters began selling on-balance 
as of the end of November, 1960. Sustained on-balance 
selling continued during the initial stages of the bull 
market. An especially strong bull market signal was given 
because both the Balance indicators and the Short Sales 
indicators confirmed, which indicated universal sentiment 
among the public. The public sentiment had changed to the 
bearish side, which forced the technician to consider that 
there was a strong possibility of an approaching bull 
market. The odd-lot public bought heavily during the 
initial stages of the decline, but they were essentially 
correct in not participating heavily throughout the entire 
dec line.
Neither of the top and bottom formations of 1961-62 
and of 1966 adhered strictly to the definitions employed 
for primary bull and bear markets. As a result of their 
brevity, the top and bottom formations for both of these 
markets will be condensed to two analyses.
To reiterate, the brief bull market of 1961 had its 
inception on July 18, 1961, and culminated on December 12, 
1961. Chart IV-2 illustrates the actions of the odd-lot 
segments at both of these critical junctures in the market. 
Table B-5 in the Appendix contains computations which 
summarize all odd-lot activity. The brief surge upward 
indicated that the technical position was apparently strong.
Ill
I V  J a »  I H t  O I B  l O '  M l l l t  AT M At t . l l  U A t K t l M I *  » * • *  ♦ »
1
!
i
T-ii> kla 'k r i  nf )Pt4
t i*
j
I I1
i i
i
«r
I
i in
i.
i
! I
112
The general odd-lot public sold on balance on the advance
to the market top and illustrated Gilbert Haller's thesis
that a serious "weakness of the majority is their disbelief 
39in change." Haller continues by saying: "Most people do
not expect or prepare for changes in the status quo. They
believe that things will continue indefinitely just as they
40are right now." Apparently, the upward movement was so 
brief that the odd-lotters did not have time to adjust and 
enter the market, even during the latter stages of the move­
ment. As a result, no top was signalled by the actions of 
the general odd-lot public.
Immediately following the market top, there was a 
congestion range present in the market (Standard and Poor's 
Average fluctuated within a range of about two points).
This condition prevailed until the beginning of April, 1962. 
By mid-May, odd-lotters began to purchase on balance heavi­
ly. The technical position of the market was apparently 
weakened substantially, which resulted in one of the 
steepest declines ever witnessed in the stock market. 
Standard and Poor's Composite Average plummetted twenty 
points, or an equivalent drop in the Dow-Jones Industrial 
Average of approximately two hundred points. The brief bear 
market of only 103 days contained a concomitant drop in the
3^Gilbert Haller, The Ha H e r  Theory of Stock Market 
Trends (West Palm Beach, Florida: GilberT-Haller, 1063),
p/'ss:
4°Ibid.
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DJIA of 187.78 points, which meant that this average almost 
reflected representation of the market as a whole.
The odd-lot public continued to buy heavily on balance 
until after mid-July, 1962, well past the market bottom of 
June 26, 1962. The public began heavy on-balance selling 
toward the end of July, and the market began to rise 
appreciably.
The activity of odd-lot short-sellers made the market 
of 1961-62 very difficult to interpret. At the market top 
and during the early stages of the decline, the odd-lot 
shorts were optimistic, as reflected by the depressed Short 
Sales measures. At the same time, the general odd-lot 
public was selling heavily on balance and this indicated 
that they were very pessimistic. However, the Weekly Short 
Sales Ratio and the Short Sales Index reached a peak at 
precisely the market bottom. The odd-lot short sellers were 
incorrect because they increased their activity at the 
lowest point of the market. Consequently, they were short 
as the market turned upward. After the market bottom, both 
indicators signalled that a rally was imminent, and they 
led the market upward.
The odd-lot public reacted to the market of 1966 much 
as they did in 1961-62. chart lv-2 and Table B-6 in the 
Appendix compare the two markets. Odd-lotters sold heavily 
on balance during the entire advance toward the market top 
of January 18, 1966, and thus they did not join the market
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late in the stages of the upward advance. The market of 
1966, however, formed a double top, the second top oc­
cur ing on April 22, 1966. There was a brief period of 
on-balance buying preceding the second market top, but it 
was not a sustained movement by the odd-lotters. The pre­
ceding statement should be qualified, however. The odd- 
lotters bought on balance throughout most of 1966, but the 
buying was slight and not construed to be in excess of the 
normal sales-to-purchases relationship. On May 6, 1967,
Business Week stated that the odd-lotters "started buying
41stocks on balance as of January, 1966," but they failed 
to point out that odd-lotters normally buy on balance to a 
slight extent. Empirical evidence suggests that the normal 
Balance Ratio and Balance Index usually are in the proximity 
of 90, which corresponded with the figures for that particu­
lar time period. Evidence provided by the tables in 
Appendix B is in agreement with this norm of 90. Therefore, 
despite the fact that the statistics revealed slight on- 
balance buying, there was not enough deviation from the norm 
to provide a signal for the subscribers of the odd-lot 
theory.
However, Business week pointed out that "Anyone who 
firmly believes--and staunchly practices--the theory that 
small investors are the world’s biggest suckers has probably
41»Is the Odd-Lotter Always Wrong?" Business Week, 
May 6, 1967, p. 147.
115
42made a killing in the stock market in the past two years.”
The article continues by suggesting that "the public is
lured into the market after a lengthy price r'.se and sells
out after a lengthy decline."4^ Business Week, like Neill,
strongly believes that the public opinion moulders induced
the public to participate at the wrong time. However, one
should recall the words of Wilbur Wright: "The only birds
44that talk are parrots, and they don't fly very high."
Although slight on-balance buying persisted throughout
much of the 1966 market, heavy, sustained on-balance buying
was evidenced by the Balance Ratio and the Balance Index at
the end of July, 1966. Such heavy purchases continued past
the market bottom of October 7, 1966. On-balance buying
continued until the end of October, 1966. Heavy on-balance
selling then became noticeable and led the market upward.
Business Week quotes James Dines, head of a market advisory
service, as saying that "it is essential for the public to
. . 45
remain bearish if a bull market is to retain its virility." 
Dines was also quoted as saying: "The moment the public
starts agreeing with us we are going to start selling out--
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
44W ilbur Wright, as cited by Walter A. Heiby, Live 
Your Life, op. cit., p. 67.
4**"Is the Odd-Lotter Always Wrong?" Business Week,
May 6, 1967, oji. cit., p. 147.
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by the theory of Positive Negativism.”46
The Short Sales indicators confirmed the action of the
Balance indicators, because the Balance indicators decreased
before the market top, as did the Short Sales indicators.
Apparently, there was universal sentiment toward continually
higher prices. Schultz says that the "market direction
tends to reverse about the time that everybody is on board;
47i.e., agreed on which way the market is going." Professor 
Lawrence of Princeton once asked, "Where is that group of 
men with the all-embracing wisdom which will entitle them to 
veto the judgment of the intelligent multitude?"4®
It should be mentioned that the Weekly Short Sales Ratio 
and the Short Sales Index again reached a crest precisely at 
the market bottom, serving as an excellent indicator of a 
reversal of trend. The odd-lot short-sellers were wrong be­
cause they stepped up their activity feverishly at the market 
bottom and were confronted with a sharp upturn in the market.
Summary. The odd-lot indicators employed in the study 
proved excellent in depicting the market junctures studied. 
Although good indications were generally provided at market 
tops and bottoms, the indicators were perhaps more decisive
46Ibid.
47schultz, 0£. c it., p. 173.
48Ibid., p. 113.
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at the bottoms. The clearer picture is the result of the 
public apparently becoming scared and "shaken out" at 
market bottoms.
Empirical evidence revealed by the tables in Appendix B 
confirms the theory that odd-lotters normally buy slightly 
on balance. This study shows that odd-lotters normally 
purchased about 10 shares for every nine sold, resulting in 
a Balance Ratio of .9000. Therefore, it would be incorrect 
to say that odd-lotters were actually buying on balance when 
the Balance indicators were .9000 or slightly higher.
By gaining an understanding of the above norm, one can 
discredit a popular theory developed over the years by the 
uninformed. Many individuals have misconstrued this slight 
on-balance buying phenomenon by believing that the odd- 
lotter is well-informed and quite astute in his perception 
of market movements. However, this study has revealed that 
the odd-lotter has not profited handsomely from his predilec­
tion for buying. In view of the rapidity of turnover of 
odd-lot transactions and the lack of financial acumen at the 
critical junctures, one can hardly contend that slight on- 
balance buying by odd-lotters has benefitted them in the 
aggregate.
The Balance Ratio and the Balance Index revealed that 
the general odd-lot public usually purchased immediately 
before or immediately after a market top and then continued 
their purchases on the decline. The public was not wrong in
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the sense that they purchased at the market bottoms, but 
they were invariably wrong in selling as each market advance 
was launched.
It may be concluded from the study that the Short Sales 
Index is less useful at tops than bottoms. True, it is 
generally low at market tops, but it may have been just as 
low for some time while the market was increasing. Short 
Sales indicators are valuable at market tops primarily be­
cause they reflect the sentiment of a portion of the odd-lot 
public; namely, the odd-lot "shorts." When the sentiment of 
the entire odd-lot public is bullish (Balance and Short 
indicators low), the technician would consider this as a 
bearish signal and begin to liquidate portfolios. Con­
versely, when the odd-lot public is bearish (Balance and 
Short indicators high), the technician knows that the time 
has come to enter the market.
The odd-lot short sellers were usually wrong in that 
they decreased their activity at market tops and on the
initial phases of the decline. In addition, odd-lot short-
sellers were apparently governed by emotion around market 
bottoms because their activity was the greatest at a time 
when they should have been considering a long position. In
most instances the odd-lot short-sellers confirmed the
action of the general odd-lot public, reflecting universal 
sentiment on the part of the public. Public sentiment has 
usually been wrong in this study. In every case, a change 
in public sentiment was very much incorrect and just the
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opposite of what it should have been in order to maximize 
profits on stock trading.
The odd-lot investigation has substantiated the pre­
ceding conclusion that the public is usually wrong at the 
critical junctures of the market. The odd-lot public is 
essentially right during a portion of primary trends, but 
it is wrong or "less correct" in its actions just before 
the market embarks on an important change in trend. Ap­
parently the public has a tendency to buy on weakness and 
sell on strength.
Since the odd-lot theory has proved its merit in an 
application to forecasting aggregate market trends, it 
would perhaps be beneficial to apply the theory to other 
areas. Attention will now be focused on the value of the 
odd-lot theory as it relates to individual issues.
CHAPTER V
AN APPLICATION OF THE ODD-LOT THEORY 
TO INDIVIDUAL SECURITIES
Follow the course opposite to custom 
and you will almost always do well.
-- Jean Jacques Rousseau 
The odd-lot investors, in the aggregate, are generally 
wrong in their analysis of stock market trends. Granville 
has mentioned that odd-lotters do represent the public and 
one should perceive their actions quite carefully. He re­
marks: ". . . public opinion is always considered to be
synonymous with majority opinion."1 Results of this study 
are confirmed by James Dines, who states: "Our most
important device for gauging the market as a whole is an
2
evaluation of public opinion."
Recently, however, there has been much conjecture 
concerning the validity of odd-lot data relating to indi­
vidual securities. Leslie M. Pollack, director of research
Joseph E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market 
Timing For Maximum Profit (Englewood cTTffs, to. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc.^ 1966), p. 80.
2
James Dines, "A Peek is worth Two Finesses," Encyclo­
pedia of Stock Market Techniques (Larchmont, N. Y.: 
Investors Intelligence" Inc., 1965), p. 83.
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at Reynolds & Co., has been quoted as saying that "The 
odd-lot theory may even be more valid for individual
3
stocks than for the over-all market." Since the correla­
tion of odd-lot data and individual securities has been 
tested very little empirically, Pollack's statement mill 
be examined closely.
Methodology. Odd-lot data on individual stocks did
4
not become available until the end of October, 1964. For 
purposes of this study, odd-lot data will be tested from 
June 21, 1965, until June 30, 1967. The dates were selected 
to test the theory in both bull and bear markets. The first 
bull market began on June 28, 1965, and terminated in the 
double top formations of February and April, 1966. A bear 
market was then initiated and lasted until October, 1966.
A bull market started in October, 1966, and lasted through 
the tested period of June, 1967. Pollock's theory can be 
adequately tested during both types of markets. The
3
As cited by Business week, "Is the Odd-Lotter Always 
Wrong?" May 6, 1967, p. 138.
4
Odd-lot data as it relates to individual stocks can 
be found in the Statistical Bulletin, a monthly publication 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Individuals 
may subscribe to the publication for a fee of only $1.50 
per year. In addition, the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, 
located in Chicago, Illinois, publishes an excellent 
weekly advisory service entitled Stock Market Forecast.
This publication likewise provides odd-lot data on the 
recently enlarged SEC list of 100 securities.
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volatility and magnitude of these movements should provide 
ample conclusions concerning any correlation between the 
odd-lot theory and individual securities.
In this study, stocks are tested on a quarterly basis.
Activity of stocks was first examined to determine which
5
issues showed a normal buying-selling relationship for the 
quarter and which stocks showed a preponderance of either 
buying or selling. Issues which showed a preponderance of 
buying were randomly selected for the first quarter, and 
the same procedure was followed for those stocks which were 
sold heavily on balance by the odd-lotters. Stocks were 
randomly selected in order to preclude bias and ensure 
objectivity within the study. After the issues which were 
heavily bought or sold on balance had been randomly selected 
for each quarter, prices of the issues were determined.
Prices at the beginning and ending of each quarter were 
determined and the percent change in each issue was computed.
The average percent change in the market value of the 
stocks tested in each buying and selling (odd-lot) group is 
contrasted with the percent change in Standard and Poor's 
Average. Generally, there are approximately ten stocks 
tested, but the number varies according to the technical 
position of the market, and the sentiment and degree of
5
Empirical evidence in Chapter IV revealed that a 
normal sales-to-purchase relationship by odd-lotters was 
approximately .9000. This relationship is defined as the 
Balance Ratio.
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odd-lot participation. At the start of an advance heavy 
on-balance selling by the odd-lotters is usually present. 
This may result in more than ten of the 75 stocks being 
included in the selling group. Conversely, odd-lotters 
generally purchase as the market declines, which results 
in a greater number of issues heavily bought on-balance. 
During declines, there may be more than ten stocks included 
in the buying group.
Stocks which were sold or purchased heavily on balance 
during the first period were given first priority in the 
selection of stocks for the subsequent quarter. The re­
mainder of the securities was randomly selected to complete 
each group. Such methodology was continued throughout the 
study and was necessary to ascertain how the odd-lot data 
affected a stock over an intermediate trend. If stocks did 
not maintain their previous relationship, they were elimi­
nated from their classification. If stocks switched to the 
opposite side of the buying-selling relationship, they were 
immediately reclassified in the other category to determine 
the effect of public action on the market price of the 
stock.
In the random selection of issues for each group, 
stocks were required to maintain a definite trend of odd- 
lot buying or selling for the duration of the particular 
quarter to qualify for possible selection. Such require­
ments were predicated on the concept that the public buys 
near the top and sells near the bottom. Generally, then,
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stocks which are purchased heavily on balance should 
theoretically be near or at the top of a move and their 
subsequent advancement should be limited, conversely, 
stocks sold heavily on balance are probably close to the 
bottom of a move and a subsequent advance should be immi­
nent, resulting in a substantial advance for the issue.
Two different indicators are employed in the study.
The first is the Quarterly Balance Ratio, which was com­
puted by summing weekly odd-lot sales for the entire 
quarter and then dividing these total sales by the summation 
of weekly odd-lot purchases for the quarter. Although the 
principal is essentially the same as the Weekly Balance 
Ratio employed in the preceding chapter, the time period 
is considerably longer. The difference in the time period 
is irrelevant because the Quarterly Balance Ratio is de­
vised to show the extent and side of the market in which 
the odd-lotters are engaged during the quarter. Since 
stock selection varied from quarter to quarter, no Balance 
Index or moving average was utilized.
The other indicator is technical in nature and is 
termed the relative strength measurement. Edmund and 
Anthony Tabell define relative strength as ", . . the 
ratio of the stock’s price to the Dow-jones Industrial 
Average, at weekly intervaIs. For purposes of this
Edmund w. Tabell and Anthony w. Tabell, "The Case 
For Technical Analysis," The Financial Analysts Journal,
Vol. 20, No. 2 (March-AprXl, 1964), p. 6V.
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study, the relative strength measurement is defined as the 
ratio of the price of the individual security to the price 
of Standard and Poor's composite market average. The use 
of the relative strength measurement becomes readily 
apparent. When the relative strength of a stock is plotted, 
a rising line indicates that a stock is performing better 
than the general market, while a falling line shows the re­
verse .
The relative strength measurements are interpreted by 
means of a table. The table utilized indicates the percent 
change in Standard and Poor's Average and the individual 
issue tested during the course of each quarter. By using 
the odd-lot data in conjunction with the relative strength 
measurement, one can determine whether these two indicators 
can be correlated in the analysis of individual issues.
An analysis of the items selected in the first quarter 
presents some interesting insight into the investigation. 
Since the bull market of 1965 had its inception on June 28, 
1965, the initial analysis encompasses the last week of the 
second quarter. To test the performance of stocks at the 
beginning of the bull market, the third quarter of 1965 was 
expanded to cover a fourteen-week period.
Early Stages of the Advance. The third quarter of 1965 
marked the beginning stages of a strong uptrend in the stock 
market. At the beginning of the advance, odd-lotters in the 
aggregate were selling on balance, which apparently made the 
technical position of the market stronger (oversold).
TABLE V-l
PERFORMANCE OF ODD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967
Heavily Bought Issues________   Heavily Sold Issues
Percent Percent
Balance Price Balance Price
Stock Ratio Change Stock Ratio Change
Third Quarter, 1965 (Standard and Poor1s Change = 5.70 Percent)
Singer Company .7646 - 3.12 Pfizer and Co., Inc. 1.7559 + 14.65
Allied Chem. Corp. .4617 + 1.30 United Aircraft .9147 + 25.69
Gen. Tel. Elect. Corp. .7470 +10.00 American Can 1.5047 + 16.30
Standard Oil (N.J.) .8372 + 0.80 Westinghouse 1.6955 + 15.98
Communic. Satellite + 0.80 Anaconda 1.3281 + 16.40
Marathon Oil Co. .8003 +11.41 Sperry Rand 1.4549 + 22.45
Libby-Oveos Ford .5263 - 1.35 Amer. Tel. & Tel. 1.2021 - 0.74
Avco .5617 + 6.02 Goodyr. Tire & Rub. 2.2370 - 1.51
No. Amer. Aviation .4734 + 6.19 General Elec. Co. 1.7118 + 19.41
Chrysler .7907 + 7.61 Intern. Bus. Mach. 1.2382 + 10.10
United Airlines 1.3946 + 20.83
Average Change + 3.97 Average Change + 14.51
Fourth Quarter, 1965 (Standard and Poor's Change = + 2.61 Percent)
Singer Company .7346 - 4.73 Pfizer and Co., Inc. 1.7764 + 18.33
Allied Chem. Corp. .5754 + 2.07 Chrysler Corp 1.8970 + 1.91
Libby-Owens Ford .7962 + 1.60 American Can Co. 1.7052 + 3.97
Marathon Oil Co. .7221 -10.52 Westinghouse 2.1992 + 9.69
Avco .7324 +13.79 Anaconda 1.4505 + 10.26
No. Amer. Aviation .8187 + 9.01 Sperry Rand 1.0956 + 46.67
Gen. Motors Corp. .6056 - 1.78 Standard Oil (N.J.) 1.3116 + 1.74
Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp. .6083 + 4.25 Aluminum Co. of Am. 2.1558 + 14. 15
RCA .7376 + 4.42 Reynolds Metals Co. 1.5795 + 13.71
Am. Tel. & Tel. .7168 - 9.67 Proctor & Gamble Co. 1.9402 - 2.29
United Airlines 1.1689 + 19.71
Average Change + 0.644 Average change + 12.55
TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF ODD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967
Heavily Bought issues______  Heavily Sold issues
Percent Percent
Balance Price Bala nee Price
Stock Ratio Change Stock Ratio Change
First Quarter, 1966 (Standard and Poor's Change = - 3.20 Percent)
Singer Co. .7820 12.30 Pfizer & Co., Inc. 1.9434 6.61
Allied Chemical Co. .4638 - 10.15 American Can Co. 1.6916 - 3.39
Libby-Owens Ford .4783 + 1.58 Westinghouse Elec. 2.2529 1.41
Marathon Oil Co. .8690 - 2.90 Anaconda Co. 1.5806 + 3.86
Avco .5180 + 12.63 Alum. Co. of America 2.6263 + 13.01
No. Amer. Aviation .6578 - 3.55 Reynolds Metals Co. 1.0798 + 15.37
Gen. Motors Corp. .5109 - 8.53 Goodyr. Tire & Rub. 2.1053 - 6.53
Gen. Tel. & El.Corp .6709 - 8.74 Col. Brdc. System 1.3420 + 16.00
R . C # A . .6524 - 8.05 Swift & Co. 2.7956 + 5.37
American Tel. & Tel. .5592 - 8.54 Royal Dutch Pet Co. 1.6092 - 7.35
Control Data Corp. .6822 - 24.38 United Airlines .9153 + 31.28
Great A. & P. Tea Co .4608 - 8.19
Union Carbide .4157 - 7.72
Average Change — 6.84 Average Change ♦ 5.67
Second Quarter, 1966 (Standard and Poor's Change = - 5.78 Percent)
Singer Co. .7161 - 7.35 Westinghouse Elec. 2.1940 - 18.00
Allied Chemical Corp. .5095 - 12.43 Aluminum Co. of Am. 2.2344 - 5.84
Libby-Owens Ford .6191 - 12.88 Columbia Brdcst. Sys .1.9588 + 12.47
Avco .6150 - 8.77 Swift & Company 3.4516 - 7.98
No. Amer. Aviation .7769 - 16.49 Royal Dutch Pet.Co. 1.4450 - 1.58
Gen. Motors Corp. .5042 - 14.70 Goodyr. Tire & Rubber2.7696 + 14.33
R *C .A. .6527 - 11.04 Commun. Satel. Corp. 1.1727 + 22.62
Amer. Tel. & Tel. .6285 - 4.35 Control Data Corp. 1.2147 + 29,30
Great A. & P. Tea Co .5343 - 6.17 General Elec. Co. 2.1066 - 3.30
Union Carbide .6058 - 6.19 Reynolds Metals Co. 1.4026 - 6.61
Chrysler Corp. .4950 - 20.81 Sears, Roebuck & Co 1.6901 - 2.64
Standard Oil, Calif. .6095 - 12.73 Proctor & Gamble 1.4704 - 2.63
Sperry Rand Corp. 1.0717 + 23.13
Burroughs 1.1932 + 5.43
Average CKTffgg-----------------   T1.16 AV«ag« Change----------------- = 577H
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TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF ODD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967
Heavily Bought Issues__________   Heavily Sold Issues
Percent Percent
Bala nee Pr ice Balance Price
Stock Ratio Change Stock Ratio Change
Third Quarter, 1966 (Standard and Poor's Change = - 10.57 Percent)
Allied Chemical Corp. .4535 - 10.86 Columbia Broad­
Libby-Owens Ford .3986 9.27 casting System 2.4586 - 3.49
Avco .6735 - 18.22 Royal Dutch Pet. Co 1.6600 - 11.58
No. Amer. Aviation .3976 - 15.79 Goodyr. Tire & Rub. 2.9766 - 8.74
Gen. Motors Corp. .5151 9.69 Chase Manhattan Bank 2.1301 - 14.66
R * C . A . .8084 - 15.92 Control Data Corp. 1.4436 - 2.08
Bethlehem Steel Corp. .5192 - 11.88 Sears, Roebuck & Co 1.5402 - 9.30
Amer. Tel. & Tel. .6273 9.09 Proctor & Gamble Co 1.9210 + 10.79
Great A. & P. Tea Co. .5721 - 10.17 Burroughs 1.8240 + 5.82
Sperry Rand .8078 1.35 So. Calif. Edison Co 2.6976 - 5.26
Chrysler Corp. .3040 - 10.22
Reynolds Tobacco Co. .4249 4.95
United Airlines, Inc. .6178 - 24.16
Comm. Satellite Corp. .6866 - 27.09
Standard Oil (Calif) .4915 7.90
Standard Oil (N.J.) .6103 9.14
Average Change 1 12.23 Average Change 1 4.28
TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF ODD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967
Heavily Bought Issues Heavily Sold issues
Percent Percent
Balance Price Balance Price
Stock Ratio Change Stock Ratio Change
Fourth Quarter, 1966 (Standard and Poor's change * + 7.25 Percent)
Allied Chemical Corp. .6561 - 2.55 Pfizer & Co., Inc. 2.8019 + 24.44
Libby-Owens Ford .4648 - 8.43 Aluminum Co. of Am. 2.0480 + 11.17
Avco .5880 + 4.17 Royal Dutch Pet. Co. 2.3868 - 2.93
Gen. Motors Corp. .8038 - 8.67 Chase Manhattan Bank 3.3960 + 28.35
Chrysler Corp. .7127 - 12.14 Proctor & Gamble Co. 1.7400 + 1.39
Reynolds Tobacco Co. .8516 - 1.80 Burroughs Corp. 1.4910 + 20.41
Comm. Satellite Corp. .7411 + 7.79 So. Calif. Edison Co 3.9508 + 15.30
Standard Oil (Calif) .6770 + 2.56 Sperry Rand Corp. 1.0258 + 16.10
U. S. Steel Corp. .8393 - 0.34 Swift & Co. 1.2649 + 18.33
Union Carbide Corp. .5529 - 4.55 Texas Gulf Sulphur 1.3688 + 37.11
Gen. Electric Co. 1.7866 + 5,99
Marathon Oil Co. 5.7357 + 17.84
Westinghouse Elec 2.8591 + 3.84
Reynolds Metal Co. 1.7834 + 22.26
Am. Tel. & Tel. 1.5962 + 8.91
Chlumbia Brd. Syst. 2.2531 + 17.14
United Airlines, Inc. .9830 + 27.75
Average Change - 2.*0 Average Change + 16.08
TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF CDD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967
_____________ Heavily Bought Issues_________  Heavily Sold Issues________
Percent Percent
Balance Price Balance Price
Stock______________________ Ratio Change Stock Ratio Change
Allied Chemical Corp. 
Libby-Owens Ford Co. 
Intern. Harvester Co. 
American Tobacco Co. 
No. Amer. Aviation 
Standard Oil (Calif.) 
Union Carbide Corp. 
Parke, Davis & Co. 
Standard Oil
Average Change + 8.65
Pfizer & Co., Inc. 3.7758 + 5.32
Alum. Co. of America 1.7536 + 14.04
Royal Dutch Pet. Co 1.8492 + 7.81
Chase Manhattan Bank 3.2203 0.0
Proctor & Gamble Co 2.2557 + 18.07
Burroughs Corp. 1.3256 + 41.75
So. Calif. Edison Co 3.5937 + 1.92
Sperry Rand Corp. 1.1654 + 14.78
Avco 5.5680 + 90.56
Texas Gulf Sulphur 1.0057 + 5.53
Gen. Electric Co. 1.2776 - 4.63
Swift & Co. 1.4375 + 16.44
Sears, Roebuck & Co 1.5374 14. 25
R. C. A. 1.3284 + 7.23
Marathon Oil Co. 4.3797 + 10.26
Westinghouse Elec. 1.7393 + 15.16
Bethlehem Steel Corp 1.9208 + 19.75
Amer. Tel. & Tel. 1.5188 + 10.34
Col. Brdcst. System 1.4590 + 12.32
Col. Gas Syst., Inc. 1.4742 + 3.33
Comm. Satellite Corp 1.7029 + 43.32
Control Data Corp. 1.9866 + 62.95
United Airlines, Inc. 1.5710 + 27.05
Average change + 19.4'S
First Quarter, 1967 (Standard and Poor*s Change - + 12.22 Percent)
6617 + 18.38
4322 + 14.67
6704 + 6.09
8631 + 10.63
7276 - 0.78
5451 - 0.21
5087 + 13.62
7501 + 14.49
4139 + 0.99
TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF CDD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUCHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967
Heavily Bought Issues Heavily Sold issues
Percent Percent
Ba la nee Price Balance Price
Stock Ratio Change Stock Ratio Change
Second Quarter, 1967 (Standard and Poor's Change = + 1.57 Percent)
Ampex Corp. .8041 + 16.53 Pfizer & Co., Inc 2.7435 + 5.32
Honeywell, Inc. .8385 - 6.64 Proctor & Gamble Co 2.7684 + 2.22
Union Carbide Corp. .6772 - 6.62 Burroughs Corp. 1.4891 + 15.21
Eastman Kodak Corp. .6814 - 8.56 Sperry Rand Corp. 1.2182 11.07
Litton Industries, inc. .8718 + 2.05 Avco Corp. 1.2841 + 27.38
Standard Oil (Calif.) .7857 - 7.11 Texas Gulf Sulphur 1.3079 + 17.67
Standard Oil (N.J.) .6802 - 3.84 Gen. Electric Co. 1.8248 + 3.12
Singer Co. .4979 + 11.64 Sears, Roebuck & Co 2.3329 + 9.45
North Am. Aviation .6103 + 2.63 R. C , A . 2.3206 + 7.07
Westinghouse Elec. 1.9986 - 1.60
Amer. Tel. & Tel. 1.5067 - 3.59
Bethlehem Steel 1.6369 - 8.51
Comm. Satellite 1.7117 ♦ 25.66
Control Data Corp. 1.4210 + 79.01
Col. Gas Syst.,Inc 1.5478 - 0.92
Gulf Oil Corp. 1.7551 + 5.94
U. S. Steel 1.7166 + 0.57
Woolnorth 2.9264 + 22.95
Average change + 6.422 Average Change + 12.82
Tables derived from ran data provided by the following sources:
"Odd-Lot Customers' Purchases and Sales On the New York Stock Exchange in 75 
Selected Stocks," Statistical Bulletin (U.S. Sec. Exchange Comm., Jan. 1965 - July 1965).
ISL Daily Stock Price Index, N.Y. Stock Exchange (Palo Alto Calif. : Investment
Statistics Lalbora t ory, Inc.'J 1^64-367.
Stock Market Forecast (Chicago, 111.: The Institute of Dynamic Synthesis),
Selecied* issues from September, 1965 to June, 1967.
The wall Street Journal, selected issues from June, 1965 to June, 1967.
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Despite the preponderance of odd-lot selling as a whole, 
several stocks were purchased heavily on balance by the 
odd-lot public.
Table V-l reveals that the third quarter of 1965 
witnesses a 5.70 percent increase in Standard and Poor's 
Average. Ten randomly selected stocks purchased heavily on 
balance (as evidenced by their Balance Ratios) revealed an 
average increase of only 3.97 percent. The performance of 
the general market exceeded the performance of the ten 
stocks purchased heavily by the odd-lot public, but Marathon 
Oil, Chrysler, and North American Aviation (especially low 
Balance Ratio) were exceptions. The theory as a whole was, 
therefore, applicable to the individual securities tested.
The technical position of most stocks tested had apparently 
been weakened considerably by heavy public participation, 
thus restricting the advance of the stocks.
Stocks which were sold heavily on balance by odd-lotters 
during the third quarter of 1965 generally showed better 
advances than the market. Results are shown in Table V-l, 
section 2. Due to heavy on-balance selling by the odd- 
lotters the technician construed the action as a reflection 
on very bearish public sentiment. All Balance Ratios were 
in excess of 100, which means that public selling was heavy. 
The only exception was United Aircraft, whose Balance Ratio 
was slightly above 91. Heavy on-balance selling prevailed 
in the latter issue, however, until the last three weeks of 
the quarter when buying became heavy. At the end of the 
quarter and after an appreciable price rise, the odd-lotters
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purchased heavily on balance and the Balance Ratio de­
clined .
Stocks which were sold heavily on balance during the 
third quarter of 1965 increased an average of 14.51 percent 
during the period, as opposed to an increase of 5.70 per­
cent in Standard and Poor's Average. This tends to illus­
trate that odd-lotter pessimism led to heavy on-balance 
selling and probably accounted for a large increase in the 
stocks tested. Price increases in stocks tested for on- 
balance selling were apparently not due solely to a rising 
stock market but to stronger technical positions caused by 
the stocks becoming oversold. A large portion of the gains 
of stocks purchased heavily on balance during the quarter 
could probably be attributed to a significant rise in the 
general market and not to a strong technical position.
The relative strength measurements proved valuable as 
indicators in both heavily bought and heavily sold stocks 
which were tested. Nine of the eleven stocks sold on 
balance illustrated significant increases in their relative 
strength measurements. Conversely, only five of the ten 
stocks purchased on balance revealed an increasing relative 
strength.
The Fourth Quarter of 1965. The bull market culminated 
in early 1966. The ten stocks tested for heavy on-balance 
buying resulted in an average increase of only 0.84 percent, 
while Standard and Poor's Average advanced 2.61 percent. 
Therefore, the general market outperformed the tested stocks
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which were heavily purchased by the odd-lot public. The 
performance of the issues heavily bought and sold is pre­
sented in Table V-l. There were two notable exceptions to 
the Odd-Lot Theory during the final quarter of 1965, these 
being Avco and North American Aviation. Six of the ten 
stocks showed declining relative strengths, while two other 
stocks showed small increases. Two of the ten stocks pur­
chased heavily by the odd-lotters showed relative strengths 
that increased significantly. In almost every instance, 
stocks which were bought on balance during both quarters 
either declined in price or increased only slightly.
Those stocks which were sold heavily on balance by the 
odd-lot public continued to increase in price in the fourth 
quarter of 1965. In contrast to the 2.61 percent increase 
in Standard and Poor's Average, the eleven stocks tested 
increased an average of 12.53 percent. Practically every 
stock which maintained sustained on-balance selling for the 
duration of the two quarters continued to show appreciable 
rises. Among the most notable were Sperry Rand, United 
Airlines, Westinghouse, and Pfizer Company. Eight of the 
eleven stocks tested for on-balance selling revealed 
strongly increasing relative strengths, while the remaining 
three stocks possessed only slightly decreasing relative 
strengths.
The Beginning of 1966. During the first quarter of 
1966, Standard and Poor's Average dropped 3.20 percent. 
There was a concurrent drop of 6.84 percent in the tested
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stocks which were purchased heavily on balance by the odd- 
lotters. Results are shown in Table V-l, indicating that 
these stocks decreased an amount more than double that of 
the general market.
Ten of the thirteen stocks tested for on-balance buying 
revealed a declining relative strength, while two of the 
remaining three stocks showed a slight increase. Singer, 
RCA, Control Data, and General Motors decreased during the 
early portion of the decline. Balance Ratios for these 
stocks were low during the first quarter, which indicated 
that odd-lotters were optimistic about these stocks. Odd- 
lot sentiment was apparently strong and firmly entrenched 
on the buying side.
Most of the stocks which were sold on balance fared 
well during the decline. Despite the 3.20 percent decline
in Standard and Poor's Average, the tested stocks sold by
odd-lotters advanced 5.67 percent for the quarter. Seven 
of the eleven stocks tested showed increasing relative 
strengths, most of which were very strong advances. Good­
year, Pfizer, and Royal Dutch Petroleum were notable 
failures. Balance Ratios in these issues were high, indi­
cating that odd-lot sentiment was very pessimistic about
the outlook for these stocks.
Arrival of the Bear Market. Stocks purchased on 
balance by the odd-lotters in the second quarter of 1966 
gave credence to the Odd-Lot Theory in its application to 
individual issues. Results of all tested issues during
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the second quarter of 1966 are revealed in Table V-l.
While Standard and Poor's Average decreased 5.78 percent, 
those stocks tested for on-balance buying declined an aver­
age of 11.16 percent. Ten of the eleven issues tested 
showed declining relative strengths, with a decline shown 
in every market price. Several of the issues had previously 
defied the theory by advancing despite heavy odd-lot pur­
chasing. These were Avco, North American Aviation, and 
Libby-Owens Ford. Apparently, the technical position of 
the stock does not necessarily become weak at the inception 
of odd-lot buying.
Numerous blue-chip issues were included in the list of 
heavily-bought stocks, among them General Motors, American 
Telephone, RCA, Standard Oil of California, and Chrysler.
All of these issues dropped significantly. All blue-chip 
issues, with the exception of American Telephone, showed 
declining relative strengths. The performance of blue-chip 
issues is considered because many advisory services and 
brokers recommend the purchase of blue chips during a market 
decline in order to minimize losses. Apparently, if the 
odd-lot public actively purchases a stock, the issue gene­
rally falls. Allied Chemical is an excellent example of a 
weakened technical position because of a sustained buying 
effort on the part of the public. After little fluctuation, 
the security declined more than 10 percent during the 
second quarter.
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While Standard and Poor's Average was declining 5.78 
percent, the stocks tested for on-balance selling advanced 
an average of 4.19 percent. Ten of the fourteen issues 
tested illustrated an increasing relative strength, with 
seven securities showing appreciable price increases. The 
two largest increases were recorded in Communications 
Satellite and Control Data, both movements being accurately 
detected by the odd-lot data. Burroughs, Goodyear, Sperry 
Rand, and Columbia Broadcasting also were strong movers as 
a result of an apparent reinforced technical strength.
Strong odd-lot buying in Control Data and Communications 
Satellite had been associated with depressed prices for the 
issues, but a sharp reversal to the selling side was con­
current with price rises in both issues in the midst of a 
very acute bear market.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company possibly showed the 
effects of sustained, on-balance selling by the odd-lotters. 
The market price of Goodyear fluctuated only slightly during 
the preceding quarter, but a persistent trend of selling 
buoyed the price and the security showed a 14.33 percent 
increase. The action of Goodyear supports previous evidence 
that persistent action by odd-lotters, whether it be buying 
or selling, eventually alters the market price of the stock 
but not necessarily during the same quarter that the trend 
is initiated.
Balance Ratios for the particular issues tested for 
on-balance selling were very high, indicating a strong pessi­
mistic sentiment by the odd-lot public toward these issues.
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A notable exception was registered by Westinghouse 
Electric, which dropped concurrently with the market de­
spite on-balance selling by the odd-lotters.
Depths of the Bear Market. The largest decline in the 
bear market of 1966 occurred in the third quarter as 
Standard and Poor's Average dropped 10.57 percent. Compari­
sons of results from all tested stocks with Standard and 
Poor's Average are shown in Table V-l. The stocks tested 
for on-balance buying (the list exceeded ten because of a 
preponderance of on-balance buying in the aggregate) 
dropped 12.23 percent. Stocks purchased on balance per­
formed worse than the general market, as represented by 
Standard and Poor's Average. Several interesting situations 
were revealed, one of which was Communications Satellite. 
After a substantial price rise, most of the increase was 
nullified by a decrease in market price of 27.09 percent as 
on-balance odd-lot buying became dominant. Avco likewise 
failed to break through previous resistance levels, but it 
was associated with heavy odd-lot participation. After its 
split, United Airlines dropped 24.16 percent. Almost 
immediately after the split, odd-lotters were apparently 
induced into participation by the lower market price.
Sustained odd-lot buying continued in issues such as 
RCA, Allied Chemical, North American Aviation, General 
Motors, standard Oil of New jersey, Chrysler, and General 
Motors. Stepped-up odd-lot activity in each of these issues 
apparently created overbought situations and led to
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significant downward moves.
More issues were tested for on-balance buying than 
selling. The greater number of issues bought resulted from 
a large amount of on-balance buying in the aggregate by the 
odd-lotters who were optimistic during the sharpest decline 
of the bear market.
These issues tested for on-balance selling revealed an 
average decrease of 4.28 percent, as contrasted with a 
10.57 percent decrease in standard and Poor's Average. De­
spite the fact that these issues decreased, stocks sold on 
balance still outperformed the market. Six of the nine 
stocks tested showed an increasing relative strength and 
seemed to resist the pressures of a falling market better 
than securities purchased heavily on balance.
It is interesting to note that Burroughs, which en­
joyed sustained on-balance selling for an extended period, 
continued to move upward. Proctor and Gamble, which had 
dipped slightly in the previous quarter despite on-balance 
selling, began to show the effects of the sustained odd- 
lot selling effort. Proctor and Gamble increased 10.79 
percent in the midst of the incisive bear market which 
eroded the profits of innumerable investors.
The Close of 1966. The stocks tested for on-balance 
buying in the last quarter of 1966 reaffirmed previous 
results of odd-lot purchases and price movements. The bear 
market terminated in October, 1966. The fourth quarter of
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1966 witnessed an over-all increase of 7.25 percent in 
Standard and Poor's Average. By comparison those stocks 
tested for on-balance buying decreased 2.40 percent (see 
Table V—1). Thus, the general market outperformed the 
tested stocks heavily purchased by odd-lotters. Exceptio­
nally low Balance Ratios indicate that public sentiment 
toward these issues was leaning heavily toward optimism.
Of the ten stocks tested for odd-lot buying, nine 
showed a decreasing relative strength. The only exception 
was Communications Satellite. The three-point increase in 
the market price of Communications Satellite indicated 
that this volatile issue was still weak technically.
During the last quarter of 1966, aggregate odd-lot 
selling was substantial and almost coincident with the ad­
vance in the market. Consequently, a large number of 
issues were sold heavily on balance by odd-lotters, which 
led to the testing of some seventeen issues. These tested 
issues revealed an average increase of 16.08 percent, 
while Standard and Poor's Average increased 7.25 percent. 
Once again, issues sold on balance outperformed the market. 
Thirteen of the seventeen issues tested showed increasing 
relative strengths.
United Airlines substantiated odd-lot theorists in 
the fourth quarter of 1966. In the previous quarter, heavy 
odd-lot buying was concurrent with a large dip in the price 
of the issue. During the fourth quarter, however, there 
was a switch to the odd-lot selling side, and the price
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increased by 27.75 percent. CBS, Reynolds Metals,
Burroughs, Texas Gulf Sulphur, Marathon Oil, Swift, Chase 
Manhattan Bank, and Pfirer Company were all large movers 
during the last quarter despite odd-lot selling.
The Beginning of 1967. During the first quarter of 
1967, heavy on-balance selling prevailed in the aggregate 
market. Standard and Poor's Average increased 12.22 percent 
while stocks tested for on-balance buying increased an aver­
age of only 8.65 percent. Much of the increase in these 
stocks probably was attributable to the strong upsurge in 
the general market. The performance of heavily bought and 
sold issues are contrasted with Standard and Poor's Average 
in Table V-l.
Exceptions to the application of the Odd-Lot Theory 
were noted in Allied Chemical, Libby-Owens Fcrd, and Union 
Carbide. Five of the nine issues revealed declining 
relative strengths, while three of the four increased 
relative strengths were slight. Once again, the blue-chip 
Standard Oil stocks (N. J. and California) fared poorly. 
These two stocks certainly make the application of the Odd- 
Lot Theory to individual stocks very credible, especially 
in view of the rising tide in the market. Both Standard 
Oil stocks, as well as the remaining portion of the tested 
stocks, showed very low sales-to-purchases ratios.
Stocks sold on balance during the first quarter of 1967 
increased 19.48 percent while Standard and Poor's Average
142
increased 12.22 percent. Fourteen of the twenty-three 
stocks tested showed strong relative strengths. The Odd- 
Lot Theory seemed to have special application to most of 
these stocks because it provided vital information con­
cerning the technical strength of several stocks which 
immediately began major moves. Perhaps the most interesting 
case among those stocks sold heavily was Avco, a stock which 
had been habitually purchased by odd-lotters in the past. 
Almost immediately after odd-lotters began selling the issue, 
the market price increased 90.56 percent. The high sales- 
to-purchase ratio for Avco indicated that odd-lot sentiment 
for this issue was diametrically opposite to that of the 
preceding quarter. Odd-lotters appeared to be "shaken out" 
of Avco almost simultaneously.
In addition to Avco, the Odd-Lot Theory was helpful in 
explaining large and extended moves by Control Data, 
Burroughs, Communications Satellite, United Airlines, and 
Proctor and Gamble. High Balance Ratios were very much in 
evidence in these issues during the first quarter of 1967. 
These ratios reflected pessimistic sentiment in the issues 
tested, and odd-lotters in the aggregate showed a concurrent 
pessimism as evidenced by a high balance ratio for the total 
market during the initial stages of 1967. High sales-to- 
purchase ratios, used in conjunction with strong relative 
strengths, depicted those issues with extended moves.
The Second Quarter of 1967. During the second quarter 
of 1967, Standard and Poor's Average increased 1.57 percent
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However, those stocks tested for on-balance buying in­
creased only 0.422 percent. Table V-l indicates that 
five of the nine stocks tested showed declining relative 
strength while two of the four remaining securities had 
slightly increasing relative strengths.
While Standard and Poor's Average was increasing 1.57 
percent, the stocks tested for odd-lot selling revealed an 
increased average of 12.82 percent. Sustained on-balance 
selling was maintained in Avco, Burroughs, Control Data, 
and Communications Satellite, with each of these issues 
showing continued price increases. Thirteen of the seven­
teen issues tested showed increasing relative strengths, 
with none of the four remaining issues showing a significant 
price decline.
Summary and Conclusions. Dr. Thomas J. Kewley and
Dr. Richard A. Stevenson recently co-authored an article
in which they concluded that "Little evidence was observed
7
to substantiate the Odd-Lot Theory." The authors also
contended that ". . . odd-lot statistics had little value
8
in predicting price movements for individual companies."
The authors also took exception to Mr. Pollack's earlier
y
Thomas J. Kewley and Richard A. Stevenson, "The Odd- 
Lot Theory as Revealed by Purchase and Sale Statistics for 
Individual Stocks," Financial Analysts journal, Vol. 23,
No. 5 (September-October^ 1967), p. IC5.
8Ibid.
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quoted statement that odd-lot statistics might even be more 
valid for individual securities than for the aggregate
L. * 9market.
The results of this study contradict the contentions 
of Dr. Kewley and Dr. Stevenson. The preceding analysis 
reveals that stocks sold on balance by odd-lotters and 
possessing a strong relative strength measurement are ap­
parently strong stocks technically. Stocks meeting these 
criteria usually are destined for large moves and outperform 
the general market in a rising trend. Stocks sold on 
balance and possessing a strong relative strength will 
usually defy a downward trend and advance or dip only 
slightly. Stocks such as Burroughs, Avco, Control Data, 
Communications Satellite, Control Data, Sperry Rand, and 
Texas Gulf Sulphur substantiate this thesis very well. 
Conversely, stocks sold heavily on balance and possessing 
a decreasing relative strength will decline, but their de­
cline in a falling market is usually restricted. These 
stocks will generally rise in an upward trend.
The study also revealed that stocks purchased heavily 
on balance and possessing a decreasing relative strength 
will generally show large decreases in a downtrend. In an 
uptrend, these stocks are usually restricted in their ad­
vance, probably the result of having been overbought. A 
strong market technically will usually force the price
9Ibid., p. 106.
145
slightly upward, although a quarterly p>eriod may not be 
long enough to depict the reversal of trend. In an upward 
trend, stocks may briefly defy the Theory in cases where 
on-balance selling prevails and the security price drops 
in price or on-balance buying exists and the stock rises.
A few of the tested stocks defied the Theory in a downtrend 
by possessing on-balance selling and the price of the 
security drops, or conversely, a stock is characterized by 
on-balance buying and the price of the security rises.
These stocks which defy the Theory generally do not remain 
in an opposite trend for an extended p>eriod of time because 
their technical position is altered as a result of the 
action of the odd-lot pmblic.
CHAPTER VI
THE SYNTHESIS
There is a time in the price of certain 
products and commodities,
Which, if taken by men at the advance 
leads on to fortune;
And if taken at the decline, leads to 
bankruptcy and ruin.
-- Samuel Benner 
According to Peter Wyckoff, there is a dichotomy which 
is very much in evidence in the stock market. Wyckoff 
asserts :
People who operate in the stock market may be 
divided into two general classes: those possessing
the right knowledge and psychological attitude, the 
so-called insiders, more popularly referred to as 
"They"; and those known collectively as "The Public," 
who lack much training and are further handicapped 
by temperament.^
The professional element of the market has been far 
superior in knowledge and were much better equipped to cope 
with stock market junctures than have the uninformed 
public. This study has substantiated the thesis that the 
public is often victimized by the professional element in 
the market place, especially at critical junctures.
^■Peter Wyckoff, The Psychology of Stock Market Timing 
(Englewood cliffs, New jersey: PrenTTce-Hall” Inc., l^t&y,
p. 90.
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Results of Technics1 Analysis. The technical analysis 
employed in this study has proved to be beneficial. The 
technical approach is very pertinent in determining the 
crux of all stock market analysis*-supply and demand. 
Technical analysis attempts to determine whether a given 
stock is overbought or oversold. if a stock is overbought, 
the public has been optimistic and has usually purchased 
the stock heavily, thus creating a weak technical position. 
Conversely, if a stock is oversold, the public is pessi­
mistic about the chances for future advance by the stock 
and has sold the stock heavily, thus creating a strong 
technical status.
The Monthly Credit and Debit Balances, representing 
the round-lot public and the astute speculators respectively, 
provide an excellent indication of action by both the unin­
formed and informed elements of the stock market. The 
Monthly Credit Balance appears to represent largely the 
uninformed round-lot public who habitually acquires securi­
ties through cash purchases. The Monthly Debit Balance 
represents the margin account, the most potent tool of the 
professional speculator.
Speculators seemingly possess valuable insight which 
enables them to enjoy a much better sense of market timing. 
Speculation appears to rely heavily on the psychology pre­
vailing in the market. In view of observations derived from 
the Contrary Thinking Theory, one could infer that even the 
composite curve of business activity is fundamentally a
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curve of mass psychology which is even in greater evidence 
in the stock market.
The odd-lot data provides the technician with a con­
ceptual framework as to what the odd-lot public is doing as 
opposed to the round-lot public. The Weekly Balance Ratio 
and the Balance Index, a five-week moving average of the 
Balance Ratio, are the most significant ratios employed in 
odd-lot analysis. In addition, the Weekly Short Sales Ratio 
and the Short Sales index, a five-week moving average of the 
Short Sales Ratio, are excellent market tools and are used 
to confirm the actions of the Balance Ratio and the Balance 
index. The Short Sales indicators seemingly had more value 
when applied at market bottoms, but served as helpful tools 
at market tops by confirming the balance indicators.
Exceptional importance should be attached to the odd- 
lot data because they are indicative of public and mass 
psychology. The trend of sentiment indicated by the odd-lot 
balance of trading assumes even more importance than the 
side on which the balance presently lies. Any indicated 
trend of majority sentiment is of the utmost importance 
because a change in public sentiment usually means an 
alteration in the technical position of the market. In 
addition, every change in public sentiment in this study 
proved to be wrong. Consequently, investment moves by the 
odd-lot public were mistimed and ill-advised.
The Odd-Lot Theory had very much merit when correlated 
to the aggregate stock market. In addition, the Theory
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also had virtue in its application to individual securi­
ties. This study determined that the Odd-Lot Theory was 
of special importance when stocks sold heavily on balance 
were used in conjunction with an increasing relative 
strength for the stock. Generally, such stocks proved to 
have extended moves, especially with the presence of an up­
ward trend in the market. Stocks which are continually 
sold or continually purchased on balance have a technical 
position that is being gradually strengthened or slowly 
weakened, thus making these stocks strong candidates for 
advances or declines, respectively.
Stocks heavily purchased on balance will usually show 
a decline, especially during a declining trend. In an up­
ward trend, these stocks may advance, but such moves can 
generally be attributed to a rally in a strong general 
market. In its application to individual securities, the 
Odd-Lot Theory generally proved to be valid. However, the 
Theory did not hold true in every individual case.
From the technical indicators employed in the study, 
one can depict the actions of the professional element, the 
round-lot public, and the odd-lot public. This technical 
analysis has provided the means to determine who is buying 
and who is selling. As a result one should be far removed 
from this sea of confusion which surrounds most investors.
By determining the actions of the odd-lot public, the round- 
lot public, and the professional speculators through these
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technical indicators, much conjecture previously associated 
with predictive actions is thus eliminated.
Resume of Public Conduct at Critical Junctures. The 
public, for the most part, has in the past showed a general 
lack of financial acumen in the stock market. In the 
beginning stages of an advance, the public was usually found 
selling securities rather than purchasing them. Although 
the public was, in many instances, correct in purchasing at 
the bottom, they were essentially incorrect in selling 
securities in the early stages of the advance. The public 
usually did not rejoin the uptrend until the late stages of 
an advance, and they then purchased securities heavily on 
the decline and at the bottom. The round-lot public appeared 
to be more consistent in entering the market before the odd- 
lot public during the late stages of an advance. The odd- 
lot public, although entering on occasion prior to the 
market top, generally rejoined the market at the crest or 
immediately afterward. Thus, the Monthly Credit Balance was 
perhaps a better leading indicator of market tops than were 
the odd-lot indicators. The Monthly Debit Balance was also 
an excellent leading indicator of market tops, as the pro­
fessional element began to retreat when the public groups 
entered. All indicators were excellent and generally 
leading indicators of market bottoms. The concept of con­
vergence was usually exhibited by most indicators at market 
bottoms. Both public groups usually sold securities prior
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to or coincident with a market advance.
The shrewd professional element, or the speculators, 
were usually correct as they purchased at the beginning 
stages of advances and sold out on the market declines. 
Professionals seemingly did not desire to attract an active 
public following during the period when they were accumu­
lating stocks. They obviously preferred to have the public 
participate actively only when prices were substantially 
higher. The professionals provided the supply and the 
public furnished the demand at the crucial market tops. 
Conversely, the professional element furnished the demand 
while the public provided the supply at market bottoms. 
Professionals purchased low and sold high, while the public 
bought high and sold low.
The study did not confirm the idea that the public is 
always wrong. The crowd was generally wrong when it paid 
to be correct. To be more sedate, one could state that the 
crowd is usually wrong at the terminals of trends, but they 
are essentially correct during a portion of the trends.
The public illustrated an apparent skepticism for new trends 
once a juncture had occurred. The public seemingly bases 
its action on hindsight and present situations rather than 
forecasting coming events.
The public apparently projected a gregarious image be­
cause they acted simultaneously and presented unanimity of 
thought. One of the basic indications for conformity by the
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masses is the fact that the public apparently bases con­
tentions on surface indications in the market. A lagging 
business picture is nearly always present in the market, 
making the fundamental picture stronger at a time when the 
technical position of the market usually grows weaker. 
Fundamentals are essential in stock market tactics, but they 
are not helpful in detecting reversals of trend in the stock 
market. Fundamentals should be employed by the "investor" 
category over the "long pull."
In addition to the lagging business picture, the 
moulders of public opinion apparently contribute to the 
mistimed actions of the public. Many brokers, tipsters, and 
writers are likewise uninformed about the market, its 
strengths, and its weaknesses. They perhaps induce much of 
the public participation in the market by making the public 
believe that the market can go no lower and the "new era" 
will last forever.
If one is to formulate an approach to market and 
security analysis, it should be cerebral as opposed to 
mechanical. Newcomers and stock market neophytes should 
always remember that during times of prosperity there has 
been a tendency by the majority to over-speculate. In most 
cases, attempts to subsequently imitate success will usually 
drag those who are oversealous for profits into an abyss 
from which extrication is most difficult.
Excessive reliance on advisory service recommendations 
also appears to contribute heavily to public participation.
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In many instances, some advisory people give good advice, 
on balance, but are usually wrong at key turning points in 
the market. They are apparently analogous to the members 
of the public majority in this respect. Advisory services 
unfortunately seem to provide the public with exactly what 
they wish to hear.
For the most part, published news appears to be of 
scant value because it has long since been discounted. The 
public seems to consider good news an inducement while 
construing bad news to be an excuse to liquidate portfolios. 
This seemed especially true concerning the odd-lot public.
News must be considered in conjunction with the technical 
position of the market. Poor news is ephemeral if the 
market shows technical strength. Unexpected news created 
by "Acts of God" will occasionally affect the market, but 
no one has the omnipotence necessary to accurately forecast 
such developments.
Conelusions. In summation, the public appears to have 
its own folly, spurred on either by the desire for profit, 
quest for excitement, or the mere force of imitation. Pro­
fessionals seem to have more judgment, common sense, and 
market perception. The public will rush in where pro­
fessionals fear to tread. The preceding may be explained be­
cause this technical analysis illustrates that the greatest 
public participation is near and at market tops, because 
rising prices and a judicious dose of propaganda appeal to the
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emotions of the public and induce them to participate.
To avoid failure in the market, one must dismiss group 
forces which distort judgment. In the stock market, 
success in the last analysis, is largely bravery. One must 
have courage in escaping from old ideas and old standards 
and group forces.
To reiterate, the public is not always wrong. In 
essence, the public is generally right during a portion of 
the trends but generally wrong where a market reversal 
occurs.
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TABLE A -1
THE MARKET TOP OF 1956
Monthly
Data
Date
Monthly Debit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Monthly Credit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Stock Average
11-30-54 2202 972 34.24
12-31-54 2388 1019 35.98
1-31-55 2516 1069 36.63
2-28-55 2590 1063 36.76
3-31-55 2652 1022 36.58
4-29-55 2704 973 37.96
5-31-55 2684 928 37. 91
6-30-55 2711 917 41.03
7-29-55 2735 918 43.52
8-31-55 2709 887 43. 18
9-30-55 2805 977 43.67
10-31-55 2749 920 42.34
11-30-55 2758 876 45.51
12-30-55 2791 894 45.48
1-31-56 2786 905 43.82
2-29-56 2739 913 45. 34
3-29-56 2786 960 48.48
4- 6-56 (top) - - 48.85
4-30-56 2788 896 48.38
4-51-56 2809 870 45.20
6-29-56 2786 836 46.97
7-31-56 2812 858 49.39
8- 2-56 (top) - - 49.74
8-31-56 2786 872 47.51
9t28-56 2787 866 45.35
10-31-56 2748 875 45.58
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A .
Heiby, President of the institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -2
THE JUNCTURE OF i960
Monthly
Data
Date
Monthly Debit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Monthly Credit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Standard & Poor's 
*500* Composite 
Stock Average
8-29-58 3012 1103 47.75
9-30-58 3109 1119 50.06
10-31-58 3188 1140 51.33
11-28-58 3245 1148 52.48
12-31-58 3285 1159 55.21
1-30-59 3297 1226 55.42
2-27-59 3253 1196 55.41
3-31-59 3305 1257 55.44
4-30-59 3401 1205 57.59
5-29-59 3385 1188 58.68
6-30-59 3388 1094 58.47
7-31-59 3375 1079 60.51
8-31-59 3270 1035 59.60
9-30-59 3250 1039 56.88
10-30-59 3210 966 57.52
11-30-59 3273 974 58.28
12-31-59 3280 996 59.89
1- 5-60 (top) - - - - - 60.39
1-29-60 3199 998 55.61
2-29-60 3129 981 56. 12
3-31-60 3028 988 55.34
4-29-60 3037 940 44.37
5-31-60 3082 970 55.83
6-30-60 3082 1016 56.92
7-29-60 3003 1018 55.51
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -3
THE MARKET TOP OF 1961
Monthly
Data
Date
Monthly Debit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Monthly Credit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Standard & Poor's 
• 500• Compos i t e 
Stock Average
6-30-60 3082 1016 56.92
7-29-60 3003 1018 55.51
8-31-60 3109 1021 56.96
9-30-60 3137 1059 53.52
10-31-60 3132 1063 53.39
11-30-60 3141 1062 55.54
12-30-60 3222 1135 58. 11
1-31-61 3253 1269 61.78
2-28-61 3358 1392 63.44
3-30-61 3601 1507 65.06
4-28-61 3936 1508 65.31
5-31-61 4060 1453 66.56
6-30-61 4025 1283 64.64
7-31-61 3991 1207 66.76
8-31-61 3972 1208 68.07
9-29-61 3991 1227 66.73
10-31-61 4028 1214 68.62
11-30-61 4141 1213 71. 32
12-12-61 (top) - - - - - - - - 72.64
12-29-61 4259 1219 71.55
1-31-62 4111 1225 68.84
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic 
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -4
THE MARKET TOP OF 1966
Monthly Monthly Debit Monthly Credit Standard & Poor's
Data Balance Balance * 500' Compos ite
Date (Millions) (Millions) Stock Average
12-31-64 5080 1169 84.75
1-29-65 4986 1207 87.56
2-26-65 5007 1254 87.43
3-31-65 5050 1264 86.16
4-30-65 5069 1207 89.11
5-28-65 5128 1208 88.42
6-30-65 5113 1297 84. 12
7-30-65 4863 1233 85.25
8-31-65 4886 1192 87.17
9-30-65 4994 1369 89.90
10-29-65 5073 1475 92.42
11-30-65 5209 1479 91.61
12-31-65 5221 1666 92.20
1-18-66 (top) . . . .
1-31-66 5552 1730 92.88
2-28-66 5753 1765 91.22
3-31-66 5645 1822 89.23
4-29-66 3835 1744 91.06
5-31-66 5768 1839 86.13
6-30-66 5766 1661 84.74
7-29-66 5667 1597 83.60
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter
A. Heiby. President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc ., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -5
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1957
Monthly
Data
Date
Monthly Debit 
Ba lance 
(Millions)
Monthly Credit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Stock Average
3-29-56 2786 960 48.48
4-30-56 2788 896 48.38
5-31-56 2809 870 45.20
6-29-56 2786 836 46.97
7-31-56 2812 858 49.39
8-31-56 2786 872 47.51
9-28-56 2783 866 45.35
10-31-56 2748 835 45,58
11-30-56 2785 822 45.08
12-31-56 2823 881 46.67
1-31-57 2760 866 44.72
2-28-57 2728 828 43.26
3-29-57 2713 820 44. 11
4-30-57 2792 807 45. 74
5-31-57 2794 817 47.91
6-28-57 2887 820 47.37
7-31-57 2885 829 47. 91
8-30-57 2832 816 45.22
9-30-57 2789 838 42.42
10-22-57 (bottom) - - - - - - 38.98
10-31-57 2569 879 41.06
11-29-57 2517 876 41.72
12-31-57 2482 896 39. 99
1-31-58 2487 937 41.70
2-28-58 2580 939 40.84
3-31-58 2665 954 42.10
4-30-58 2735 985 43.44
5-29-58 2857 979 44.09
6-30-58 2920 1047 45.24
7-31-58 3021 1080 47. 19
8-29-58 3012 1103 47.75
9-30-58 3109 1119 50.06
10-31-58 3188 1140 51. 33
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter 
A. Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic 
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -6
THE MARKET BOTTCM OF I960
Monthly
Data
Date
Monthly Debit 
Ba la nee 
(Millions)
Monthly Credit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Standard & Poor's 
'500* Composite 
Stock Average
3-31-59 3305 1257 55.44
4-30-59 3401 1205 57.59
5-29-59 3385 1188 58.68
6-30-59 3388 1094 58.47
7-31-59 3375 1079 60.51
8-31-59 3270 1035 59.60
9-30-59 3250 1039 56.88
10-30-59 3210 966 57.52
11-30-59 3273 974 58.28
12-31-59 3280 996 59.89
1-29-60 3199 998 55.61
2-29-60 3129 981 56.12
3-31-60 3028 988 55.34
4-29-60 3037 940 54. 37
5-31-60 3021 970 55.83
6-30-60 3082 1016 56. 92
7-29-60 3003 1018 55.51
8-31-60 3109 1021 56.96
9-30-60 3137 1059 53.53
10-25-60 (bottom) - - - - - - 52.30
10-31-60 3132 1063 53.39
11-30-60 3141 1062 55.54
12-30-60 3222 1135 58. 11
1-31-61 3253 1269 61.78
2-28-61 3358 1392 63.44
3-30-61 3601 1507 65.06
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
170
TABLE A -7
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1962
Monthly
Data
Date
Monthly Debit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Monthly Credit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Stock Average
4-28-61 3936 1508 65.31
5-31-61 4060 1453 66.56
6-30-61 4025 1283 64.64
7-31-61 3991 1207 66.76
8-31-61 3972 1208 68.07
9-29-31 3991 1227 66.73
10-31-61 4028 1214 68.62
11-30-61 4141 1213 71.32
12-29-61 4259 1219 71.55
1-31-62 4111 1225 68.84
2-28-62 4066 1190 69.96
3-30-62 4083 1154 69.55
4-30-62 4079 1110 65,24
5-31-62 3999 1205 59.63
6-26-62 (bottom) - - - - - - 52.32
6-29-62 3605 1374 34.75
7-31-62 3563 1252 58.23
8-31-62 3773 1130 59. 12
9-28-62 3887 1091 56.27
10-23-62 (bottom) - - - - - - 53.49
10-31-62 3864 1126 56.52
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc,, Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -8
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1966
Monthly
Data
Date
Monthly Debit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Monthly Credit 
Balance 
(Millions)
Standard & Poor's 
*500' Composite 
Stock Average
6-30-65 5113 1297 84.12
7-30-65 4863 1233 64.25
8-31-65 4886 1192 87. 17
9-30-65 4994 1369 89.96
10-29-65 5073 1475 92.42
11-30-65 5209 1479 91.61
12-31-65 5521 1666 92.43
1-31-66 5552 1730 92.88
2-28-66 5753 1765 91.22
3-31-66 5645 1822 89.23
4-29-66 5835 1744 91.06
5-31-66 5768 1839 86.13
6-30-66 5766 1661 84.74
7-29-66 5667 1597 83.60
8-31-66 5610 1595 77.10
9-30-66 5355 1529 76.56
10- 7-66 (bottom) - - - 73.20
10-31-66 5169 1520 80.20
11-30-66 5218 1532 80.45
12-30-66 5329 1637 80.33
1-31-67 5288 1914 86.61
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
A PPENDIX
TABLE B-l
THE DOUBLE TOP OF 1956
Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's Weekly Weekly
Weekly 
Data Date
'500* Composite 
Stock Average
Balance 
Ratio
Ba lance 
Index
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sa 
Index
10-14-55 41.22 .8202 .9406
10-21-55 42.59 .7365 .6251
10-28-55 42.37 .7629 .6123
11-4-55 47.96 .8118 .8386
11-11-55 45.24 .7825 .7828 .6005 .7234
11-18-55 45.54 .8616 .7911 .8679 .7089
11-25-55 45.68 .8776 .8193 .7818 .7402
12-2-55 45 .44 .8831 .8433 .6908 .7559
12-9-55 45.89 .9281 .8666 .4997 . 6881
12-16-55 45.13 . 9404 .8981 .6707 .7022
12-23-55 45.50 .9380 .9134 .6494 .6418
12-30-55 45 .48 .8585 .9096 .3637 .5749
1-6-56 45. 14 .8009 .8932 .2625 .4892
1-13-56 44.67 . 7656 .8607 .4974 .4887
1-20-56 43.22 .7179 .8162 .4055 .4357
1-27-56 43.35 .7438 .7773 .5751 .4208
2-3-56 44.78 .7544 .7565 .4917 .4464
2-10-56 43.64 .8094 .7487 .5983 .4956
2-17-56 44.52 .7677 .7586 .7924 .5546
2-24-56 45.32 .8345 .7820 .4799 .5695
TABLE B-l (CONTINUED)
Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's Weekly Weekly
Weekly '500' Composite Balance Balance Short Sales Short Sales
Data Date Stock Average Ratio Index Ratio Index
3-2-56 45.81 .7748 . 7882 .7931 .6131
3-9-56 46.70 .8764 .8126 .5032 .6154
3-16-56 48.14 .8717 .8384 .4710 .6079
1-23-56 48.83 .8271 .8369 .6357 .5766
3-29-56 48.48 .8868 .8474 1.0072 .6820
4-6-56 48.85 (top) .8067 .8537 (top) .6241 .6482
4-13-56 47.95 .7910 .8367 .4833 .6443
4-20-56 47.76 .7655 .8154 .5170 .6535
4-27-56 47.99 .7595 .8019 .5468 .6357
5-4-56 48.51 .7967 .7839 .4946 .5332
5-11-56 47.12 . 7828 .7791 .3680 .4819
5-18-56 46.39 .7795 .7768 .3986 .4650
5-25-56 44.62 .8633 .7964 .6466 .4909
6-1-56 45.58 .6972 .7839 .7928 .5401
6-8-56 45.14 .7942 .7834 .5673 .5547
6-15-56 46.37 .7777 .7824 .5223 .5855
6-22-56 46.59 .8881 .8041 .3875 .5833
6-29-56 46.97 .8914 .8097 .6384 .5817
7-6-56 48.04 .8123 .8327 .8187 .5868
7-13-56 48.72 .8009 .8341 .6052 .5944
7-20-56 49.35 .84 96 .8485 .4532 .5806
7-27-56 49.08 .7933 .8295 .7618 .6555
8-2-56 49.74 (top) -
8-3-56 49.64 .8110 .8134 .6818 .6641
8-10-56 39.09 .7791 .8068 .6396 .6283
TABLE B-l (CONTINUED)
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Stock Average
Weekly 
Ba la nee 
Ratio
Balance 
I ndex
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sales 
I ndex
8-17-56 48.82 .7880 .8042 .6365 .6346
8-24-56 47.95 .7092 .7761 1.5534 .8546
8-31-56 47.51 .7192 .7613 1.0827 .9188
9-7-56 47.81 .7520 .7495 .5854 .8995
9-14-56 47.21 .7433 .7423 .5430 .8802
9-21-56 46.58 . 6858 .7219 .6897 .8908
9-28-56 45.35 .6901 .7181 .8515 . 7505
10-5-56 46.45 .5903 .6923 1.0085 .7356
10-12-56 47.00 .6773 .6774 .8882 .7962
10-19-56 46.24 .7170 .6721 .8537 .8583
10-26-56 46.27 .6890 .6727 .7438 .8691
11-2-56 46. 98 .6639 .6675 .6323 .8253
11-9-56 46.34 .5946 .6684 .8217 .7897
11-16-56 65.73 .7437 .6816 .9472 .7997
11-23-56 45. 14 .7389 .6860 1.3386 .8976
11-30-56 45.08 .7473 .6977 .6407 .8761
12-7-56 47.04 .7302 .7109 .5163 .8529
12-14-56 46.54 .8460 .7612 .4251 .7736
12-21-56 46.37 .8654 .7856 .4820 .6805
12-28-56 46.56 .8476 .8066 .6060 .5240
1-4-57 46.66 .7239 .8026 .7830 .5625
1-11-57 46.18 .6832 .7932 1.0085 .6609
1-18-57 44.64 .6992 .7639 1.0950 .7951
1-25-57 44.82 . 7057 .7319 1.0843 .9155
2-1-57 44.62 .7011 .7026 .9670 .9877
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President of
the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
TABLE B-2
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1957
Weekly
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor's 
'500* Composite
Weekly 
Balance Ba lance
Weekly 
Short Sales Short Sales
Data Date Stock Average Ratio Index Ratio Index
5-17-57 47. 15 . 9145 1.1581 •
5-24-57 47.21 .9219 .7391
5-31-57 47.43 .8468 .8494
6-7-57 47.65 .8558 .6768
6-14-57 48.15 .8562 .8790 .6173 .8081
6-21-57 47. 15 .8303 .8622 .8139 .7393
6-28-57 47.37 .7394 .8257 .5324 .6980
7-5-57 48.69 .7545 .8072 .5061 .6293
7-12-57 49.08 .8163 .7993 .6013 .6142
7-19-57 48.38 .8108 .7903 .4455 .5798
7-26-57 48.45 . 7844 .7811 .4647 .5100
8-2-57 47.68 .7397 .7811 .9071 .5849
8-9-57 46. 92 .6924 .7687 1.0543 .6946
8-16-57 45.83 .6861 .7427 1.4485 .8640
8-23-57 44.51 .6525 .7110 1.8456 1.1440
8-30-57 45.22 .6527 .6847 2.3590 1.5229
9-6-57 44.68 .6950 .6757 1.1876 1.5790
9-13-57 44.80 .7248 .6822 1.3604 1.6402
9-20-57 43.69 .7290 .6908 1.1712 1.5848
9-27-57 42.55 .7136 .7030 1.8283 1.5813
10-4-57 42.79 .6562 .7037 1.3269 1.3755
10-11-57 40. 94 .7361 .7119 2.3950 1.6164
10-18-57 40.33 .6356 .6941 2.6629 1.8769
10-22-57 38.98 (bottom)- - -
10-25-57 40.59 .6175 .6718 2.8312 2.2088
TABLE B-2 (CONTINUED)
Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's Weekly Weekly
Weekly 
Data Date
'500' Composite 
Stock Average
Balance 
Ratio
Balance 
Index
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sa 
Index
11-1-57 40.44 .6690 .6629 3.2895 2.5011
11-8-57 40.19 .7112 .6739 3.1040 2.8565
11-15-57 40.37 .7616 .6790 2.4309 2.8637
11-22-57 40.87 .8223 .7163 2.3385 2.7988
11-29-57 41.72 .8298 .7588 1.9249 2.6175
12-6-57 41.31 .8813 .8012 1.0968 2.1790
12-13-57 40.73 . 9221 .8434 1.0548 1.7692
12-20-57 39.48 .9371 .8785 1.2729 1.5376
12-27-57 39.78 1.0561 .9253 .7870 1.2273
1-3-58 40.87 .9050 .9403 . 7030 .9829
1-10-58 40.37 .6142 .8869 2.6830 1.3001
1-17-58 41. 10 .6792 .8383 3.7000 1.8292
1-24-58 41.71 . 7727 .8054 2.3653 2.0476
1-31-58 41.70 .7562 .7455 2.2495 2.3383
2-7-58 41.73 .7555 .7156 2.0866 2.6150
2-14-58 41.33 .8688 .7665 2.6234 2.6031
2-21-58 40.88 .8480 .8002 2.8624 2.4356
2-28-58 40.84 .8597 .8176 2.8031 2.5232
3-7-58 42.07 .8212 .8306 1.6621 2.4075
3-14-58 42.33 .8693 .8534 1.9459 2.3792
TABLE B-2 (CONTINUED)
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Stock Average
Weekly
Balance
Ratio
Balance
Index
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sales 
Index
3-21-58 42.42 .8845 .8565 2.0515 2.2648
3-28-38 42.20 .8694 .8608 1.5951 2.0113
4-3-58 41.48 .7660 .8421 2.2099 1.8926
4-11-58 41.74 .8063 .8391 2.1437 1.9890
4-18-58 42.71 .8528 .8304 1.9003 1.9801
4-25-58 43.36 .8418 .8219 1.7301 1.9158
5-2-58 43.69 .8717 .8223 1.6681 1. 9304
5-9-58 44.00 .8667 .8425 1.6112 1.8107
5-16-58 43.36 .9026 .8617 2.5474 1.8914
5-23-58 43.87 1.0090 .8984 1.3391 1.7792
5-29-58 44.09 1.0046 . 9309 . 9918 1.6315
6-6-58 44.64 .9964 .9559 .8195 1.4618
6-13-58 45.02 1.0498 .9925 .8646 1.3125
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President of
the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
TABLE B-3
THE TOP OF I960
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor's 
*500* Composite 
Stock Average
Weekly
Balance
Ratio
Balance 
I ndex
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sales 
Index
7-17-59 59.41 . 9000 .3847
7-24-59 59.65 .8706 .3238
7-29-59 60.62 - - - - -  ■ - -(top) -
7-31-59 60.51 .8423 .3115
8-7-59 59.87 . 8666 .5003
8-14-59 59.29 .8060 .8571 1.0333 .5107
8-21-59 5 9.08 .8328 .8437 .8551 . 6048
8-28-59 59.49 .8707 .8437 .7927 .6986
9-4-59 58. 54 .7816 .8194 1.1739 .8711
9-11-59 57.41 . 7848 .8152 1.8223 1.1355
9-18-59 56.09 .6901 .7920 1.8763 1.3041
9-25-59 56.73 .6491 .7552 2.6656 1.6662
10-2-59 57.20 .6883 .7188 2.0066 1.9089
19-9-59 57.00 .7694 .7163 1.1229 1.8987
10-16-59 57.33 .7755 .7145 1.0044 1.7352
10-27-59 56.56 .8222 . 7409 .9285 1.6567
10-30-59 57.52 .7828 .7676 . 9570 1.2039
11-6-59 57.60 .8360 .7972 .8693 . 9764
11-13-59 56.85 .8288 .8091 .6497 .8818
11-20-59 56. 97 .8371 .8214 .6529 .8115
TABLE B-3 (CONTINUED)
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Stock Average
Weekly
Balance
Rat io
Ba lance 
index
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sales 
Index
11-27-59 57.70 .8997 .8369 .8970 .8052
12-4-59 58.85 .8848 .8573 .4756 .7089
12-11-59 58.88 .9179 .8737 .3786 . 6602
12-18-59 59. 14 .9458 .8971 .4061 .5620
12-24-59 59.00 . 9199 .9106 .3465 .5008
12-31-59 59.89 .8945 .9126 . 2822 .3778
1-5-60 60.39 - - - - - (ma r ke t top) - - - - - - - - - - - -
1-8-60 59.50 .7029 .8762 .3316 .3490
1-15-60 58.38 . 7184 .8363 .5706 .3874
1-22-60 57.38 .7233 .7918 .6558 .4373
1-29-60 55.61 .7695 .7617 .8081 .5297
2-5-60 55. 98 .6532 .7135 1.1636 .7059
2-12-60 55.46 . 7338 .7196 1.4312 .9259
2-19-60 56.24 .7299 .7219 1.3632 1.0844
2-26-60 56. 16 .7798 .7332 .8720 1.1276
3-4-60 54.57 .8228 .7439 1.0602 1.1780
3-11-60 54.24 .7980 . 772 9 1.4229 1.2299
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President
of the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
TABLE B-4 
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1960
Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's Weekly Weekly
Weekly 
Data Date
'5001 Composite 
Stock Average
Balance 
Ratio
Balance 
Index
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short S 
Index
1-8-60 59.50 .7009 .3316
1-15-60 58.38 .7184 .5706
1-22-60 57.38 . 7233 .6558
1-29-60 55.61 .7695 .8081
2-5-60 55.98 .6532 .7135 1.1636 .7059
2-12-60 55.46 .7338 .7196 1.4312 .9259
2-19-60 56.24 .7299 .7219 1.3672 1.0844
2-26-60 56.16 .7798 .7332 .8720 1.1276
3-4-60 54.57 .8228 . 7439 1.0602 1.1780
3-11-60 54.24 .7980 . 7729 1.4229 1.2299
3-18-60 55.01 .8018 .7865 1.2994 1.2035
3-25-60 55. 98 .8558 .8116 .9190 1.1147
4-1-60 55.43 .8990 .8355 .8131 1.1020
4-8-60 56.39 .8868 .8483 .6793 1.0267
4-14-60 56.43 . 9049 .8697 .6911 .8804
4-22-60 55.42 .8684 .8830 .8923 .7990
4-29-60 54.37 .8483 .8815 1.1868 .8525
5-6-60 54.75 .8311 .8679 1.2115 .9322
5-13-60 55.35 . 9040 .8713 1.1067 1.0177
5-20-60 55.83 .9364 .8776 .6357 1.0066
TABLE B-4 (COr^TINUED)
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor’s 
'500' Composite 
Stock Average
Weekly 
Ba lance 
Ratio
Balance 
Index
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Rat io
Short Sales 
Index
5-27-60 55.74 . 9444 .8928 .5923 .9466
6-3-60 56.23 .9432 .9118 .4792 .8051
6-10-60 57.97 .9457 .9347 .3617 .6351
6-17-60 57.44 , 9444 .9428 .4071 .4952
6-24-60 57.68 1.0176 . 9591 .3572 .4395
7-1-60 57.06 . 9354 .9573 .3464 .3901
7-8-60 57.38 . 9280 .9542 .4149 .3775
7-15-60 56.05 .9215 .9494 .6661 .4383
7-22-60 54.72 .8850 .9375 .6470 .4863
7-29-60 55.51 .7913 .8922 1.4930 .7135
8-5-60 55.44 .8860 .8824 1.4165 .9275
8-12-60 56.66 .9117 .8791 .8862 1.0218
9-19-60 57.01 .9581 .8864 .6103 1.0106
8-26-60 57.60 1.0075 .9109 .5446 .9901
9-2-60 57.00 . 9906 . 9508 .7993 .8514
9-9-60 56.11 .9807 .967 9 .9410 .7563
9-16-60 55.11 .9479 .9770 1.0096 .7810
9-23-60 53.90 .8715 .9596 1.5789 .9747
9-30-60 53.52 .9004 . 9382 1.7470 1.2152
10-7-60 54.03 .7858 .8973 1.8723 1.4298
10-14-60 54.86 .8650 .8741 2.1340 1.6684
10-21-60 53.32 .9291 .8704 1.6875 1.8039
10-25-60 52.30 - - - - -  - (bottom) -
10-28-60 53.41 .9208 .8802 2.4593 1.9800
11-4-60 54. 90 .8978 .8797 2.0129 2.0332
TABLE B-4 (CONTINUED)
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Price Average
Weekly
Balance
Ratio
Balance
Index
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sales 
Index
11-11-60 55.87 .8235 .8872 1.8873 2.0362
12-18-60 55.82 .9838 .9110 1.2574 1.8609
11-25-60 56.13 1.0222 .0206 1.0786 1.7391
12-2-60 55.39 1.0650 .9585 .9500 1.4372
12-9-60 56.65 1.1291 1.0047 .9052 1.2157
12-16-60 57.20 1.1688 1.0738 .6271 .9637
12-23-60 57.44 1.2147 1.1200 .3764 .7875
12-30-60 58.11 1.1827 1.1521 .3235 .6364
1-6-61 58.48 .8803 1.1151 .7134 .5891
1-13-61 59.60 .8976 1.0686 .6553 .5391
1-20-61 59.96 .9696 1.0288 .6467 .5431
1-27-61 61.24 .9965 .9852 .5989 .5876
2-3-61 62.22 .9230 .9332 .4669 .6162
2-10-61 61.50 1.0569 .9685 .4762 .5688
2-17-61 62.10 1.0401 .9972 .3972 .5172
2-24-61 62.84 1.0307 1.0094 .3593 .4597
3-3-61 63.95 .9888 1.0079 .3431 .4085
3-10-61 63.48 1.0376 1.0308 .4103 .3972
3-17-61 64.60 1.0132 1.0221 .2872 .3594
3-24-61 64.42 1.0209 1.0182 .2417 .3283
3-30-61 65.06 1.0489 1.0219 .2010 .2967
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President of
the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
TABLE B-5
THE MARKET OF 1961-62
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Price Average
Weekly 
Balance 
Ratio
Ba la nee 
Index
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sales 
Index
12-8-61 72,04 1.0724 .4810
12-12-61 72.64 - - - - ■ - - (top) -
12-15-61 72.01 1.0147 .4378
12-22-61 70.91 1.0757 .3887
12-29-61 71.55 1.0627 .3506
1-5-62 69.66 .8723 1.0196 .7909 .4898
1-12-62 69.61 .8423 .9735 1.1404 .6217
1-19-62 68.75 .9023 .9511 .9190 .7919
1-26-62 68. 13 .9255 .8889 1.1986 .8799
2-2-62 69.81 .9332 .8963 1.1217 1.0341
2-9-62 70.48 .9471 .9113 .7108 1.0181
2-16-62 70.59 1.0358 .9500 .5059 .8912
2-23-62 70.16 1.0317 .9747 .7117 .8317
3-2-62 70.16 1.0059 .9907 .6436 .7387
3-9-62 70.42 1.0182 1.0077 .5827 .6309
3-16-62 70.94 1.0245 1.0232 .4196 .5727
3-23-62 70.45 1.0729 1.0306 .4560 .5627
3-30-62 69.55 1.0205 1.0284 .6704 .5545
4-6-62 68.84 . 9600 1.0192 .9592 . 6176
4-13-62 67.90 .9397 1.0035 1.1135 .7237
TABLE B-5 (CONTINUED)
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Price 
of Standard & Poor's 
'500' Composite 
Price Average
Weekly 
Balance 
Rat io
Balance 
I ndex
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sales 
I ndex
4-19-62 68.59 .8993 . 9785 1.1261 .8650
4-27-62 66.30 .9541 . 9547 1.3957 1.0530
5-4-62 66.24 .8656 .9237 2.1847 1.3558
5-11-62 62 .65 . 9933 . 9304 2.5185 1.6677
5-18-62 67.82 .7588 .8942 3.5272 2.1504
5-25-62 59.47 1.0164 .9176 4.5633 2.8378
6-1-62 59.38 .7292 .8727 2.4080 3.0403
6-8-62 58.45 . 7696 .8535 6.1346 3.8303
6-15-62 55.89 .8884 .8325 6.5628 4.6391
6-22-62 52.68 .8820 .8571 6.4470 5.2231
6-26-62 52.32 - - - - - - (bottom) - - - - - - - - - - - -
6-29-62 54.75 .85.10 .8240 5.9395 5.4983
7-6-62 56. 17 .6784 .8139 5.4675 6.1102
7-13-62 57.83 .7016 .8003 5.0277 5.8889
7-20-62 56.81 .8880 .8002 5.2376 5.6238
7-27-62 57.20 . 9371 .8112 3.5385 5.0521
8-3-62 58. 12 1.0174 .8445 2.7137 4.4070
8-10-62 57.55 1.0141 .9116 2.6267 3.8388
8-17-62 59.01 1.0689 .9851 1.9173 3.2167
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President of
the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
TABLE B-6
THE MARKET OF 1966
Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's Weekly Weekly
Weekly •500* Composite Ba lance Balance Short Sales Short Sales
Data Date Price Average Rat io Index Ratio I ndex
1-7-66 93.14 .8985 .4802
1-14-66 93.50 .8840 .8220
1-18-66 93.95 ........ .(top) .
1-21-66 93.47 .9316 .5852
1-28-66 93.31 .9023 .5652
2-4-66 93.26 .8823 .8997 .8660 .6637
2-11-66 93.81 .9140 .9028 .6145 .6909
2018-66 92.41 .9039 .9007 .6727 .6607
2-25-66 91.14 .9357 .9076 .6314 .6700
3-4-66 89.24 .7924 .8857 .8480 .7265
3-11-66 88.85 .7692 .8630 1.4028 .8339
3-18-66 88.53 .8477 .8498 1.7550 1.0620
3-25-66 89.54 .8340 .8358 1.7727 1.2820
4-1-66 89.94 . 9722 .8431 1.2571 1.4071
4-7-66 91.76 .9176 .8681 .8378 1.4051
4-15-66 91.99 . 9592 .9061 .5956 1.2436
4-22-66 92.27 1.0191 .9404 .7571 1.0441
4-29-66 91.06 .9543 .9645 .7432 .8382
5-6-66 87.84 .9632 .9627 1.4710 .8809
5-13-66 85.47 .7972 .9386 2.4455 1.2026
TABLE B-6 (CONTINUED)
Weekly Closing Price
of Standard and Poor’s Weekly Weekly
Weekly 
Data Date
'500’ Compos ite 
Price Average
Balance 
Rat io
Ba la nee 
Index
Short sales 
Ratio
Short Sa 
I ndex
5-20-66 85.43 .8448 .9157 3.3919 1.7617
5-27-66 87.33 .8003 .8720 2.8157 2.1734
6-3-66 86.06 .9121 .8635 2.8779 2.6004
6-10-66 86.44 .9675 .8644 2.5962 2.8254
6-17-66 86.51 . 9715 .8992 1.7612 2.6885
6-24-66 86.58 .9558 .9214 1.4086 2.2919
7-1-66 85.61 .8314 . 9277 2.7324 2.2752
7-8-66 87.61 .8667 .9186 2.0237 2.1044
7-15-66 87.07 1.0173 . 9285 1.4096 1.8671
7-22-66 85.41 1.0053 . 9353 1.5027 1.8154
7-29-66 83.60 .8121 . 9066 3.1799 2.1692
8-5-66 84.00 .8088 . 9020 2.8609 2.1949
8-12-66 83.17 . 9492 .9185 2.3776 2.2835
8-19-66 79.62 . 9426 . 9036 2.4401 2.4900
8-26-66 76.41 .7605 .8546 3.4199 2.8734
9-2-66 77.42 .7068 .8336 5.1723 3.2719
9-9-66 76.29 .7493 .8217 6.4280 3.9853
9-16-66 79.99 .7193 .7757 4.9855 4.4891
9-23-66 77.67 .7897 . 7451 5.1584 5.0328
9-30-66 76. 56 .7500 .7430 4.7917 5.3071
TABLE B-6 (CONTINUED)
Weekly 
Data Date
Weekly Closing Prices 
of Standard & Poor's 
’ 5001 Composite 
Price Average
Weekly 
Ba lance 
Ratio
Balance
Index
Weekly 
Short Sales 
Ratio
Short Sales 
Index
10-7-66(bottom) 73.20 .7713 .7559 7.6828 5.8092
10-14-66 76.60 .7802 .7621 8.6667 6.2570
10-21-66 78.19 .7851 .7753 6.7339 6.6067
10-28-66 80.24 .8379 .7849 5.7088 6.7167
11-4-66 80.81 .9221 .8193 4.6863 6.6957
11-11-66 81.94 .9518 .8554 3.1008 5.7793
11-18-66 81.26 .9361 .8866 3.0028 4.6465
11-25-66 80.85 1.0801 .9456 3.0058 3.9009
12-2-66 80. 13 1.2066 1.0193 2.1920 3.1975
12-9-66 82.14 1.2001 1.0749 1.3040 2.5210
12-16-66 81.58 1.2512 1.1348 1.4732 2.1955
12-23-66 81.47 1.2665 1.2009 .8422 1.7634
12-30-66 80.33 1.2876 1.2424 .8788 1.3380
1-6-67 82.18 .8715 1.1754 2.0712 1.3139
1-13-67 84.53 1.0227 1.1399 1.6706 1.3872
1-20-67 86.07 1.0363 1.0969 1.2333 1.3392
1-22-67 86.16 1.0862 1.0609 1.2520 1.4212
2-3-67 87.36 1.0912 1.0216 .9828 1.4420
2-10-67 87.63 1,0829 1.0639 .9567 1.2191
2-17-67 87.89 1.0950 1.0738 .9546 1.0759
SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President
of the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicaog, Illinois.
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